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Abstract 
The accountability relationships that surround the operations of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund are a key feature of global politics. These institutions 
continue to face criticism from both state and non-state actors over a perceived 
‘democratic deficit’, and yet the frameworks that we use to investigate the politics of 
accountability in international organisations (IOs) remain underdeveloped. By 
integrating the insights of rationalist and constructivist approaches to the study of 
IOs, this thesis provides clarifications to the conceptual tools available to analysts 
working in this field. In addition, through a dual focus on the politics of shareholder 
and stakeholder accountability at the Bank and Fund, important empirical advances 
are made over previous works. By placing contemporary developments in their 
historical context, a detailed picture is drawn of the dynamics surrounding 
shareholder states’ attempts to control these IOs, and of the processes through which 
relationships between IO staff and in-country stakeholders are reformed. The thesis 
closes by exploring the fruitful cross-pollination between the analysis of the politics of 
accountability and broader works on cosmopolitan global governance, concluding 
that through such a combination the former can be better ‘put to work’, and the real-
world tractability of the latter can be enhanced. 
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Chapter One – The Politics of Accountability in International 
Organisations 
I .0. Introduction 
Accountability is a hot topic for international organisations (IOs). Many IOs face 
criticism from both member states who accuse them of being unresponsive to 
demands for change, and from non-state actors who protest that they are marginalised 
and  ignored within  IOs’  operating  procedures.  Straddling  the  domestic/international 
divide, IOs tend not to fit neatly into accountability structures as traditionally 
conceived.  In one sense, IOs are deeply ‘inside’ countries: their actions undoubtedly 
affect individuals and groups within particular states, often profoundly. However, IOs 
have  remained conspicuously  ‘outside’ of national  level accountability mechanisms, 
often represented only by proxy through the governments that have supported or 
implemented IO-sanctioned policies. Instead, the accountability mechanisms of IOs 
have traditionally remained lodged in the realm of the international: representatives of 
states delegate resources to IOs, and construct systems with which to monitor and 
control their actions. 
 These state-centred channels continue to constitute the predominant 
mechanisms of accountability in the world of IOs. Criticism has long been voiced by 
NGOs regarding the perceived inadequacies of these accountability structures, and 
recently there has been a dramatic increase in the intensity of such challenges. Over 
the last decade, in addition to a ratcheting-up of pressure from NGOs, many 
prominent IOs have attracted unprecedented levels of mass public opposition. The 
violent confrontations between police and demonstrators at the Battle of Seattle in 
1999 represented the apogee of public anger at the so-called  ‘instruments  of 
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globalisation’,  and  in  the  following  years  large  scale  protests  against  institutions  of 
global governance have become commonplace at key global summits. 
These accountability issues are amplified in the cases of the World Bank and 
IMF. In addition to several decades of NGO-based protests, member states have long 
voiced concerns that the institutions have taken on functions beyond their mandates. 
More  recently  ‘everyday  actors’  have  increasingly taken to the streets to protest 
against what they perceive to be the disastrous impact of Bank and Fund engagements 
in their countries (Walton and Seddon 1994). The violence that erupted on the streets 
of Athens in response to the IMF-backed austerity plans illustrate that such popular 
discontent remains a powerful feature of global politics. In addition, it is rare to read a 
politician’s  speech,  a  newspaper’s  editorial,  or  an  NGO’s  publication  about  the 
institutions that lets slip the opportunity to attack them for shortcomings on this front. 
Given the ‘new intrusiveness’ of  the Bank and Fund’s activities (Woods & Narlikar 
2001: 569), there seems little reason to doubt that accountability will remain high on 
the agenda of the international financial institutions. Indeed, the Communiqué 
following the G20 London Summit of 2009 called on member states to explore ways 
of ‘providing strategic direction to the IMF and increasing its accountability’.1 
 Although accountability is very much on the public agenda of the World Bank 
and IMF, it is an issue rarely addressed in academic writing, and the conceptual 
implications  for  the  wider  analysis  of  IOs  that  follow  from  the  ‘politics  of 
accountability’ are yet to be mapped out. The purpose of this thesis is to address this 
lacuna, and more immediately the purpose of this chapter is to establish a conceptual 
framework around which the politics of accountability can be explored. In order to 
draw together two previously disparate conceptualisations of the accountability of 
                                                     
1 See G20 London Summit Official Website, at 
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409. 
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IOs, in the form of the shareholder and stakeholder variants, I advance a model that 
captures the complex and dynamic relationships surrounding the operations of these 
IOs. In relation to shareholder accountability, I examine both the mechanisms through 
which states seek to control the activities of the Bank and Fund, and the process 
through which  their understanding of what constitutes  ‘appropriate’  IO behaviour  is 
altered. In relation to stakeholder accountability, I focus on the micro-processes 
through which the channels of interaction between the IOs and in-country groups are 
formed and re-formed over time. In both cases, by placing contemporary 
developments in their historical context, a detailed picture of the currently unfolding 
changes is presented. 
There is a tendency in existing analyses to examine the accountability 
practices of  the Bank,  the Fund,  and  IOs  in general against  ‘gold  standard’ models. 
The standards against which the Bank and Fund are assessed commonly remain 
implicit or under-explored (e.g. Stewart and Wang 2006, Craig and Porter 2002, 
Grusky 2000). Although such works often generate important empirical insights, their 
conceptual utility is by definition limited. In contrast, a number of analyses have 
sought to draw on cosmopolitan political theory to explicitly sketch out yardsticks 
against which to assess the democratic credentials of IOs (e.g. Archibugi 2008, 
Habermas 2001, Held 1996, Archibugi 1995, Falk 1995, Held 1995). With their 
firmly grounded normative positions, these latter works offer a fruitful point of 
engagement for this examination of the politics of accountability at the World Bank 
and IMF. The thesis closes with an exploration of this common ground, concluding 
that such a combination allows for the central insights into the dynamics surrounding 
the  politics  of  accountability  to  be  better  ‘put  to  work’,  and  for  the  real-world 
tractability of works on cosmopolitan global governance to be enhanced. In addition, 
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by exploring ‘international organisations and the construction of governance space’, a 
template is put forward around which the democratic credentials of the Bank and 
Fund can be assessed.  
 Recent reforms in the engagements of the Bank and Fund with low-income 
countries provide a fascinating insight into the politics of accountability at these IOs, 
which shed light onto a number of contemporary trends. The most high profile 
attempt  to  clarify  the  grounds  of  the  Bank  and  Fund’s  interactions  with  indebted 
countries has been the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative, which in 
1999 sought to both introduce a mainstreaming of poverty reduction and embed a 
‘participatory  turn’  in  the  formation  of  restructuring  programmes.  In  relation  to  the 
former, we see that significant efforts are being made by creditor states to hold the 
World Bank accountable according to a poverty reduction metric, whereas with the 
Fund disagreements between creditors as to the appropriate goals of the organisation 
have impeded the embedding of such a framework. Regarding the participatory 
‘process  conditionality’  of  the  PRSP  initiative, 2  this development represents a 
fundamental shift in the rules of engagement of the Bank and Fund. Whereas 
previously  domestic  politics  was  officially  ‘off-limits’,  now  the  organisations  are 
formally pressing national governments to establish political processes that 
incorporate the active participation of a broad range of in-country groups. Alongside 
this focus on reforming national-level mechanisms of stakeholder accountability, 
recent years have also witnessed significant (albeit incremental) changes to the 
channels through which the Bank and Fund engage directly with in-country groups. 
The main body of the thesis is dedicated to exploring both the processes through 
which changes occur in the (direct and indirect) mechanisms through which the Bank 
                                                     
2 The term ‘process condition’ is used by Frazer (2005: 318) to describe the participatory requirement 
within the PRSP initiative. 
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and the Fund engage with stakeholder groups, and the contemporary dynamics 
surrounding shareholder states’ attempts to control these IOs. 
 As well as exploring the dynamics within the politics of shareholder and 
stakeholder accountability, the thesis also reflects upon the dynamics between these 
relationships. By linking up the analysis of the politics of accountability with 
contemporary debates in cosmopolitan political theory, I show that there are inherent 
tensions within the three-way relationship between the IOs, their major creditors, and 
the recipients of their assistance programmes. Whilst the Bank and Fund are 
providing material resources and information to empower domestic populations, the 
pre-existing operational goals that underpin the activities of these complex 
bureaucratic  organisations  serve  ultimately  to  restrict  domestic  actors’  capacity  for 
autonomous action. With creditor states’ monitoring frameworks limiting the potential 
of domestic groups to set key policy-goals, shareholder control continues to crowd-
out stakeholder empowerment. 
The goal of this thesis is ambitious: to advance a conceptual framework 
capable of tracking the politics of accountability surrounding the World Bank and 
IMF’s  engagements with low-income countries, and to present a detailed picture of 
contemporary developments therein. In order to keep this ambitious goal attainable, it 
is necessary at the outset to clearly delineate the general parameters of the study. 
Concerning the empirical focus of the study, analysis is focussed on the reforms to 
Bank and Fund practices that have occurred in relation to International Development 
Association (IDA) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) lending. The 
PRSP initiative, launched in 1999 with much fanfare regarding the mainstreaming of 
poverty reduction and participation by the Bank and Fund, is of particular importance 
here, and particular attention is paid to the 24 countries that have reached ‘completion 
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point’  in  the  initiative.3 These countries, 20 in Africa and four in Central and South 
America, have a history of both a heavy reliance on Bank and Fund resources, and of 
making slow progress in terms of economic development. The impact of World Bank 
and IMF programmes on economic development continues to be hotly contested, and, 
as the thesis shows, the question of how to measure and improve the effectiveness of 
the performance of these IOs remains at the centre of the politics of accountability at 
these IOs. 
In terms of the conceptualisation of ‘accountability’ within the study, although 
the exploration of the contestability of the term is at the centre of the investigation, 
two general  strands  are  focused on. The  first,  ‘shareholder’  accountability,  refers  to 
the relationship between the IOs and their major creditors,4 and can by explored by 
integrating rationalist and constructivist approaches to the analysis of IOs. The 
second,  ‘stakeholder’  accountability,  refers  to  the  relationship  between  the  IOs  and 
populations in borrowing countries affected by the programmes that they support. 
Although these theoretical approaches have not previously been applied to this branch 
of IO accountability, rationalist and constructivist insights can again be drawn upon to 
bring clarity to the issue, and to allow for a holistic analysis of the politics of 
accountability in the Bank and Fund to be undertaken.  
The remainder of the opening chapter is structured as follows. In the second 
section, in order to clearly situate the theoretical contribution made by this 
investigation of the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF, I outline the 
                                                     
3 As of January 2009, these countries were Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia. See IMF official website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm 
(accessed 27 March, 2009). 
4 There is by necessity a degree of flexibility around the term ‘shareholder’. In the case of the Bank the 
focus is on the US and key IDA donors; at the Fund, the focus is on the US and key European member 
states. 
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current  ‘state  of  the  art’  regarding  the  analysis  of  IO  accountability.  In  the  third 
section I begin to lay the foundations of the analytic framework around which the 
thesis is structured. This is initially done through an investigation of the social 
relationships  that  are  implied  by  the  concept  of  ‘accountability’,  before  the 
shareholder and stakeholder variants are outlined more fully. In the fourth section I set 
out the central analytic framework in detail. At core, the framework seeks to integrate 
rationalist and constructivist approaches to the study of IOs by drawing on the 
‘morphogenic’  model  of  change  to  highlight  the  fundamental  compatibility of the 
approaches. The penultimate section of the chapter serves to clarify the 
epistemological position upon which the study is founded, which I characterise as 
following a broadly pragmatist approach. Finally, the concluding section of the 
chapter provides an overview of chapters 2 to 6, which constitute the main body of the 
thesis. 
 
I .1. Competing visions of I O accountability 
The World Bank and IMF, it is fair to say, are high profile international organisations, 
with significant material power in the international economy. Both institutions 
directly control the flows of substantial volumes of resources to member countries. At 
the close of financial year 2008-09 the IMF had 44 active arrangements with member 
countries, under which a total of US$42 billion were committed;5 at the World Bank 
Group, total lending commitments made by the IBRD and IDA over the period came 
to US$47 billion.6 In addition to the practice of tying these resources to particular 
projects and policy programmes, the IOs also exert a more subtle form of influence. 
                                                     
5 IMF Annual Report 2009, Appendix Table II.2. See IMF Official Website, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/pdf/a2.pdf.  
6 See World Bank Official Website, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22233771~pagePK:34370~pi
PK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.  
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Through the unparalleled concentration of institutional expertise at the organisations, 
the Bank and Fund wield a formidable agenda-setting capability in the fields of 
development and balance of payments respectively (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 13, 
Mawdsley and Rigg 2002: 93).  
Within academic and policy-making circles, debates have long raged as to the 
impact of Bank-supported projects and Fund-supported programmes on borrowing 
countries. Regarding the World Bank, works have commonly sought to bring to 
attention prominent examples of the harmful social and environmental consequences 
of large-scale developments (e.g. Fox 2000, Fox and Brown 2000, Mehta 1994, Rich 
1994, Hancock 1989). Regarding the Fund, meta-analyses of the effect on economic 
growth of policy conditionality exist alongside case studies of particular country 
programmes (e.g. Barro 2005, Bird 2004, Boorman 2000, Bird 1995, Killick 1995). 
Closely linked to these controversies over their effectiveness, disputes over the 
appropriateness of the accountability structures surrounding the IOs has also been rife. 
Owing to the size and complexity of the Bank and Fund, and the fact that their 
operations are conducted across global, national, and local sites of authority, opinions 
on the matter span a wide continuum. On the one hand, they have been characterised 
as acting at the behest of the advanced industrialised states (and particularly the US), 
who are said to employ the IOs in pursuit of strategic interests (Andersen et al 2006, 
Stone 2004); on the other, they are characterised as rogue institutions, acting only to 
further their own narrow bureaucratic interests (Vaubel 1996). Before stepping into 
this heated area of dispute, it is useful to take a diversion into the established literature 
on accountability and IOs. By so doing, the foundations can begin to be laid for the 
analytic framework around which the following investigations of the politics of 
accountability at the World Bank and IMF are structured. 
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With the profusion of writings on the role of international institutions in 
contemporary  IPE,  the  issue  of  accountability  has  in  recent  years  ‘gone  global’ 
(Benner and Witte 2004: 1). The dominant strain of writing on accountability beyond 
the national level presents an image of disjuncture between state-based accountability 
mechanisms and increasingly global power structures (Chesterman 2008, McGrew 
1997, Held 1995, Ohmae 1995). Globalised networks of production, trade, and 
finance are said to leave communities at the mercy of forces over which they have 
little control. The problem is summed-up succinctly by McGrew (1997: 231), who 
argues  that  the  contemporary  era  is  ‘an  epoch  in  which  the  scale  of  human  social 
organisation no longer appears to coincide with national territorial boundaries’. The 
position of IOs within this complex milieu is heavily contested, with works examining 
the issue falling broadly into two camps. The dividing line running between the two 
groups regards which actors are seen to constitute the accountability relationship. On 
the one side are works that concentrate on the relationship between states and IOs, on 
the other those that concentrate on the relationship between stakeholders and IOs. 
Of the two forms of analyses, those investigating the relationship between 
stakeholders and IOs have been the more prominent. The contrast between the deeply 
embedded mechanisms through which states and IOs interact and the comparatively 
novel attempts by IOs to increase their engagements with stakeholders explains this 
difference.  The  attempts  by  states  to  influence  IOs’  behaviour  is  old  news;  IOs’ 
moves to incorporate a wider range of actors into decision-making processes, which 
are often imperfect and so controversial, attract a greater degree of interest. Works 
examining developments in the area of stakeholder accountability are in the main 
critical of the performance of international organisations, with judgements being 
reached by assessing IOs against either a theoretically derived aspirational model (e.g. 
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Held 2009, Aksu 2007, Archibugi 2004), or against more general standards of best 
practice (e.g. Glenn 2008, Scholte 2001). 
Drawing on cosmopolitan-inspired beliefs in the advances to be had by 
attempting to solve collective problems through communication and persuasion,7 the 
more theoretically driven analyses of stakeholder accountability in IOs are structured 
with an a priori belief in the benefits to be had from broadening the available 
channels of interaction. The following assessment is characteristic of such work: 
While mechanisms exist in principle to provide a measure of accountability in 
some of these [international] organisations... the nature of their accountability, 
if any, to the ordinary citizens of the nation-states in which they operate, 
remains an acute and pressing question (Held 1995: 139). 
 
Directly participatory mechanisms of stakeholder accountability are presented as the 
model to be emulated. IOs that fail the test are presented with repeated injunctions to 
reform (e.g. Goldblatt 1997, Dryzek 2007, Held 2009).8 Measurement of the real 
world against an ideal standard to encourage a closing of the (inevitable) performance 
gap is a long established practice, and indeed the advocacy of any reform agenda 
relies on such a process. However, without the addition of a close analysis of the 
current stakeholder accountability practices of particular IOs, and of the process 
through which changes occur in such activities, the value of such works is restricted.9  
In contrast to the assessments lodged firmly in the realm of the ideal, there is 
an established strain of writing that takes a more context-sensitive approach to the 
issue of stakeholder accountability in IOs. By examining specific instances of IO 
performance, such works provide a valuable insight into  institutions’  current 
practices. Although the trend is not universal, most of these works contain a critical 
                                                     
7 As formulated most notably by Habermas (1985). 
8 For an overview of cosmopolitan critiques of global governance, see Archibugi (2004). 
9 As is shown in chapter six, this shortcoming can be addressed by linking-up the insights of the 
politics of accountability with these comprehensively structured normative arguments. 
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edge.10 Along these lines, critical reflections on the practices of the United Nations 
(Henry 2009), the African Development Bank (Hunter and Clark 1995), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (Nelson 2000) have been presented. However, the 
institutions in receipt of the highest concentration of such critical analysis have been 
the World Bank and IMF, sparked in recent times by their operationalisation of the 
participatory component of the PRSP initiative. Amongst such works, attention has 
been placed on both individual country experiences (World Development Movement 
2006, Craig and Porter 2002), and on the overall contribution of the Bank and Fund to 
the promotion of in-country participatory processes (Blackmon 2008, Stewart and 
Wang 2006, Grusky 2000). This seam of literature on stakeholder accountability in 
IOs is undoubtedly empirically rich, and contributes to the valuable project of 
illuminating  IOs’  current  practices.  However,  the  yardstick  with  which  IO 
performance is measured remains problematic. In the case of Bank- and Fund-specific 
literature, for example, although most works criticise the IOs for an insufficient 
contribution to the realisation of satisfactory participation, they can be unclear about 
the standards that should be met. Although the insights of such literature are drawn 
upon in order to help elucidate the contemporary practices of the Bank and Fund, it is 
the more theoretically informed cosmopolitan works that are returned to in the closing 
chapter of the thesis.  
As is shown in the concluding chapter, combining the insights regarding the 
factors that combine to (re-)shape the mechanisms of interaction between the IOs and 
in-country stakeholders with the insights of these cosmopolitan-based works is a 
mutually beneficial venture. The analysis of the politics of accountability can be 
linked-up to the strong normative commitment within the cosmopolitan approach, and 
                                                     
10 There are, for instance, a number of legalistic analyses of formal changes to the operations of IOs. 
See, for example, Bradlow (2005), and Suzuki and Nanwani (2006). 
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the insights regarding detailed processes of change can be used to increase the extent 
to which cosmopolitan-inspired calls for reform remain in the ‘realm of the possible’. 
The conceptual framework around which the politics of stakeholder accountability at 
the Bank and Fund are examined is outlined in the following sections of the chapter. 
For now, the existing literature on the analysis of shareholder accountability is turned 
to. 
Within the analysis of international organisations it has long been held that 
states call the shots, and it is often taken for granted that the state-IO accountability 
relationship is a natural aspect of world politics. This state-centric, shareholder view 
of accountability is understandable: international organisations are, in an immediate 
sense, the children of states, conceived through the act of granting a mandate and 
supported by resources from the founding parties. However, the conceptualisation of 
the role and the degree of agency of IOs themselves in this relationship has shifted 
dramatically. The first wave of analyses of transnational regimes, which emerged in 
the late 1970s, tended to downplay the significance of the institutional structures at 
the centre of these regimes. Instead, the central disputes focussed on what motivated 
state actors to participate in such arrangements. Within the so-called ‘neo-neo debate’, 
those on the liberalist side saw states cooperating with a view to maximising the 
individual gains, while those on the realist side argued that the anarchical nature of 
the international system compelled states to keep a firm eye on the relative 
distribution of the fruits of cooperation (Lamy 2001: 193-5, Keohane 1986: 10-25). 
In more recent years attention has turned onto IOs themselves, as rationalist 
and constructivist scholarship has taken centre stage. Although not framed explicitly 
in  terms  of  ‘accountability’,  rationalist-based analyses have sought to examine the 
features of state-IO relationships that inhibit or enhance the ability of states to control 
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IOs. The working assumption of such works has been,  if not ‘he that pays the piper 
calls  the  tune’,  then  at  least  that  the  core  problematique of enquiry should be the 
investigation of conditions that affect the extent to which this is the case (e.g. 
Hawkins et al 2006, Lake 2006, Bauer 2002). Often presented in opposition to the 
rationalist approach, constructivist works have tended to focus on exploring the more 
subtle forms of power exerted by IOs, through which they are able to manufacture 
autonomy from their state-masters. For constructivists, a key mechanism of influence 
lies in their ability to fix the understanding of both policy problems and the 
appropriate responses to these issues. In order to effectively exercise this influence, it 
is said that IOs have to work to establish and maintain a position of expertise on 
pressing issues of global governance (e.g. Weaver 2008, Barnett and Finnemore 
2004). Both approaches are drawn upon in the analytic framework used to structure 
this investigation of the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF, and as 
such are outlined fully in the following sections of the chapter. 
The conceptual framework that I advance in order to comprehensively explore 
the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF contributes to an innovative 
line of work drawing on the insights of both rationalist and constructivist approaches 
to the study of IOs (Vetterlein 2007, Weaver and Park 2007, Nielson et al 2006, 
Jupille et al 2003). The framework allows for the subtle power relationships between 
major creditor states and IOs to be investigated, and for the interplay between internal 
and external factors to be coherently examined in the dynamics surrounding changes 
in the mechanisms of stakeholder accountability. Before this framework is outlined in 
depth, an elucidation of the meaning of the term ‘accountability’ is provided. Such a 
clarification is a vital, albeit occasionally overlooked, component of an investigation 
into accountability in the world of IOs. 
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I .2. A historical account of accountability 
At first sight deceptively straightforward, the concept of accountability as in fact 
remarkably elusive. Although standard definitions reveal important aspects of the 
social relationships implied by the term, they fail to capture the multiplicity of forms 
that accountability relations can take. In addition, the role played by key actors in the 
granting of legitimacy to accountability mechanisms is often underplayed. These 
lacunae are particularly serious in relation to the analysis of IOs, where not only do 
multiple accountability practices commonly cut across overlapping levels of 
governance, but also where the institutions themselves often play a central part in 
controlling and sanctioning changes in accountability practices. By briefly examining 
the etymology of the term, it is possible to uncover the core properties of 
accountability; however, in order for a comprehensive understanding of accountability 
in the world of IOs to be put forward, it is necessary for a number of appendages to be 
made. 
In everyday language, ‘accountability’ is used synonymously with terms such 
as ‘responsibility’ and ‘culpability’, and is taken to refer to the requirement that in a 
given context an individual explain or justify their actions to an appropriate audience. 
When accountability is considered in an explicitly political context, it is broadly held 
to be ‘a process where a person or group of people are required to present an account 
of their activities and the way in which they have or have not discharged their duties’ 
(Lawton and Rose 1994: 19). The existence of sanctions or penalties is also 
commonly held to be central to the idea of accountability: when the discharge of 
duties has been found to not accord with established expectations, some form of 
remedial action – be it the provision of an explanation, a policy change, or a 
‘sacrificial’ resignation – is required (Flinders 2001: 12). A history of the word’s verb 
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stem shows that, over time, three key aspects have been sedimented into the meaning 
of the word. These are the exchange of information, the existence of a relational 
hierarchy, and the potential for sanctions to be deployed by the holder of power to 
alter the behaviour of the agent held to account. 
 In its early use, to account meant literally to ‘reckon, count-up, or calculate’, 
and was primarily applicable to fiscal practices (Wagner 1990: 7). However, far from 
being a mechanical, objective activity, accounting is said to have been a powerfully 
constitutive act that served to make sense of the complexities of the social world. 
Indeed, there is an intimate connection between accounting and the construction of 
the apotheosis of information, the fact. According to Poovey: 
Early-modern bookkeeping was one of the first practices where a proto-type of 
the modern fact was generated. In contrast to ancient facts, which referred to 
metaphysical essences, modern facts are assumed to reflect things that actually 
exist, and they are recorded in a language that seems transparent (1998: 29). 
 
Thus, when we look to the etymological base of accountability, we find information, 
and particularly reliable information about an aspect of the social world, to be at the 
centre. 
 As accountability migrated into the world of formal politics the term gained an 
explicitly inter-personal aspect, and in doing so became imbued with a secondary set 
of power relations, beyond the constitutive. Under the medieval structures of 
government, founded on the principle of the divine right of the monarch, 
accountability began to gain a connotation  of  social  control.  A  ‘system  of 
accountability’ evolved centred around the Court of  the Exchequer, whose members 
ensured that anyone who owed outstanding monies to the King faced a judicial trial 
and would face appropriate sanctions to secure payment (Horowitz 1999). Under the 
threat of coercive action, subjects whose accounts did not tally with official reckoning 
were compelled to make amends.  
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 The connection between accountability, information, and control has remained 
through to the modern period. With the shifting of the basis for governmental 
legitimacy from monarchy to democracy, accountability began to acquire important 
aspects of its contemporary meaning. Growing consensus that the legitimate exercise 
of governmental power rested on the consent of the governed led to a revolution in the 
understanding of accountability. In the place of the top-down model, in which 
subjects were called to account by the government, there emerged a bottom-up model, 
in which governments were called to account by citizens. The shift is captured well in 
the writings of Locke, who advocated a shift from the ‘divine right of royalty’ to the 
‘divine royalty of right’. It was for Locke the masses that had the authority to judge 
whether governments were adequately meeting what they held to be right and just 
goals: if they judged not, then the people could dispense with the existing government 
(Held 1996: 80).  
 In complex modern societies, a plethora of mechanisms have emerged in order 
to ensure that governance structures  are,  in  the  final  reckoning,  accountable  to  ‘the 
people’. At  the most  general  level,  accountability  is  linked  to  the  revocability  of  a 
mandate: however, this blunt instrument is supplemented by a wide range of auxiliary 
mechanisms. These mechanisms can be embedded in the formal structures of 
government through, for example, ministerial responsibility, select committees, and 
judicial  review,  or  in  the  less  direct  contractual  relationships  between  ‘next-step’ 
service providers and consumer-citizens (Flinders 2001: 12, 20-27). Despite the 
multiplicity of forms, these accountability mechanisms remain united by their 
common foundation upon the dual principles of the provision of information between 
hierarchically arranged actors, and the prospect of one actor legitimately exercising 
control over another. 
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Such definitions of accountability have been transplanted directly into 
analyses of IOs. Stiglitz (2003: 11), for example, suggests in relation to the World 
Bank and IMF that accountability implies that:  
[The IOs] are given certain objectives; there is a reliable way of assessing 
whether they have met those objectives; consequences exist for both the case 
in which they have done what they were supposed to do and the case in which 
they have not done so. 
 
Although such understandings do capture part of the accountability relationship, 
specifically the exchange of information and the legitimate exercise of control, they 
leave a number of its central aspects unexamined. In relation to international 
organisations these lacunae apply mainly to the field of stakeholder accountability, 
although subtle aspects of the shareholder accountability relationship are also missed 
by these conventional accounts. 
 By emphasising the exchange of information and the exercise of legitimate 
control within a settled hierarchical arrangement, established understandings of 
accountability capture the essence of the state-IO relationship relatively well. 
Mechanisms of shareholder accountability tend to be built into the formal 
organisational structures of IOs, be it through the ratification of decisions through 
voting by member-states in plenary sessions or through delegated representation on 
Executive Boards. However, one issue that is rarely examined is the question of the 
yardstick by which  the  actor  ‘in  control’  of  the  accountability  relationship  judges 
performance, which is commonly taken to be exogenously determined. Such 
bracketing off of important socialisation processes obscures a subtle form of power in 
the world of IOs, specifically the capacity of the agent held to account to frame the 
way in which the controlling agent understands an issue. A concern with this aspect of 
the shareholder-IO relationship is integrated into the analytic framework that guides 
the present investigation of the politics of accountability in the World Bank and IMF. 
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Whilst it is understandable (and indeed useful) to emphasise the dynamics that 
develop within a static, largely uncontroversial relationship when discussing 
shareholder accountability, such a view is less appropriate in the field of stakeholder 
accountability. Here, attention must also be paid to the processes of contestation 
surrounding mechanisms of engagement, and to the important role played by the 
wider social environment in legitimating an accountability relationship. For IOs, 
many of which face competing demands for change from a range of state and non-
state actors, the question of who is to be involved in accountability relationships is a 
pressing concern. Consequently, a focus on the institutional features that affect the 
evolution of mechanisms of engagement with in-country groups must be a central 
component of the analysis of the politics of stakeholder accountability. Although 
facets of accountability as commonly understood (such as the exercise of legitimate 
control) are less applicable to these dynamic contexts, an awareness of the complexity 
and multiplicity of accountability mechanisms allows for a comprehensive 
understanding of contemporary trends to be presented. 
 As the above review makes clear, accountability has conventionally been 
understood to refer to a set of social relationships encompassing three key criteria: the 
exchange of information, the existence of a stable hierarchy, and the legitimate 
exercise of control. Although such a definition provides a useful starting point for 
inquiry, a number of modifications are required in order for the politics of 
accountability in the world of IOs to be comprehensively captured. Regarding 
shareholder accountability, the main characteristics of the relationship between major 
states and IOs are captured well by the conventional understanding, although the 
ability of international institutions to frame state-actors’ understandings is overlooked. 
Regarding stakeholder accountability, the conventional understanding fails to cover 
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the most important aspects of interest. Here, the unsettled nature of the relationship 
means that emphasis needs to be placed on the internal and external factors that 
impact on changes to practices in this area, and also on the important role played by 
IOs themselves in legitimating mechanisms of engagement with stakeholders. The 
current investigation into the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF 
adopts a broad conceptualisation of accountability, which integrates the areas ignored 
by conventional understandings into its analytic framework. As the following sections 
of the chapter demonstrate, the insights of rationalist and constructivist models of IOs 
can be integrated in order to allow for such a holistic investigation of the politics of 
accountability in IOs to be carried out.  
 
I .3. Integrating rationalist and constructivist models of I Os 
Accountability in international organisations is a highly complex issue, in the name of 
which institutions are beset by competing demands from a range of actors. By 
distinguishing between the shareholder and stakeholder variants, and recognising that 
there are inherent differences between these accountability relationships, it is possible 
to bring a degree of analytic tractability to the issue. However, in order to fully lay the 
groundwork for the following investigation of the politics of accountability at the 
World Bank and IMF, it is necessary to outline the guiding analytic framework in 
detail. The framework, which is constituted through an integration of the insights of 
rationalist- and constructivist-based approaches to the analysis of IOs, allows for a 
comprehensive interrogation of both the functioning and evolution of the 
accountability relationships surrounding the operations of the Bank and Fund. 
Although with different points of emphasis, the investigation of both the politics of 
shareholder accountability and the politics of stakeholder accountability can be 
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structured  around  a  ‘morphogenic’  combination  of rationalist and constructivist 
accounts. Before outlining the morphogenic method of combining these approaches, it 
is useful to first present an overview of the characteristics and respective merits of the 
approaches. 
Rationalist approaches to the analysis of international organisations are 
characterised by a conceptualisation of state- and IO-actors as behaving according to 
incentive-based structures of decision-making. Within such works, the predominant 
structure of analysis is the principal-agent (PA) model, whereby states are taken to be 
the  ‘principals’  in  control  (to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent)  of  their  IO  ‘agents’.  The 
principal-agent approach provides important insights into the shareholder-IO 
accountability relationship, although by ignoring the social environment in which 
state interests are formed, it leaves a key source of IO power in this context 
unexamined. In order to fully uncover the power relationships that are embedded 
within shareholder accountability, it is necessary to investigate not only the 
mechanisms through which states attempt to monitor and control IOs, but also the 
more subtle means through which IOs are able to contribute to the socialisation of 
states. In order to facilitate such an analysis, the constructivist approach to the 
analysis of IOs must also be drawn on.  
 The central contribution of the PA approach to the understanding of 
shareholder  accountability  lies  in  its  investigation of  states’  abilities  to monitor  and 
control  IOs. At  its core,  the PA approach attempts  to  ‘examine IOs in their roles as 
agents  variously  responsible  to  member  states’,  and  to  address  the  two  linked 
questions  of  ‘why  do  states  delegate  certain  tasks  and  responsibilities  to  IOs?’  and 
‘how do states control IOs once authority has been delegated?’ (Hawkins et al 2006: 
4). Drawing on the insights of economic analyses into the relationship between 
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individuals who sign a contract in which one party hires another to perform a function 
on its behalf, the approach analyses the tension between the gains that can be made by 
states’ delegation of authority to, and the imperfect mechanisms through which they 
attempt to maintain control of, an IO (Pollack 2003: 134-136, Bauer 2002: 382). The 
issue of how states are able to set goals for, monitor, and control an IO – that is, how 
states maintain the accountability of IOs – is key to the PA approach. 
 When  addressing  the  issue  of  ‘why  delegate?’,  PA  theory  begins  with  the 
simple observation that all forms of delegation are predicated on the assumption that 
gains can be made through a division of labour and specialisation. In the realm of 
inter-state relations a number of additional gains are identified that might induce 
states to delegate to an IO, including aiding collective decision-making amongst 
member states, resolving disputes, and locking-in policies. The larger the potential 
gains in these areas, the more likely it is that states will delegate authority to an IO 
(Lake 2006, 342-44).  
In relation to the latter of the two guiding questions of PA investigations noted 
above, a great deal of attention is paid to the mechanisms of control that are available 
to states. Generally, providing an IO is producing policies that are broadly consistent 
with principals’ preferences, states will leave the IO to act on its own: however, when 
intervention is deemed to be necessary, a range of mechanisms are available to states 
(Nielson & Tierney 2003: 245). Following a rationalist approach, states are said to use 
mechanisms of control that attempt to structure the incentives of agents in such a way 
that it is in the interests of agents to carry out the interests of principals faithfully. 
Mechanisms of control include the balance between rules and discretion in the 
founding contract of the IO, screening and selection procedures of the IO to which a 
task is delegated (especially the selection of management and staff), institutional 
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checks and balances within the IO, monitoring and reporting requirements, and 
sanctions (Hawkins et al 2006: 26-31). An important additional mechanism of 
securing  IO  compliance  relates  to  the  control  by  principals  of  IOs’  financial 
arrangements. In their relationships with the World Bank and IMF, for instance, 
principals’ deliberate under-funding so that they can employ supplementary finance as 
a bargaining tool, and their increasing use of trust funds, have been highlighted as 
mechanisms of increasing their leverage over the Bank and Fund (Clegg 2010b, 
Broome 2008: 126, Gould 2006, Weaver 2007: 500).  
In order to effectively utilise the tools of compliance at their disposal, though, 
states must be able to monitor the output of their agent-IOs. The task of monitoring is 
often highly challenging, and it is especially difficult to assess the impact of IOs on 
complex global issues. However, the more readily observable an issue is, the greater 
scope there is for control of the agent (Lane 2007: 616 Nielson et al 2006: 111-12, 
Nosal 2006: 1093, Worsham and Gatrell 2005: 366, Kasim and Menon 2003: 124). As 
a recent IMF internal evaluation of reform efforts noted, change had been most 
effectively implemented when principals have clearly articulated the outcomes that 
they wished to see, and set up quantifiable targets with which to monitor them (IMF 
IEO 2007: 6).  
Expressed in terms of shareholder accountability, then, the PA approach 
usefully directs attention toward the ability of states to use compliance mechanisms to 
ensure that IOs remain ‘on task’ with their goals. However, the approach suffers from 
a major lacuna, which needs to be addressed in order for a fuller appreciation of the 
politics of shareholder accountability to be gained. Whereas the PA approach takes 
exogenously given state interests as the starting point of analysis, in order for an 
understanding of the full complexities of the politics of accountability to be 
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appreciated, it is necessary to compliment the insights of the PA model with those of 
the constructivist approach to the analysis of IOs. 
In a marked contrast to the PA model, the constructivist approach attempts to 
go beyond an examination of the conditions that allow for or impede IO autonomy, 
instead examining the means through which IOs are able to manufacture autonomy 
and deploy power in the international arena (Weaver 2007: 497). Broadly, two linked 
but separable aspects of the constructivist approach to IOs can be distinguished, both 
of which have important implications in terms of the politics of shareholder 
accountability. The first of these aspects is an emphasis on the capacity of IOs, by 
using their position of authority, to frame the way in which an issue is perceived by 
the relevant community of policy-makers, and the second is the view of IOs as 
containing strong bureaucratic cultures that inform how external demands will be 
interpreted. 
Regarding the former aspect, for constructivists IOs are thought to be powerful 
‘not  so  much  because  they  possess  material  or  informational  resources  but,  more 
fundamentally,  because  of  their  authority  to  orient  action  and  create  social  reality’ 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 6). Through a process of classification, fixing of 
meaning and diffusion of norms, IOs are able to not only solve the problems and 
pursue the collective interests that were encoded by states in their founding principles, 
but also to help define and re-define these problems and collective interests. 
According to constructivists, the dissemination of international norms within a social 
environment shape state behaviour by framing the way in which policy-makers view 
an issue (Alderson 2001: 421, Johnston 2001: 488, Immergut 1998: 14-19).  
The second aspect of IO power as seen by the constructivist approach is the 
tendency to filter and interpret external stimuli through a strong bureaucratic culture.  
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The bureaucratic culture, the rules and procedures that are consciously or sub-
consciously shared by IO staff, are argued to pervasively influence bureaucrats’ views 
of the world and to inform their views of appropriate action. Bureaucratic culture is 
said to make change within IOs highly path dependent, as staff are more receptive to 
new goals that can be easily accommodated within their existing worldview. If a new 
goal can be seen to cohere with the organisation’s existing knowledge about how to 
realise its mission, staff are likely to attempt to actively implement it (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 64). It has been suggested, for example, that the technocratic, rules-
based self-image of IMF staff, and their near homogeneous macro-economic 
educational background, has meant that changes in staff practices have occurred when 
they can be shown, according to acceptable econometric standards, to contribute to 
the overall goal of advancing monetary stability and economic growth (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 68-9). In contrast, the more heterogeneous educational background 
of Bank staff, and their immersion  in  the  more  ‘messy’  world  of  developmental 
economics, are said to have made the organisation more flexible and accommodating 
of a range of supplementary goals (Vetterlein 2006: 125).11  
In terms of advancing our understanding of the politics of shareholder 
accountability, the value of the constructivist approach is in showing the important 
role played by IOs in fixing the meaning of loosely defined concepts, and in diffusing 
norms that impact on the socialisation of states. There is a complex interplay between 
state and IO in an accountability relationship, with IOs contributing to the elaboration 
of  the  social  environment  that  informs  states’  demands,  and  responding  to  states’ 
demands for more effective performance. A comprehensive framework for analysing 
the politics of accountability must integrate the influence of intersubjective contexts 
                                                     
11 The important influence of ‘bureaucratic culture’ on the adaptability of the World Bank and IMF was 
brought up on a number of occasions, unprompted, during interviews with both Bank and Fund staff. 
The interpretations put forward cohere with the accounts referred to above.  
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in determining shareholders demands and understandings of an issue, and the agency 
of creditor states in setting an agenda for change to which they attempt to compel IOs 
to comply with. The morphogenic model, around which such a holistic analysis can 
be structured, is outlined below: first, the contributions of the rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to the study of stakeholder accountability are introduced. 
In contrast to the concept of shareholder accountability – a relationship 
between creditors and IOs whose legitimacy is generally taken for granted, and is both 
embedded in the governance structures of IOs and is the subject of a well developed 
strain of academic writing – stakeholder accountability is a less well established idea 
in mainstream analyses of IOs. By integrating aspects of the rationalist and 
constructivist models of IOs, it becomes possible to strengthen our understanding of 
the processes through which changes in these practices occur. Although the 
conceptual tools with which to interrogate this relationship draw more heavily on the 
constructivist side of the framework, the morphogenic framework can be drawn upon 
to advance a comprehensive understanding of the politics of stakeholder 
accountability. 
The primary value of the rationalist approach to the analysis the politics of 
stakeholder accountability in IOs lies in its outlining of the dynamics that are missing 
in this area of IO operations. The core focus of principal-agent analyses is on the use 
by powerful states of incentive structures to alter the decision-making environment of 
IO agents; to alter behaviour through the manipulation of staff calculations of ‘logics 
of  consequence’.  As  the  evolution of stakeholder accountability practices have 
generally occurred at  a  level  below  the  ‘high politics’ of  state-IO interactions, such 
pressures have been of limited significance. In relation to the politics of stakeholder 
accountability, the contests at the level of ideas have provided the main dynamics. 
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These contests have typically involved both internal actors within IOs and less 
materially powerful external actors, and have been centred on attempts to reform the 
dominant  ‘logics  of  appropriateness’  amongst  staff  of  international  organisations. 
Because external actors have not attempted to deploy significant material resources to 
‘tempt’ IOs into altering the mechanisms through which they engage with stakeholder 
groups, reforms instead occur through incremental changes to the understanding 
within the bureaucratic culture of the IO. 
 A key insight from the constructivist approach into the politics of stakeholder 
accountability relates to the conceptualisation of accountability as a socially 
sanctioned relationship. The importance of this insight derives from the existence of a 
range of stakeholder accountability mechanisms in the world of IOs, and the tendency 
over time for the understanding of what constitutes appropriate practice in this area to 
evolve (Ezzamel et al 2007, Moravcsik 2002, Shearer 2002). In the early post-war 
period, when many of the core institutions of global governance were brought into 
being, there was an implicit acceptance within their social environment of the 
appropriateness of a delegated model of stakeholder accountability. Within the 
delegated structure, the mechanisms of engagement between in-country stakeholders 
and IOs themselves ran exclusively through state-level representatives (Grant and 
Keohane 2005). However, with the emergence of a  ‘liberal aid  agenda’  in  the post-
Cold War era, significant normative pressure has been placed on IOs by member 
states to improve the channels through which they interact with stakeholders (Nelson 
2001: 1843, Nelson 2000: 413).  Additional pressure to reform has also come from 
increasingly effective NGO campaigns, which have commonly sought to ‘shame’ IOs 
into altering their operational procedures (Fox and Brown 2000: 500-5, Keck 2000: 
181, Wirth 2000: 52-3, Keck and Sikkink 1998: 135-40), and from the need for high 
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profile  IOs to respond to a declining acceptance of  their claims to ‘expert’ authority 
with  a  bolstering  of  their  ‘democratic’  legitimacy  (Lazarus  2008:  1216,  Seabrooke 
2007: 250). Within this broad shift in the zeitgeist surrounding the practices of IOs, 
the constructivist approach provides the analytic tools with which to gain an 
understanding of the dynamics affecting individual institutions. 
 The extent to which an IO will alter its behaviour in response to demands from 
external agents that reforms be made to the mechanisms through which they interact 
with in-country stakeholder groups depends crucially on the bureaucratic culture of 
the institution. The degree to which such demands can be comprehended by staff as 
being complementary to the primary aims of the IO, or at a minimum as not actively 
detrimental to these aims, is a crucial determinant of their likelihood of realisation 
(Weaver 2008: 5-6, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 43-4). Although the way in which 
in an IO ‘sees’ its environment tends to alter in an incremental fashion, and to change 
only in response to explanations that are expressed in terms that meet internally 
accepted standards of proof (Janis 1982: 174, O’Brien et al 2003: 189-96), there are a 
number of factors that influence the level of cultural malleability. Key amongst these 
factors  are  the  personnel  practices  of  IOs  (O’Brien  et  al  2003:  90-1), the depth to 
which an IO works within a specialised ‘language of expertise’ (Konioka and Woller 
1999: 309-10, Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 50, Adler and Bernstein 2005: 304), and 
the formal organisational structure of an IO (Page 2004: 592). Such characteristics of 
IOs affect the degree to which internal and external alliances in favour of operational 
change are able to coalesce. 
 Although the rationalist and constructivist approaches take-up differing 
proportions of the analytical strain in the investigation of the politics of shareholder 
and stakeholder accountability in IOs, there is value to be gained by integrating the 
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insights of both around a common framework. By doing so, it becomes possible to 
coherently examine the dynamics driving developments in the two spheres of 
operation. In isolation, both approaches fail to adequately situate the interdependent 
role played by agents and ideational structures in the process of change in IOs. The 
rationalist concentration on the role of agency in the restructuring of incentive-based 
games systematically underplays the more subtle power-relationships that are bound-
up within the production and re-production of ideational structures. Conversely the 
constructivist tendency to foreground the role played by ideational structures serves to 
cloud the process through which agential behaviour reshapes these structures. In order 
to address these conceptual weaknesses, I frame the insights of the rationalist and 
constructivist around a morphogenic approach to social change. 
 The central contribution of a morphogenic approach is that it provides an 
analytic framework around which to integrate structure and agency in the process of 
change in IOs (Adler 1997: 330, Carlsnaes 1992, Archer 1985). With its 
conceptualisation of the relationship between social structures and agents as co-
determinant, the morphogenic framework allows us to view social change as ‘endless 
cycles  of  structural  conditioning/social  interaction/structural  elaboration’  (Archer 
1985: 61), which integrates structure and agency rather than privileging one or the 
other. To give an illustrative example, although the PA approach can be employed to 
convincingly examine the important role of states in pressing the IMF to cut back the 
number of conditions attached to loans (Gould 2004), an examination of the social 
environment that informed states’ understanding of excess conditionality as a problem 
in need of remedial action would provide a more comprehensive account of the 
process of change in this policy area. Hence, with the morphogenic approach, the PA 
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approach’s placing of causal primacy with exogenously given state preferences can be 
combined with the focus on intersubjective structures of the constructivist approach. 
In addition, the morphogenic approach provides the means with which to 
integrate a diachronic element into the analysis of the connections between the ‘high-
level’ interactions  between  creditor  states  and  IOs  and  the  ‘low-level’  interactions 
between less materially powerful actors and IOs. When looking at policy outcomes 
using the morphogenic approach, one can see that: 
Policy actions become intertwined with their multifarious structural 
consequences, and together conjoin in constituting the future dispositions of 
actors and hence also their intentions and subsequent actions (Carlsnaes 1992: 
261).  
 
When applied to the politics of shareholder accountability, the morphogenic approach 
provides a framework for analysing the complex, multilevel feedback process through 
which major shareholders compete to restructure the central mission of IOs, and 
through which a range of actors interact in the process of re-forming the mechanisms 
through which IOs interact with in-country stakeholder groups. 
 In relation to the politics of shareholder accountability, the morphogenic 
model allows us to conceptualise the relationship between major creditors and IOs as 
unfolding through a series of interlinked stages. This process is presented 
schematically in Figure 1.1.12 The most important moment in determining the tasks 
for which an IO will be held accountable is at the setting of its articles of agreement 
(Interaction I). It was, for instance, at the United Nations Monetary and Finance 
Conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 that the core objectives of the World Bank and 
IMF were outlined, with the Bank primarily providing finance for reconstruction and 
development and the Fund overseeing international monetary stability to foster the 
                                                     
12 I have developed the morphogenic model by drawing on the lessons learnt from the case study within 
this research project, and as such the framework is best viewed as an ‘organising perspective’ that 
facilitates the exploration of complex issues and provides a basis for future refinement (Rhodes 1997: 
5). 
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prospects for economic growth. However, over time the mandates of IOs exhibit a 
level of flexibility, and indeed a degree of freedom to explore competing means 
through which to meet their overall goals is inherent in the authority that is delegated 
to them. These internal processes, which occur alongside critiques by external actors, 
generate  competing  understandings  of  the  IO’s  role  within  its  social  environment. 
This intersubjective context informs the following attempts by shareholders to pin-
down a framework outlining what constitutes appropriate behaviour from the IO 
(Interaction II). 
 At this secondary stage, two factors influence the extent to which shareholders 
are able to construct an effectively functioning accountability relationship; the degree 
of intra-shareholder consensus on the appropriate goals of the IO, and the tractability 
of the desired outputs from the IO. Under the influence of these factors, there is an 
important bifurcation in the morphogenic cycle. Where the interaction of shareholders 
and IOs produces a precise definition of an issue, and the action required by the IOs to 
address this issue is measurable, the cycle progresses along a path over which 
creditors are able to exert a significant degree of control. However, because of the 
difficulty of isolating the impact of IOs on complex global issues, the capacity of 
states to generate information regarding the activities of IOs (which is a necessary 
prerequisite of attempting to employ mechanisms of control) is often relatively 
limited. Additionally, intra- shareholder conflicts often also impede the ability of 
creditor states to create coherent systems with which to monitor and control IOs. 
Under such circumstances, an evolutionary path develops over which creditors have a 
reduced capacity to exert control. In such circumstances, the internal bureaucratic  
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F igure 1.1. Morphogenic model of the politics of shareholder accountability in 
I Os 
 
 
  
culture of the IOs, and the interactions between the IOs and less materially powerful 
actors, assume a greater importance in determining the process of change. As chapters 
two and three illustrate, the politics of shareholder accountability at the World Bank 
have been characterised by the former process, represented by the right-hand 
bifurcation; at the IMF, they have been characterised by the latter. In both cases, 
combining rationalist and constructivist models clearly adds value. The rationalist 
insight that reducing information asymmetries and creating incentive structures are 
core components of states’ attempts to regulate the behaviour of IOs helps to clarify a 
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action is measurable 
Issue x is not precisely defined, and / 
or IO action is not measurable 
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III, IV, V etc. 
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Minor alteration to the understanding 
of x, and / or of required IO action 
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key mechanism through which ideational change occurs in IOs, an issue at the heart 
of constructivist analysis. 
Turning to the politics of stakeholder accountability, the morphogenic 
approach can again be drawn upon in order to advance a conceptual framework that 
allows for a comprehensive analysis of the issue. Figure 1.2 provides an overview of  
F igure I .2. Morphogenic model of the politics of stakeholder accountability in 
I Os 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this process. By viewing social structures and agential behaviour as co-determinant, it 
is possible to coherently integrate the role of a range of internal and external actors in 
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the evolving understanding of what constitutes appropriate mechanisms of 
engagement with in-country stakeholder groups. Because these processes have largely 
occurred ‘below the radar’ of materially powerful states, and relatively few attempts 
have been made to alter staff incentive structures within logic of consequence 
calculations, the primary site towards which pressure for reform have been applied 
have been the bureaucratic culture of IOs. 
 As was the case in relation to shareholder accountability, a defining moment 
that in important respects serves to set the boundaries of the form taken by the 
stakeholder-IO accountability relationship is the crafting of its Articles of Agreement. 
In the early post-war years, when several of the key institutions of global governance 
were founded, there was a general agreement amongst state actors regarding the 
appropriateness of exclusively delegated modes of stakeholder accountability. 
Consequently, the mandates and institutional structures that were set out for IOs 
established structures for state-actors to engage with IOs: these institutions remained 
largely sealed-off from direct interactions with domestic groups. Such structures 
helped to foster an internal culture in which little value was attached to soliciting the 
input of in-country groups into operational decisions, and growing levels of 
institutional expertise further closed-off the opportunities for such groups to access 
policy discussions. 
 In more recent years, partly under the influence of increasingly effective NGO 
campaigns, and partly under the influence state-actors’ shifted priorities  in  the post-
Cold War environment, there has been a significant shift in views on the legitimacy of 
exclusively delegated mechanisms of stakeholder accountability. However, the 
internal characteristics of individual IOs determine the extent to which this altered 
intersubjective context is taken on board and transformed into altered operational 
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practices. In IOs with a relatively homogenous bureaucratic culture, when calls for 
reform to the mechanisms of stakeholder accountability are not justified in accordance 
with acceptable standards of evidence, institutional resistance to these changes results. 
Although developments can occur organically through processes of internal learning, 
these are typically aimed at improving the functioning of the existing modes of 
stakeholder accountability rather than at radical restructuring, and so do little to 
assuage  the  IO’s  external  critics.  Conversely,  in  IOs  with  a  more  heterogeneous 
culture, and with institutional characteristics that foster a greater degree of openness 
to externally generated ideas, there is potential for a less confrontational series of 
interactions to develop. With the existence of a group of internal advocates of reform, 
it is possible for alliances to be forged with external actors. Internal advocates play a 
key role in ‘translating’  the pressures to  institute more direct channels of  interaction 
with stakeholders into a language that coheres with the IO’s dominant culture, thereby 
facilitating the process of gaining support from key internal actors. In such 
circumstances, something of a virtuous circle develops, and acceptance of the need to 
reform stakeholder accountability mechanisms begins to snowball.  
As chapters four and five illustrate, the politics of stakeholder accountability at 
the IMF and World Bank are characterised interesting points of similarity and 
difference, with developments in both institutions reflecting aspects of both paths in 
Figure 1.2. From an initial position in which the state-centric delegated model of 
stakeholder accountability reigned supreme, the moves by the Bank to directly engage 
with in-country groups have significantly outstripped those of the Fund. Additionally, 
both IOs have recently begun to push low-income countries to improve their domestic 
accountability structures. Before the content of the chapters investigating the politics 
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of accountability at the World Bank and IMF are outlined more fully, consideration is 
first given to the key philosophical underpinnings of the research project as a whole. 
 
1.4. Pragmatism and the Study of I Os 
Whether explicitly acknowledged or not, research into any aspects of the social world 
is necessarily founded upon a series of linked epistemological and methodological 
assumptions. Although commonly glossed over, this truism applies equally to the 
study of international organisations. These underlying assumptions are of key 
importance in determining the questions that are addressed, and the means through 
which they are answered. The assumed relationship between simplifying theoretical 
frameworks  and  the  ‘real  world’  underpins  the  stance  adopted  in  relation  to  these 
philosophical issues. By adopting a pragmatist position in preference to more extreme 
philosophical stances, it becomes possible to offer both an innovative reading of an 
interesting contemporary issue facing the World Bank and IMF, and to contribute to 
the ongoing project of ‘middle-range’ IO theory-building. Following a brief review of 
the polarised positions on the relationship between the theoretical and empirical 
realms, I outline the way forward offered by a pragmatist position. I conclude the 
section with some notes on the resources that are drawn upon in support of the 
findings of the research project overall. 
 At  one  end  of  the  epistemological  scale,  a  ‘naturalist’  approach  to  research 
posits an unproblematic relationship between facts and theory. In line with the 
approach classically laid out by Carl Hempel, the purpose of research is taken to be 
the development of general laws that are ‘capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed 
by  suitable  empirical  findings’  (1942:  35).  An  admirably  concise  defence  of  this 
approach is offered by the authors of an influential US research handbook, Designing 
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Social Inquiry. According to King et al (1995: 475), the objective of all social science 
research is to develop and evaluate theory; to establish sound descriptive and causal 
inference. The criteria on which theories are tested are drawn from physicist Richard 
Feynman: ‘If it [the theory] disagrees with the empirical evidence, it is wrong. In that 
simple statement is the key… That is all there is to it’.  
For its supporters, this approach fosters a rigorous approach with which to 
increase our understanding of the social world through the repeated testing and 
refining of theoretical propositions against empirical data (Holsti 1989: 256). 
According to this stance, rival paradigms are comparable, as they can ultimately be 
assessed according to a common standard: that of correspondence to the real world 
(Neufeld 1996: 50). It is on such a view of the relationship between theory and 
evidence that the so-called ‘neo-neo’ debate in IPE was founded (Lamy 2001: 191). In 
the analysis of IOs within this debate, the major point of contention tended to revolve 
around the distribution of benefits from the regimes that IOs were at the centre of: 
were states interested in maximising relative gains to enhance their power in an 
anarchical system, or in realising absolute gains in an increasingly liberalised, co-
operative order (Keohane 1986: 10-25)? 
 However, in a challenge to this epistemological position, works advocating 
greater theoretical reflexivity made a compelling case regarding the need for a deeper 
investigation of the philosophical foundations of research in IPE and on the analysis 
of IOs. Rather than accepting the empirical world to be a means with which to 
adjudicate between different theoretical positions, it was argued that the field of IPE 
was comprised of a number of incompatible, hermetically sealed paradigms. Rather 
than laying their founding principles open to examination, these sophisticated and 
internally coherent approaches are capable of adapting to such an extent that, even 
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when they are used to look to the same topic, they will systematically provide 
differing interpretations of the same phenomena. The creation of rival paradigms led 
at best to a dialogue de sourds, at worst to a retreat into intra-paradigm debate 
(Neufeld 1996: 56, Smith 1996: 20, McKinlay and Little 1986: 267). Depending on a 
priori theoretical assumptions, IOs could be seen as either venues in which states 
battled for supremacy and relative gains over rivals or co-operated in order to benefit 
from absolute gains, or in which (transnational) social classes compete for supremacy. 
In  this  impasse,  different  theoretical  approaches  become  ‘incommensurable  and 
therefore  incomparable’:  once  the  conceptualisation  of  the  empirical  realm  as  an 
‘Archemedian point’ with which to judge theoretical positions is removed, a form of 
post-modernist relativity ensues (Neufeld 1996: 44, 54-57).  
The  ‘pragmatist’  approach  stems  from  a  frustration  with  the  tendency  for 
research within  IPE  to  remain  segmented with  ‘research  traditions’,  and  it  aims to 
draw upon the insights from different theoretical traditions in order to investigate ‘real 
world’  puzzles  (Sil  and  Katzenstein  2005:  3,  Sil  2000:  353).  By  tempering  the 
strength of the knowledge claims made, the pragmatist position is able to chart a 
middle course between the ‘naturalist’ and ‘post-modernist’ extremities. The aims of 
the approach are summed up well by Cochran: 
Any  ‘truths’  we  might  establish  through  a  pragmatist  science…  cannot  be 
associated  with  an  absolute  notion  of  ‘Truth’  in  any nomological or 
foundationalist sense. To establish truth pragmatically is to settle a complex or 
controversial issue for the time being, until something comes along to dislodge 
the comfort and reassurance that has thereby been achieved (2002: 527). 
 
The idea of ‘truth’ is at the centre of pragmatism. The approach rejects the modernist 
‘God’s eye view’ of knowledge (Putnam 1981: 74), while at the same time opposing 
the extreme relativism of post-modernity. As Richard Bernstein (1992: 838) suggests 
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regarding pragmatist  philosophy:  ‘the  creative  task  is  to  learn  to  live  with an 
irreducible contingency and ambiguity – not to ignore it and not to wallow in it’. 
 Regarding the relationship between theory and fact, the pragmatist solution is 
to be aware that research necessarily takes place within a particular tradition that in 
part  defines  and  structures  one’s  approach  to  a  research  problem,  but  also  to  be 
optimistic that in a research tradition progress is attainable. Johnson (2002: 226) 
offers the suggestion that: 
We make progress insofar as we resolve conceptual as well as empirical 
problems. We make theoretical progress… to the extent that we specify more 
clearly the mechanisms at work in our theories or that we more successfully 
incorporate conceptual resources available from sources outside our own 
research tradition. 
 
Although rarely explicitly acknowledged, many of the contemporary advances in the 
study of IOs that have been made have accorded with this spirit of pragmatism. 
 The most common approach taken in analyses of IOs is to draw upon models 
that offer competing interpretations of the dynamics of change in IOs, and to outline 
the concrete ways that the factors and mechanisms upheld by each approach are in 
evidence during an empirical course of events. A recurring conclusion has been that a 
range of empirical puzzles are best understood by combining the insights of a 
rationalist approach, which foregrounds the importance of the relationship between 
state-principals and IO-agents and particularly the mechanisms of control available to 
states, with the insights of the constructivist approach, which focuses on the means 
through which a range of actors contribute to the evolving understanding of policy 
issues and appropriate solutions within a social environment (Weaver 2007: 498, 
Weaver and Park 2007: 463, Gould 2006: 310, Nielson et al 2006: 110, Weaver 2005: 
375, Jupille et al 2003, Lewis 2003: 97). The framework adopted by this investigation 
fits with the approach of these works, and by providing a coherent framework around 
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which to synthesise the insights of the two approaches makes an important conceptual 
contribution. 
 This research project is best characterised as an investigation into the social 
environment of the World Bank and IMF. In addition to the conceptual advances 
outlined above, the key contribution of the work lies in the information provided on 
the contemporary attempts by large creditor states to push for reforms in the goals of 
the  IOs’ engagements with  low-income countries, and on the dynamics surrounding 
the ongoing reforms to the mechanisms through which the IOs interact with 
stakeholder groups within low-income countries. A range of sources are drawn upon 
in order to place the contemporary picture within its historical context, and the picture 
itself has been pieced together through an extensive analysis of IMF archival material, 
publicly available IMF and World Bank documents and databases, and interviews 
with Bank and Fund members of staff.13 The interviews with staff from the IOs 
provided  invaluable  insights  not  only  into  the  ‘behind  the  scenes’  processes  at  the 
Bank and Fund, but  also  into how  to  ‘read’  the  institutions.  In  accordance with  the 
pragmatist tradition, the conceptual and empirical content of the thesis is presented as 
a staging post in the journey to enhance our understanding of the functioning of these 
IOs, rather than as a discrete end-point in itself. 
 
1.5. Overview of A rgument 
The thesis focuses on developments that are occurring at the centre of the World Bank 
and IMF, providing an insight into the dynamics of reform within the headquarters of 
the two organisations. In the case of the IMF, an institution that remains highly 
                                                     
13 Interviews were carried out at the World Bank and IMF in November and December 2008, during 
which time I was a Visiting Research Scholar at American University. Thanks are owed to Tammi 
Gutner of AU, and to the thirty individuals at the Bank and Fund who generously gave their time, 
including several Executive Directors and many senior members of staff. A full list of interviewees and 
methodological notes can be found in Appendix I. 
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centralised and in which permanent representatives outside of Washington are situated 
well down the organisation’s hierarchy, developments at the centre are of paramount 
importance. In the case of the World Bank, with its much more significant regional 
and in-country offices, this focus on developments at the centre adds an important 
piece to the overall jigsaw of our understanding of the international organisation. The 
dynamics at the centre exist in a symbiotic relationship with wider trends in the Bank, 
and their co-evolution continues to shape and re-shape the way in which the 
organisation approaches its  developmental  mandate.  Although  ‘performance  gaps’ 
will, inevitably, continue to exist between the actions of widely dispersed operational 
staff and the guidance and policy goals presented from the centre, the detailed 
analysis of the dynamics at the centre of the organisation sheds valuable light on the 
efforts being made to control and reform the activities of this large and complex 
bureaucratic organisation. 
A core aim of the investigation is to disaggregate the analysis of accountability 
in IOs into its constituent shareholder and stakeholder dimensions. As such, the 
following chapters of the case study fall neatly into two parts. Chapters two and three 
deal with shareholder accountability, and chapters four and five stakeholder 
accountability, at the World Bank and IMF respectively. The dual focus on the Bank 
and Fund lends a comparative element to the study, with noteworthy points of 
similarity and difference emerging from the analysis of reforms surrounding the 
concessional lending windows of the IOs. Finally, chapter six branches out to 
consider  the  ‘ins and outs’ of  the politics of accountability, drawing out  the  lessons 
that can be transplanted from the investigation into literature on cosmopolitan global 
governance. 
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Chapter two reviews the progress made by major  creditor  states  in  ‘Closing 
IDA’s Accountability Gap’. A recurring point of contention in the Bank’s history has 
been the operationalisation of its developmental mandate, which has at times 
generated trenchant critiques of the Bank by external actors. Following such a period 
of crisis in the 1990s, the Bank moved increasingly to legitimise its operations in low-
income countries in terms of their poverty reduction impact. Concurrently, major 
shareholder began to use IDA replenishment negotiations as a major material 
incentive to push for more effective Bank performance, as measured in terms of 
quantifiable  poverty  reduction.  The  ensuing  ‘results  agenda’  has  been  used  by 
shareholders to increase their ability to pin-down the output of the IO, and has 
somewhat paradoxically also provided the IO with a means of more effectively 
legitimising its activities. This provides an intriguing insight into the process through 
which attempts to manage a complex bureaucracy can serve to lock-in a particular 
understanding of its primary mission. In addition, these external pressures can be seen 
to intersect with the Bank’s institutional dynamics, as internal advocates have begun 
to draw upon the pressures of the results agenda to further their own preferred 
understanding of how the Bank should approach its overall mission. 
The third chapter focuses on analogous developments in the politics of 
shareholder accountability at the IMF. In contrast to the Bank, where a relatively high 
degree of consensus amongst shareholders provided a context in which efforts to 
control its output could be made, intra-shareholder disputes have hampered such 
moves at the Fund. The ‘minimalist’ shareholder grouping, led by the US, have over 
the past decade argued that the problems of low-income countries are often of a 
developmental rather than short-term balance of payments nature, and consequently 
have pushed the Fund to reduce the scope of its PRGF lending operations. In contrast 
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the  ‘developmentalists’,  led  in  particular  by  the  UK and France, see balance of 
payments corrections and long-term development as indivisible issues, and so have 
pushed  the  Fund  to  improve  the  ‘fit’  between  PRGF  arrangements  and  a  country’s 
long-term developmental needs. As a consequence, they have fought to maintain (and 
indeed increase) the resources available through the concessional lending window. 
The  depth  of  the  disagreements  as  to  what  constitutes  a  legitimate  ‘balance  of 
payments crisis’  for  low-income countries between these groups means that, for the 
foreseeable future, such disputes will continue. 
Turning to the issue of stakeholder accountability, chapter four reviews the 
dynamics surrounding reforms in this area at the World Bank. From an initial position 
in which stakeholder accountability was practiced exclusively through state-based, 
delegated mechanisms, a culture developed in which little value was attached to 
gaining the input of domestic groups into operational processes. Through the 1970s, 
with  the  burgeoning  heterogenisation  of  staffs’  professional background, a more 
‘stakeholder  friendly’  sub-culture began to develop. Accompanying this shift, and 
under heavy external pressure, operational changes were made to allow stakeholders 
to have access to a more direct relationship with staff through  the  Bank’s  project 
lending. This  trend  has  been  developing  since  the  late  1980s,  and  in  the  Bank’s 
contemporary operations significant resources are available to staff to enhance their 
engagements with key stakeholders during the design, implementation, and evaluation 
stages of a project cycle. Although the pressures of the so-called  ‘disbursement 
imperative’ remains an  important  limitation on staffs’ willingness  to undertake such 
activities, personnel in key management positions within the Bank and beginning to 
push through changes to the way in which staff performance is monitored. Moreover, 
important  changes  are  also  underway  in  the Bank’s  policy-based lending. With the 
 43 
publication of the Governance Matters report in 1999, the World Bank signalled its 
desire to use its lending to reform the relationship between the state and domestic 
populations in low-income countries. The Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network within the Bank is now at the forefront of efforts to put the 
improvement of domestic accountability mechanisms at the centre of lending 
activities, and has significant financial and personnel resources at its disposal with 
which to enhance its activities as an internal ‘norm entrepreneur’. As such, over the 
past decade, there has been  something  of  a  ‘Reconstruction  of  Stakeholder 
Accountability’ at the World Bank. 
Chapter five reveals the different dynamics surrounding stakeholder 
accountability at the IMF. Throughout the majority of its existence, the Fund has been 
accustomed  to  ‘acting  behind  the  scenes’,  following  operating  procedures  that  are 
severely at odds with the calls for greater accountability and stakeholder engagement 
that are now routinely directed toward IOs. Core characteristics of the Fund, including 
importantly an institutional culture that views social change as an essentially 
apolitical process, have served to sustain a fundamental continuity in its mechanisms 
of stakeholder accountability, which remain dominated by channels of delegation 
through state-agents. However, under the influence of internal dynamics, two notable 
developments have occurred. First, domestic civil society groups have increasingly 
been utilised by the Fund as ‘disciplinary stakeholders’ to keep watch of errant low-
income country governments, and have been provided with informational resources 
with which to more effectively execute this task. Second, because of a concern with 
the positive relationship between participation in programme design, policy 
ownership, and successful implementation, efforts have been made to broaden the 
range of in-country actors that Fund Mission Teams and Resident Representatives 
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engage with. However, these additional actors remain largely within official 
government circles, and consequently the Fund continues to attract heated criticism 
for the ‘underoperationalisation’ of its participatory turn.  
The concluding section draws together the insights gained into the politics of 
accountability at the World Bank and IMF through the previous chapters, and links 
these into wider debates on the prospects for cosmopolitan global governance. The 
broad lesson of this collapsing-out of the research project is clear: there is significant 
room for mutual gain from the bringing-together of the literatures examining the ‘is’ 
and  the  ‘ought’  of  international  organisations.  By  joining  up  the  dots  between  the 
politics of accountability and projects advocating cosmopolitan global governance, it 
becomes possible to examine the nature of the footprint of the activities of IOs on the 
‘construction  of  governance  space’  in  low-income countries. The chapter – and the 
thesis – closes by proposing a research agenda through which this question can be 
comprehensively addressed. 
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Chapter Two – Closing IDA’s Accountability Gap 
2.0. Introduction 
There has never been a more urgent need for results in the fight against 
poverty… Whether  investing  in  education, health,  infrastructure,  agriculture, 
or the environment, we in the World Bank must be sure that we deliver results 
(Paul Wolfowitz 2005). 
 
I call on all multilateral development banks… to tie support more directly  to 
clear and measurable results (George W. Bush 2001). 
 
In early 1942, Harry Dexter White sat down in his US Treasury office to draft a 
proposal for an international bank. With his mind understandably focussed on the 
mass of physical devastation that the years of war had wrought, White headed the 
report  ‘Bank  for  Reconstruction’.  However,  during  the  course  of  re-writing the 
blueprint, a tête á tête with his deputy, Ed Bernstein, would lead to a fateful two-word 
appendage  to  the  embryonic  institution’s  title. When  optimistically  thinking  to  the 
future  and  considering  the  bank’s  place  in  a  post-war global order, Bernstein 
wondered aloud about what to do with the institution after reconstruction had been 
completed. White turned the question back on his deputy, and Bernstein suggested 
that it could be used to lend to other areas that required development. When the 
amended plan was circulated to other governments the following year, it outlined 
ideas for  an  expanded  organisation:  an  ‘International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development’  (Kapur  et  al  1997:  57).  It  is  around  the  operationalisation  of  its 
developmental mandate that the politics of shareholder accountability in what 
eventually became known as the World Bank are at their most visible.  
The politics of shareholder accountability at the World Bank consists of a 
nexus of often subtle power relationships through which the IO and its key creditors 
act to redefine the Bank’s primary mission and ensure that this mission is effectively 
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fulfilled. In line with the model outlined in the previous chapter, in order to gain a full 
understanding of the politics of shareholder accountability, it is necessary to 
analytically incorporate a concern with both means through which IOs are able to 
shape understandings of policy problems, and the means through which state-
principals are able to alter the incentives of IO-agents in order to ensure they remain 
‘on  task’.  From  the  early  years  of  its  operation  the  Bank  has been able to use its 
position of authority to frame understandings of key aspects of its developmental 
mission. This capacity has been carried over into its contemporary operations; indeed, 
in recent years a ‘positive feedback cycle’ has developed whereby the Bank’s moves 
to re-frame  its  primary  mission  in  terms  of  ‘poverty  reduction’  have  been 
complemented  by  principals’  use  of  material  incentives  to  ensure  effective 
performance according to this metric. These pressures have contributed to a tightening 
of the focus of the Bank’s engagements with low-income countries toward generating 
a quantifiable impact on poverty levels. Although both the Bank and its key creditors 
present  this  evolving  ‘results  agenda’  as  a  narrowly  technocratic  exercise,  the 
acceleration of the quantification of global poverty that has been driven by the 
pressures of shareholder accountability is in fact a deeply political act, which is 
contributing to the embedding of a particular conceptualisation of poverty. 
Interestingly, this process is impacting on the institutional dynamics of the Bank, as 
internal advocates of a broad-based approach to poverty reduction are drawing on the 
pressures released by the results agenda to advance their favoured understanding at 
the expense of the more narrowly economistic vision of their competitors. 
The chapter proceeds according to the following structure. The opening 
section introduces the conceptual framework that allows for a comprehensive 
understanding of the politics of shareholder accountability at the Bank to be 
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presented. In line with the general approach outlined in chapter one, the framework 
synthesises elements of PA and constructivist analyses of IOs in order to holistically 
view the mechanisms at work in the push to quantify the poverty reduction impact of 
IDA lending. In the second section I review the major events in the evolution of the 
IDA. This serves to both contextualise the contemporary dynamics, and also shows 
that attempts to define and redefine the primary goal of IDA lending have long 
permeated the relationship between the Bank and its key creditors. In the third 
section, I present the evidence of the evolving positive feedback cycle between the 
Bank and its major creditors. Following a period of crisis through the late 1980s, the 
Bank’s major creditors moved to institute a regime with which to better monitor the 
Bank according to its contribution to global poverty reduction, which became 
increasingly focussed around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Concurrently, the Bank also moved to reshape understandings of its appropriate goals 
by increasingly legitimising its activities in terms of their impact on global poverty. 
Through  the  fourth  section,  the  efforts  by  the  Bank  to  ‘fill  the world with  poverty 
indicators’, and to increase the PRSP countries’ capacity to  track a range of poverty 
indicators, are examined. These efforts include most recently the launch of Africa 
Results Monitoring System (ARMS), and have as a whole formed a central 
component  of  shareholders’  monitoring- and  the  Bank’s  legitimation-mechanisms. 
The  fifth  section  examines  the  ‘battlefield  of  knowledge’  at  the  World  Bank, 
specifically investigating the intersection between the pressures released by the results 
agenda  and  internal  contests  over  how  the  IO  ‘sees’  its  mission.  Finally,  the 
concluding section of the chapter reviews the insights gained from the analysis of the 
politics of shareholder accountability in the World Bank, and introduces the themes 
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that are returned to when the politics of accountability are placed within broader 
debates on cosmopolitan global governance in chapter six. 
 
2.1. Measuring I O performance – whose standard is it anyway? 
As was noted in chapter one, two distinct approaches to the analysis of change in IOs 
are commonly identified, centred on the PA and constructivist models. In order to 
fully grasp the politics of shareholder accountability at the World Bank, it is necessary 
to incorporate the insights of both models. Based on rationalist assumptions, the 
former investigates the means through which state-principals are able to alter the 
incentives of IO-agents  in  order  to  ensure  they  remain  ‘on  task’, whereas  the  latter 
typically concentrates on the more subtle means through which IOs are able to shape 
understandings of policy problems and appropriate solutions. As the mechanisms 
upheld by each approach are visible in the politics of shareholder accountability at the 
World Bank, there is a pressing need to better combine their respective insights. By 
adopting an analytic framework with an explicitly diachronic focus that opens up to 
analysis  the process  through which  states’ demands on  IOs are  formed,  the PA and 
constructivist models can be successfully synthesised. This improves our 
understanding of the process of change in IOs, and allows us to clearly see the 
positive  feedback  cycle  surrounding  the  evolution  of  the  Bank’s  ongoing  results 
agenda. Such a framework allows us to see that for state-principals, quantification can 
increase the capacity to monitor and control the output of IOs, while for IO-agents 
quantification provides a resource with which to effectively legitimise their activities. 
By specifying more clearly the mechanisms at work in the evolution of its results 
agenda, this conceptual innovation provides an important contribution to the study of 
the World Bank. 
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The central foci of work within the PA tradition are the mechanisms employed 
by major states in order to effectively keep IOs in line with their goals, and so to 
minimise  ‘agency  losses’.  A  range  of  tools  including the crafting of the founding 
mandate of the IO, screening and selection procedures of IO staff, and control over 
promotions within the organisation, are said to be used to this end (Hawkins et al. 
2006: 26-31). An important additional mechanism of securing IO compliance – one of 
particular significance to financial institutions such as the World Bank – is the control 
by state-principals  of  the  IO’s  financial  arrangements:  a  number  of  studies  have 
shown that the controllers of finance have significant leverage over IO actions 
(Broome 2008: 126, Weaver 2007: 500, Gould 2006b). However, in order for states to 
be able to utilise the tools of compliance at their disposal effectively, they must first 
overcome  the  problem  of  ‘information  asymmetries’  (Lane  2007: 616, Nosal 2006: 
1093, Nielson et al 2006: 111-12, Worsham and Gatrell 2005: 366, Kasim and Menon 
2003: 124). 
The problem of asymmetric information relates to the difficulty encountered 
by a principal when attempting to track the activities of its agent. There are 
weaknesses associated with each of the mechanisms by which states monitor even the 
relatively simple outputs of IOs (Lake and McCubbins 2006: 347-9), but when 
attempts are made to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the IO’s impact on complex 
global issues, major uncertainties arise. According to Hawkins et al. (2006: 24), ‘it is 
this inability to distinguish the causes of policy success and failure that prohibits, in 
part, the principal from writing an optimal contract to control the agent’. However, the 
more readily observable and measurable an IO’s ‘progress’ toward a stated goal is, the 
greater scope there is for control of the agent. As I demonstrate below, creditors’ push 
for the implementation of a ‘results agenda’ at the Bank can be read as an attempt to 
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reduce information asymmetries and allow for better monitoring of the IO. As the 
following empirical sections show, the PA approach usefully directs attention to the 
role of powerful states in setting the agenda of change in IOs, and in highlighting the 
desire of states to gain traction over errant-IOs through the quantification of IO 
output.  However,  for  a  full  understanding  of  the  ‘results  agenda’  to  be  gained  the 
question of the socialisation of states must be addressed, which calls for us to examine 
the subtle form of power deployed by IOs in their relationship with their creditor 
states.  
In terms of advancing our understanding of the politics of shareholder 
accountability, the value of the constructivist approach is in showing the important 
role played by IOs in fixing the meaning of loosely defined concepts, and in diffusing 
norms that impact on the socialisation of states. IOs use their position of authority to 
frame the way in which an issue is perceived by a relevant community of policy-
makers (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 6, Immergut 1998: 14-19). This is an important 
resource because of the pressure on IOs to demonstrate policy success in order to 
enhance operational autonomy and budgetary stability. As I demonstrate through the 
current case study, when IOs are successful in using their position of authority to 
influence creditor states’ understandings of their appropriate role and of the standards 
with which to judge performance, a positive feedback cycle can develop whereby 
states’ demands closely cohere with the ‘natural’ tendencies of the IO. However, IOs 
are rarely homogeneous beasts. In the case of the Bank, although there is broad 
acceptance  that  ‘poverty  reduction’  is  at  the  centre  of  its mission,  there  is  a  heated 
contests over the understanding of the term. 
For constructivists, the authority of an IO is constituted by the shared 
understanding in a policy community that it serves some valuable social purpose. 
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Claims of expert and moral authority are two of the central components of IO 
authority: expert authority comes from the acceptance that IOs hold specialised 
knowledge about the important social task with which they have been charged, while 
moral authority is often bolstered by IOs through frequent claims to be impartial, de-
politicised agencies pursuing goals of universal benefit to the international community 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 22-7). According to the constructivist approach, IOs 
are able to use these sources of authority in order to deploy power in a subtle but 
effective manner. Through a process of classification, fixing of meaning and diffusion 
of norms, IOs are able not only to solve the problems and pursue the collective 
interests that were encoded by states in their founding principles, but also to help 
define and re-define these problems and collective interests (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004: 51-6, Bauer 2002: 387). The dissemination of international norms within its 
social environment can in this way subtly shape state behaviour (Alderson 2001: 421, 
Johnson 2001: 488, Immergut 1998: 14-19). 
 In close connection with the authority of IOs to frame the way in which a 
policy community perceives issues is the use by IOs of specialist knowledge to 
legitimise its actions. By presenting evidence of success that is consistent with its 
framing of a policy issue, IOs are able to justify their approach to their audience. This 
legitimating function of knowledge is of importance during periods of uncertainty for 
IOs, in particular when criticism is encountered from an increasingly hostile 
environment. Evidence of IO policy success is at its most credible when presented in 
an  unambiguous,  ‘scientific’  form  (Boswell  2008:  472-3, Bauer 2002: 387). By 
enhancing an IO’s legitimacy and authority to frame policy issues, ‘hard’ evidence of 
policy success is a critical resource. However, the process of redefining the yardstick 
with which to measure IO success is rarely uncontested. Although the initial 
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restatement by the Bank of the centrality of poverty reduction to its mission was 
uncontroversial, the ensuing attempts by shareholders to clarify its meaning in terms 
of the MDGs has had greater internal implications. The proclivity within the World 
Bank for a statistically based, income-headcount conceptualisation of development is 
well documented, with roots in the time of McNamara (Ellerman 2006, Ascher 1983). 
The push toward a more multi-dimensional approach has assisted the efforts of an 
innovative group within the Bank to highlight the common ground between the two 
approaches. The improved analytical techniques of the Poverty Reduction Group, 
assisted by more readily available data, is laying the groundwork for deeper changes 
in the way the Bank sees poverty, although such changes will take place over the 
longer term. 
 Far from being a ‘closed’ relationship between the IO and shareholder stakes, 
the process  through which  the key principals’ understanding of  the  IO’s appropriate 
role is set involves a range of actors, including other state- and IO-representatives. For 
instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been at the 
forefront of efforts to establish the MDGs as the yardstick with which to measure 
global  poverty  reduction,  and  also  has  designated  the World  Bank  as  the  ‘official 
scorekeeper’ of the MDGs (Deaton 2005: 2). In so doing, the UNDP has undoubtedly 
played  a  role  in  shaping  shareholders’  understanding  of  the  appropriate  poverty 
reduction metric with which to measure Bank performance. Other smaller states have 
also for many years advocated the use of a multi-dimensional view of poverty in 
global policy making (Bebbington et al 2004: 45), and so have further shaped the 
social  environment  that  informed  shareholders’  understanding  of  appropriate 
measures  to  track  the  Bank’s  contribution  to  poverty  reduction. It is with this 
background  context  in  mind  that  the  shareholders’  push  to  pin-down  the  Bank’s 
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performance is best understood. The desire to monitor its IO-agent underscored 
creditors’  push  with  the  results  agenda,  although  the  Bank  (and  a  range  of  other 
actors) helped shaped their view that an MDG-centred view of poverty reduction was 
an appropriate means of gauging effective performance. 
Recent innovative analyses of IOs have adopted the position that our 
understanding of IOs can best be furthered by viewing the PA and constructivist 
approaches as complementary (Weaver and Park 2007, Nielsen et al. 2006, Jupille et 
al. 2003, Pollack 2003, Haas and Haas 2002). The evidence within this chapter 
regarding the dynamics surrounding the Bank’s results agenda and ARMS underlines 
the need for such a combination, as mechanisms upheld by both approaches are 
clearly in evidence within this case study. By adopting an analytic framework that 
coherently incorporates a diachronic element, we are able to clearly see the 
interactions between state and IO in shaping the standards according to which an IO is 
assessed. Figure 2.1 provides a schematic presentation of this process. 
As the following sections show, poverty reduction was established as a 
concern of IDA lending relatively early in its history, during the presidency of Robert 
McNamara. However, in the context of the post-Wapenhans crisis, the Bank moved to 
increasingly present poverty reduction as the driving goal of its engagements with 
low-income countries. By restructuring the social environment that informed the US 
understanding of its appropriate role, the Bank was able to exercise a subtle control 
over following developments, whereby its major creditor began to demand evidence 
of performance according to a poverty reduction metric and to structure material 
incentives to encourage compliance. The evolving positive feedback cycle has 
impacted upon debates within the Bank over how it should conceptualise its mission, 
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F igure 2.1. The positive feedback cycle of I O monitoring 
 
 
and in particular is opening ground for advocates of a multi-dimensional approach to 
poverty reduction. The relationship between how internal and external actors 
understand the Bank continues to unfold in an intricate, dynamic fashion. The analytic 
framework above allows us to gain a comprehensive understanding of this process. 
 
2.2. A brief history of the International Development Association 
When formed in 1960, the International Development Association represented a 
major turning point in the World Bank. The IDA both provided creditor states with a 
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55 
 
new route through which to employ financial bargaining to push for changes in what 
had very rapidly become a remarkably independent institution, and provided the Bank 
with a new lending window through which to engage with a group of previously 
‘uncreditworthy’  states.  From  the  outset,  the  Bank  was  successful  in  using  the 
language of expertise in order to expand the range of lending products with which to 
meet  the  IDA’s  broad  developmental goals. The shift from lending for revenue 
generating projects toward lending for activities in the ‘social sector’, as is outlined in 
this section, laid the groundwork for the subsequent demands from creditors for 
performance in relation to poverty reduction and the instigation of the positive 
feedback cycle of Bank monitoring. 
As is well known, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) was called into being following the 1944 United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.1 The early years of its 
operation were a time of the Bank ‘finding its feet’, during which it moved to clarify 
its relationships both with member states and with the capital markets that became a 
vital source of funding. Interestingly, the initial concern of creditor states that controls 
be put in place to strictly limit the IBRD’s activities in an effort to forestall financial 
looseness had by the time of the creation of IDA in 1960 significantly shifted. The 
contests between creditor states and the Bank over its mission provide an informative 
backdrop against which to analyse the contemporary dynamics of shareholder 
accountability in the IO. 
 With a staff of just 72, the IBRD opened for business in June 1946. The 
founding member states had granted the organisation a mandate to bridge the gap 
                                                     
1 Over the years, the IBRD was joined by the International Development Association (IDA), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). These institutions are known 
collectively as the World Bank Group. The main focus of this study is on the IDA, the concessional 
lending arm of the World Bank Group’s activities.  
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between on the one hand the massive amounts of capital needed to finance the 
reconstruction of war damage and the development of economically less advanced 
areas, and on the other the scarce resources of the private financial markets that 
remained heavily shocked by the previous depression and war. In order to meet its 
mandate, the Bank was endowed with paid-in capital by its founders. However, in 
order to maximise its lending capacity, the Bank was designed as a leveraged 
organisation, able to use its capital base to borrow from private markets. This 
borrowing capacity was further increased by a supplementary pool of callable capital, 
with which states effectively acted as guarantors to the private markets against default 
by the Bank. In terms of formal governance structure, member states were given 
representation on a Board of Governors that was to be convened annually, and on a 
Board of Directors that was involved on a day-to-day basis. Executive Directors were 
to be selected to either individually represent the member states with a large financial 
commitment to the Bank, or to collectively represent groupings of states with lower 
financial commitments (Weaver 2008: 8, Vetterlein 2006: 125-27, Mason and Asher 
1973: 72-94). The story of the early years of the Bank, though, was one of limited 
state-capacity to shape the operations of what was in any case a rather conservative 
IO. 
 Because of its desire to gain the confidence of the private markets in order to 
access capital at a low rate of interest,2 the early years of the Bank’s operations were 
dominated by a generally cautious and financially sound approach to lending. The 
stipulation in its Articles of Agreement limiting operations to lending for specified 
projects, a clause that had been included by signatory states to increase their ability to 
                                                     
2 From an initially restricted position in which World Bank dollar-denominated bonds were issued only 
to the New York financial market, the Bank now issues globally in 19 currencies. See World Bank 
Treasury official website, at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Capital+Markets/Annual+Issuance/index.html. Accessed 3 
May, 2009. 
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keep a reign on the Bank’s activities, became something of a ‘golden straightjacket’.3 
Care was taken to ensure that projects for which the Bank provided financing had a 
clear potential to generate repayment revenues, and within the Bank the Central 
Projects Staff were highly effective in maintaining standards. In an ironic twist, in 
order to further maintain credibility and cushion the Bank from ‘political’ interference 
regarding loan decisions, in 1947 the second Bank President pushed through a ruling 
blocking Executive Directors from proposing loans. By following this market-friendly 
route in its early years, the Bank attained its sought-after AAA credit-rating in 1959. 
With this accreditation, the Bank was able to borrow at low rates wholesale in the 
capital markets, and – even allowing for its premium charge – re-lend to governments 
at rates below those at which they could individually borrow from the private market. 
In line with its view that supported projects should make an identifiable contribution 
to economic development, and so facilitate governments’ ability to make repayments, 
power and transportation projects came to dominate the Bank’s  portfolio  (Woods 
2006: 15-38, Kapur et al 1997: 12, 85-87, Mason and Ascher 1973: 105-6). 
 In terms of its operational autonomy and financial stability, by the late 1950s 
the Bank was in a comfortable position. However, due to the confluence of internal 
and external factors, in 1960 a decision was made to create the International 
Development  Association,  an  organisation  that  has  been  referred  to  as  ‘an  affiliate 
that  changed  the  whole  history  of  the  World  Bank’  (Kapur  et  al  1997:  13-14). 
Regarding the pressures  whose  convergence  fermented  IDA’s  creation,  internally, 
although the ‘business model’ for the IBRD had been generally successful (and was in 
fact by the late 1950s generating a surplus income that was becoming something of an 
embarrassment of riches), there was a perception that the Bank was running out of 
                                                     
3 I borrow the term from Thomas Freidman (2000: 101-11). Whereas Freidman uses the metaphor to 
describe the relationship between global capital and domestic policy options, I apply it to the 
relationship between the Bank and private finance in the early years of the Bank’s operations. 
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opportunities to serve a large number of developing countries that had either 
exhausted or not yet sufficiently demonstrated their creditworthiness. Externally, in 
the light of the Cold War, the Bank’s major creditors viewed providing assistance to 
many such countries as being a vital pillar of security policy, and were keen to expand 
the capacity of the Bank as a cost-effective means of contributing to pressing foreign 
policy objectives. IDA’s inception addressed these complementary concerns (Kapur et 
al 1997: 178-80, Mason and Asher 1973: 380-82). IDA was designed as an adjunct to 
the IBRD, to allow for the needs of less well developed countries to be catered for. In 
the time preceding its launch and into the early years of its operation, debates around 
the IDA were dominated by (closely linked) concerns over its funding structure and 
the type of projects that its resources should be used to support.  
In terms of access to IDA lending, although the specific criteria for funding 
allocation is still the subject of debate amongst creditors, the institution rapidly began 
to focus its activities on low-income countries. Regarding its funding, concerns over 
the potential for the IDA to ‘taint’ the reputation of the IBRD in the capital markets 
led  to  the  two branches’  resource pools being clearly separated. Although a channel 
was established whereby IBRD profits could be funnelled into IDA operations, a core 
component of IDA resources came directly from member state subscriptions (Kapur 
et al 1997: 184). By providing creditor states with a direct source of leverage over the 
Bank, this decision had a huge impact in terms of the politics of shareholder 
accountability at the Bank, one whose dynamics continue to reverberate. As the IDA’s 
funding pool would continually be drawn down by provision of loans to low-income 
countries at subsidised rates, the Bank was forced at regular intervals to turn to 
creditors for additional funds. Over time a pattern emerged whereby  ‘replenishment 
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negotiations’  would  be  concluded  in  a  triennial  cycle,  with  creditors  using  the 
opportunity to load demands onto IDA operations. 
At the time of its establishment, a tough battle was fought between Bank 
management and major creditors over the types of activities that were to be supported 
by IDA lending. Management held that IDA operations should not differ in kind from 
those of the IBRD, and should be directed toward projects with demonstrable 
revenue-generating potential to maximise governments’ repayment ability. Creditors, 
led vocally by the US representative, argued that non-revenue  generating  ‘social 
lending’ should be included in the IDA’s portfolio (Kapur et al 1997: 157-59). When 
the terms of reference for the IDA were set, it was laid out that a project could be 
supported  if  it  was  of  sufficiently  ‘high  developmental  priority’  even  if  it  was  not 
‘revenue-producing  or  directly  productive’.  Additionally,  the  definition  of  ‘project’ 
was  expanded,  such  that  ‘a  group  of  related  programmes forming part of a 
developmental  programme’  could  be  considered  eligible  for  funding. 4  The 
compromise reached illustrates that, from the moment of its birth, there was 
considerable  uncertainty  and  a  large  amount  of  ‘wriggle-room’  around  the 
understanding of  the  IDA’s  primary  mission.  As  it  happens,  change  in  the 
organisational culture of  the Bank in the early years of  the IDA’s operation led to a 
convergence of management and creditors’ views and a shift toward social lending by 
the institution, as Bank staff became increasingly adept at framing justifications for a 
wide range of projects in terms of their economic impact. 
Through the 1960s, the scope of IDA lending increased significantly. With the 
aid of a rapidly expanding Economic Department arguments and methodologies were 
developed with which to establish economic ‘rates of return’, which thereby increased 
                                                     
4 IDA Articles of Agreement and Accompanying Report of the Executive Directors of the IBRD, 
Article V(Ib) paragraphs 13-15 (1960). Cited in Rajagopal (2003: 111). 
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the credibility of what had previously been labelled social sector lending. With the 
added confidence in the viability of such projects, IDA operations broadened to cover 
education and agricultural projects (Neu 2006: 645, Kapur et al 1997: 212-13). It was, 
however, under the presidency of Robert McNamara (1968-81) that the major changes 
in scale and scope of IDA lending took place.  
F igure 2.2. G rowth in ID A lending, 1969-‘965 
 
 
During McNamara’s first year at  the Bank a moderate 62 new projects were 
approved, whereas during his final year at the Bank the number had risen to 266 
(Ayres 1983: 4-7). In terms of the annual volume of IDA disbursals, this represented a 
thirteen-fold increase. Although the lending surge under McNamara was dramatic, 
equally worthy of note was the creation of a qualitatively new form of Bank lending 
during the closing years of his presidency: structural adjustment lending (SAL). SAL 
emerged as a consequence of a growing frustration within the Bank, whereby it was 
perceived that poor economic management at the national level was limiting the 
effectiveness of supported projects. It was in 1979, at a session of the United Nations 
                                                     
5 Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are expressed in real terms using 2007 prices. 
Annual IDA Disbursals
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
US
$b
n
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee database: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm                      
61 
 
Conference on Trade and Development, that McNamara made his first call for the 
shift into ‘programme’ lending: 
In order to benefit fully from an improved trade environment the developing 
countries will need to carry out structural adjustments favouring their export 
sectors…  I  am  prepared  to  recommend  to  the  Executive  Directors  that  the 
World Bank consider requests for assistance, and that it make available 
programme lending in appropriate cases (quoted in Kapur et al 1997: 507). 
 
Initially conceived as a lending tool for middle-income countries, during the mid- to 
late-1980s low-income countries became the main recipients of SAL. This was the 
case partly because middle income countries could afford to be somewhat ‘choosier’ 
and so eschew the exacting reform requirements, and partly because of the need to 
address balance of payments pressure on low-income countries that were exacerbated 
through the decade by the debt crisis. For many low-income countries, SAL became a 
vital source of external financing during an increasingly difficult period (Kapur et al 
1997: 517-21). An additional pressure also came from the general decline in global 
commodity prices in the 1980s, which pushed low-income countries to be more 
dependent of World Bank financing as their export earnings from raw materials 
declined (Maizels 1987: 539). 
The Bank in the McNamara years also became increasingly vocal in its 
commitment to the alleviation of poverty in its member countries. It is officially noted 
by the Bank that ‘McNamara eschewed the cautious, Wall Street-oriented approach of 
his  predecessors’,  and  that  his  leadership  of  the  organisation was  driven  by  a  ‘firm 
belief  that  the  problems  of  the  developing  world  could  be  solved’.6 McNamara’s 
‘Nairobi  Speech’,  delivered to the 1973 Board of Governors meeting in Kenya, is 
emblematic of this change of focus. In the speech, McNamara passionately laid out 
his view for  the  long  term role of  the Bank. After describing absolute poverty as  ‘a 
                                                     
6 Official World Bank website biopic of Robert McNamara, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:2
0502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html. Accessed 13 May, 2009. 
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condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to 
deny its victims basic human necessities’, McNamara committed the Bank to ‘placing 
far greater emphasis on policies and projects which will begin to attack the problem’ 
(McNamara 1973: 3). Acknowledging the financial resources that this focus on the 
reduction of poverty would require, McNamara made a direct appeal to the creditor 
states: 
In my view the fundamental case for development assistance is the moral one. 
The whole of human history has recognized the principle - at least in the 
abstract - that the rich and the powerful have a moral obligation to assist the 
poor and the weak. That is what the sense of community is all about-any 
community: the community of the family, the community of the village, the 
community of the nation, the community of nations itself (McNamara 1973: 
4). 
 
In addition to the individual appeals of McNamara, much of the Bank’s research work 
was devoted to the issue of poverty alleviation, with the 1974 Redistribution with 
Growth publication having a heavy impact on developmental thinking both within and 
outside the Bank (Ayres 1983: 5). 
Given  the  IDA’s  funding  structure,  the  flip-side of rising rates of lending 
during this time was increasing resource transfers from creditor states. Although 
struggles over the scale and relative share of contributions dominated early 
replenishment rounds, IDA-2 through to IDA-6 generated steady growth in creditor 
commitments (see Figure 2.3). However, the growing US dissatisfaction over 
inadequate ‘burden-sharing’ from other creditors reached its peak in IDA-6 (1978-81) 
and IDA-7 (1981-85). Indeed, US intransigence was one of the causes of the latter 
round’s extension by a year. Such pressure led to a levelling-out in the contributions 
from IDA’s main creditors, although the G7 as a whole continued to dominate.7  
                                                     
7 By the conclusion of IDA-10, the G7 still supplied over 80 percent of replenishment commitments. 
See OECD Development Assistance Committee database, at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm. Accessed 4 May, 2009. 
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F igure 2.3. G rowth in ID A funding, 1969-968 
 
  
From the early days of replenishment negotiations it was common for 
creditors to link the provision of additional funds to efforts to tie the Bank to their 
wider foreign policy goals. French negotiators, for example, consistently lobbied for 
greater distribution of resources to francophone Africa, whilst the US unambiguously 
threatened to scupper IDA-6 unless the Bank provided an assurance that no resources 
would be committed to Vietnam (Sanford 2009).9 In addition to the ‘high politics’ of 
resource distribution constant demands for more operational control over the micro-
management of IDA resources were a background theme in negotiations, although up 
until the late 1980s the Board was relatively successful in frustrating creditors’ efforts 
in this later regard (Kapur et al 1997: 1149). However, in what was a hostile external 
environment, creditors moved to exert a concerted pressure on the Bank to perform 
more effectively. In the light of the shift in lending practices that had occurred 
                                                     
8 For a list of the dates of IDA replenishment rounds, see Annex II. 
9 The major creditors were, however, by no means always successful in these attempts. In 1971, for 
example, the US restriction of aid to India in the face of a deteriorating relationship was actually 
countered by IBRD and IDA lending, in spite of US pressure to the contrary (Woods 2006: 37-8). 
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through the IDA, creditors increasingly demanded that the Bank perform in terms of 
global poverty reduction. 
As the following section of the chapter shows, from the early 1990s onward 
IDA replenishment negotiations have been used as a proactive means of ensuring 
shareholder accountability at the World Bank, as creditors have used the forum to 
enforce more effective Bank performance when measured against a poverty reduction 
metric. The focus of the remainder of this chapter is on the process whereby a positive 
feedback cycle has developed between the World Bank and its key creditor states, 
through which principals’ efforts to ensure effective performance have coalesced with 
the efforts of the Bank to legitimate its activities in an increasingly hostile and 
demanding environment. Quantification, and in particular the quantification of global 
poverty, has been adopted by creditors as a mechanism with which to better monitor 
the output of the Bank. Paradoxically, the same process has also provided the Bank 
with the means with which to better legitimise its activities – not least to the creditors 
holding the purse-strings.  
 
2.3. Embedding the World Bank’s poverty reduction turn 
Following the dramatic developments of the McNamara era, by the late 1980s 
creditors’ understanding of  the Bank’s primary mission had begun  to  fix around  the 
alleviation of global poverty. Beginning with IDA-10, the ensuing period is marked 
by  the  opening  attempts  of  creditors  to  use  IDA  negotiations  to  alter  the  Bank’s 
material incentives so as to ensure better performance in line with this re-formed 
understanding of its mission. From this time there has been a steady consolidation of 
the poverty  reduction  focussed  ‘results agenda’ by shareholders. Creditors’ pressure 
on the Bank to roll out the PRSP initiative was a significant moment in their moves to 
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enhance  the Bank’s  direct  focus  on  poverty  reduction,  and  the  recent  launch of the 
Africa Results Monitoring System (ARMS) represents the culmination of this drive. 
During this time, the complementary side of the feedback cycle is shown by the 
Bank’s increasing legitimation of its activities in terms of their contribution to poverty 
reduction. 
 The IDA-10 replenishment round, which was concluded in 1994, is described 
by Kapur  et  al  (1997:  1149)  as  ‘breaking  ice’  in  terms  of  the  level  of  influence  of 
creditor states on the lending operations of the IDA. The context in which the 
discussions took place goes some way to explaining their watershed nature. Following 
the  previous  ‘decade  of  debacles’,  during which  the Bank  attracted  heavy  criticism 
from a range of NGOs in relation to the negative consequences of a series of high 
profile loans (Rich 1994: 25-48), increased scrutiny was placed on the social and 
environmental impact of Bank-supported projects by creditors. Under pressure from 
creditor states, in particular the US, in 1993 the Bank was pushed to establish an 
Inspection Panel, which was mandated to hear complaints from groups that were 
negatively  impacted  on  as  a  consequence  of  the  Bank’s  failure  to  follow  its  own 
operating procedures (Weaver 2008: 52, Shihata 2000: 4). In the years preceding 
IDA-10, a series of internal reports highlighted major shortcomings in the operating 
procedures of the Bank, pointing in particular to the effect of low attention to project 
and programme implementation on overall success rates (Kapur et al 1997: 42). In 
addition, the leaked Wapenhans Report in 1992, which concluded that poor 
performance in programme design, implementation, and monitoring were the result of 
an ‘approval culture’ (Weaver 2008: 84), ratcheted up the critical focus on the Bank.  
 The conditions attached by creditors to the IDA-10 replenishment package 
were a sharp development in the politics of shareholder accountability at the Bank. 
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With the agreement, shareholders moved to take an unprecedented role in the micro-
management of IDA operations: 
[Creditor states] went a step further, prescribing that IDA was to maintain 
rising trends for both social sector and antipoverty programmes… Since such 
programmes already claimed some 40 percent of IDA investment lending and 
28 percent of all IDA outlays, these stipulations encroached severely on 
management’s programmatic discretion (Kapur et al: 1997: 1149-50). 
 
Although representing an important starting-point in the development of the positive 
feedback cycle of Bank monitoring, through the following replenishment rounds 
moves were made to further clarify the yardstick according to which shareholders 
expected the Bank to perform. 
 Throughout the most recent series of negotiations, improving their ability to 
monitor the output of the World Bank has been of high importance to successive 
groups  of  IDA  replenishment  negotiators.  Reflecting  the  Bank’s  redefinition  of  its 
primary mission, its contribution to poverty reduction has been taken up by as an 
appropriate metric. Amongst the major shareholders, the implementation of a results 
agenda has been a particular priority aim for the US government, especially so since 
the second Clinton Administration (Sanford 2002: 752, Weiss 2007: 12). In 1998, 
under pressure from the US, major steps were taken by creditor states during IDA-12 
to push for the implementation of mechanisms through which to increase the poverty 
reduction effectiveness of IDA funds. In response, a formal Performance Based 
Allocation (PBA) system taking into account Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments (CPIAs) was created (Sanford 2005: 2). 
 Under the new PBA arrangements, Bank staff made evaluations of how 
appropriate countries’ policy environments were to sustainable economic growth and 
poverty reduction, with the resultant CPIA rating forming one of the inputs into IDA 
lending allocations. The justification for this system was that, by diverting resources 
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to where they were likely to have the greatest poverty reducing impact, PBA met the 
demands of shareholders. Although debates over the effectiveness of PBA continue, 
in particular over which policy and institutional factors are of prime importance in 
determining  a  borrower’s  effectiveness  to  translate  resources  into  poverty  reduction 
(World Bank 2001, World Bank 2004a, World Bank 2004b), reforms to PBA are a 
tangible means through which the politics of shareholder accountability have shaped 
IDA operational practices. 
 Following these initial steps to ensure more effective Bank use of resources in 
its engagements with low-income countries, in the rounds that have taken place since 
IDA-12 the pressure from creditors for the establishment of a more effective system 
with which to monitor the output of the Bank has grown. In addition, an increasing 
emphasis has been placed on securing a more targeted assessment of the contributions 
that IDA programmes make directly to poverty reduction as measured by the MDGs 
(Sanford 2005: 3, Weaver 2007: 500). The IDA-13, 14, and 15 replenishment reports, 
which provide the details of each series of negotiations between 1999 and 2008, 
provide evidence of this trend. 
 The agreement reached through IDA-13, which was concluded in 2002, listed 
the implementation of systems ‘to ensure that IDA assistance is effective and delivers 
measurable results’ as one of the priority areas for Bank attention (World Bank 2002: 
i). The report goes on to detail the conditions for such a system as laid down by the 
representatives of the IDA’s creditors. It notes that: 
Deputies recommended that Management put in place a system to measure, 
monitor and manage for development results. The system should link progress 
in reaching country development outcomes to IDA country programmes and, 
given an appropriate data base, should provide a clear indication of how IDA’s 
programmes promote the achievement of these outcomes (World Bank 2002: 
7). 
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It  is  in  this report  that  the Bank’s principals  for  the first  time explicitly suggest  that 
the  MDGs  be  used  as  the  metric  against  which  the  organisation’s  effectiveness  is 
assessed:  
Deputies recommended that the MDGs provide a basic point of reference for 
measuring outcomes, with countries themselves monitoring and reporting on 
progress (World Bank 2002: 8).  
 
At the conclusion of IDA-13, the US offered an unprecedented direct inducement to 
the Bank to accelerate the embedding of the results agenda.  
 Upon concluding the negotiations for IDA-13, the Bush administration 
announced that it would contribute an additional US$300 million on the condition that 
the Bank met requirements that aid could be shown to generate ‘measurable results’. 
Health and education, two areas of central importance to the MDGs, were highlighted 
as particular areas in relation to which the Bank was called demonstrate success (US 
Treasury 2002). In April 2002, Treasury Secretary John Snow announced that he was 
satisfied with the Bank’s progress, and said that he would ask Congress to appropriate 
the first US$100 million instalment (US Treasury 2003). In June of the next year, 
Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John Taylor ‘gave an upbeat 
assessment’  of the  findings  of  an  independent  report  into  the  Bank’s  ongoing 
effectiveness measures, and announced that he planned to ask Congress to release the 
second instalment of US$200 million (Blustein 2004). 
This focus on the MDGs was consolidated through the following 
replenishment round, which was concluded in 2005. Although generally supportive of 
the initial efforts at mainstreaming the MDGs within systems to monitor IDA 
effectiveness, the creditors expressed concern at the quality of data that was available 
from the poorest group of borrowing countries. In order to overcome this crucial 
weakness in its monitoring system, in the IDA-14 report the deputies reiterate that ‘an 
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important IDA objective is… to enhance direct support for efforts to build capacity to 
measure results’ (World Bank 2005: 15). This concern was reiterated during the most 
recent replenishment negotiations (World Bank 2008b: 22-3). 
The importance of the role played by the US in the consolidation of the moves 
to better tie IDA lending to measurable results is acknowledged informally by Bank 
staff, and it is common practice within the Bank to refer to the results agenda and 
ARMS as US-inspired initiatives.10 Because of  the US and other  IDA shareholders’ 
use of material incentives, enhancing IDA-borrowing  countries’  ability  to  track  a 
range of key poverty indicators and assess the impact of IDA funded projects on 
them, now lies at the centre of the Bank’s ability to demonstrate to its key principals 
that it is performing effectively. 
Turning briefly back to the Bank, we see that throughout the period of the 
shareholder push with the results agenda and ARMS, the institution increasingly 
justified its activities in terms of their contribution to poverty reduction. In addition to 
the direct interactions with creditors through IDA negotiations, the Bank continued to 
shape the understanding of its central mission in its wider social environment as 
centring on this issue. Through such legitimation activities, the positive feedback 
cycle was completed.  
An analysis  of  the  content  of  the  Bank’s  flagship  publication,  the  World 
Development Report (WDR),  reveals  the  extent  to  which  reference  to  ‘poverty 
reduction’ expanded dramatically from the mid-1990s.11 From a starting point of just 
                                                     
10 Amongst the interviewees that raised this link were Graham Eele (World Bank Development Data 
Group), Dino Merotto (Uganda Country Economist, World Bank), and Jon Sanford (Congressional 
Research Centre). Indeed, when asked if demands to demonstrate results in terms of poverty reduction 
had led to any tangible changes in Bank operations, several interviewees suggested that the Africa 
Results Monitoring System had been instituted in direct response to the US pressures outlined above. 
11 The dramatic outlier in 2000/01 is the result of the WDR focussing on ‘Attacking Poverty’. The 
following graphs on capacity building assistance and the availability of poverty indicators also contain 
outliers around 2000/01, which I suggest were linked to a millennium-inspired push on MDG 
monitoring. 
70 
 
two mentions in the both the 1996 and 1997 WDRs, between 2002 and 2008 the 
phrase  ‘poverty  reduction’  appeared  with  an  average  frequency  of  59  times.  The 
content of WDRs matters a great deal in terms of the relationship between the Bank 
and its wider audience: with a minimum of 50,000 English language copies and a 
further 50,000 foreign language summaries of each WDR distributed to governmental, 
media, and civil society sources (Wade 2001: 130), and given their relatively 
accessible content, WDRs are often seen as the ‘public face’ of the Bank (Mawdsley 
and  Rigg  2002:  93).  This  shift  in  emphasis  toward  ‘poverty  reduction’  is  also  in 
evidence when the Bank’s management of its media relations is examined. Exhibiting 
a clear upward trend, during the period from 1996 to 2006 the number of press 
releases  issued  on  the  subjects  of  ‘poverty’  and  ‘poverty  reduction’  grew  from  an 
average annual total of less than 20 in 1996--99 to more than 80 in 2004--06. With a 
database of over 5,000 press contacts amongst whom information is circulated, press 
releases are a vital component of the Bank’s public relations management.12 
Figure 2.4. ‘Poverty reduction’ as legitimation device (a) 
Content Analysis of World Development Reports
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12 Information regarding the Bank’s circulation of press releases was supplied by Amy Stilwell, World 
Bank External Affairs Media Manager, during e-mail correspondence with the author, September 2008. 
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Figure 2.5. ‘Poverty reduction’ as legitimation device (b) 
 
 
In addition, the personal impact of James Wolfensohn in renewing the Bank’s 
focus on poverty reduction must not be overlooked. Wolfensohn became President of 
the Bank in 1995, and took the opportunity of his first Annual Meeting to lay out his 
goals for the Bank: 
One thing is clear: we must continue to act so that poverty will be alleviated… 
social justice extended, human rights strengthened and women rights advanced 
(Wolfensohn 1995: 1). 
 
Similarly, when announcing that the World Bank (and IMF) would for the first time 
systematically write-off the debts of a group of the poorest countries with the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Wolfensohn proclaimed that the 
development was ‘very good news for the poor’ (1996: 1). The role of Wolfensohn as 
a high-profile and vocal advocate of poverty reduction at the high table of global 
policy making, and his importance in maintaining the explicit focus on poverty 
reduction through the enhanced HIPC, is well attested (Mallaby 2006). 
 By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a positive feedback cycle had developed 
around the politics of shareholder accountability at the World Bank. The original 
reorientation  of  the  Bank  in  the  McNamara  years  had  shaped  creditors’ 
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understandings of the appropriate primary mission in the Bank’s engagement with its 
low-income IDA borrowers, such that when prompted by a period of crisis to push for 
increased effectiveness on the part of the Bank they moved to monitor its output in 
terms of its contribution to poverty reduction. As the results agenda has been 
consolidated,  the  positive  feedback  cycle  has  been  completed  by  the  Bank’s 
increasing use of poverty reduction as a legitimation device to its wider social 
environment. 
 
2.4. F illing the world with indicators 
Owing to the positive feedback cycle outlined above, effectively tracking the impact 
of IDA lending on poverty reduction in borrowing countries has become a central 
component of the politics of shareholder accountability. Creditor states have pushed 
for this link to be made explicit in order to provide them with better information with 
which to monitor the effectiveness of the Bank, and in so doing have provided 
material incentives for the Bank to generate such data. It was at the turn of the 
millennium that the Bank started to systematically support its poorest borrowers to 
enhance their capacity to monitor socio-economic indicators, key amongst which 
were poverty indicators.13  
Evidence that is indicative of this turn can be seen in the amount of Bank 
resources that were directed toward statistical capacity building projects, as listed on 
the Bank’s Statistical Information Database.14 Between 1996 and 2006, assistance in 
                                                     
13 This information regarding the Bank’s shift to statistical capacity building efforts was initially 
supplied by Graham Eele, World Bank Development Data Group, in e-mail and telephone 
correspondence with the author, September 2008, and confirmed by several interviewees in 
Washington, DC in November and December 2008. 
14 See World Bank Statistical Information Database, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20541648~men
uPK:1164885~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. Accessed 13 May, 
2009. 
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this area to 23 of the lowest income IDA borrowers more than doubled every two 
years.15 From a low base-point, by the end of the period each of the countries received 
an average annual package of some US$570,000. Relatively small amounts can 
achieve significant results in statistical capacity building: a figure of approximately 
US$140,000 covers the formation of a 10-year National Statistical Development 
Strategy. 
 
 
 
 
F igure 2.6. Funding the world to track global poverty 
 
 
According  to  its  internal  evaluations,  the  Bank’s  efforts  to  improve  the 
capacity of its poorest borrowers to track key poverty indicators have been relatively 
successful. The Bank’s assessment of country capacity to collect data relating to  the 
MDGs show that the results for this group have on average improved for each of the 
years for which data is available, and that on average their capacity is higher than that 
                                                     
15 The group that I focus on are the 23 countries that have passed through the PRSP initiative to receive 
HIPC debt relief. For a complete list of the PRSP-HIPC group see IMF ‘PRSP Factsheet’, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. Accessed 13 May, 2009. 
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of the general Bank borrower.16 An analysis of the longer term trend in the production 
of poverty indicators confirms this trend: from an average total of just 51 indicators 
per year from 1994 to 1999, an average total of 89 indicators were produced in the 
years 2003 to 2006.17  
F igure 2.7. Bank assessment of the increasing global capacity to track poverty 
 
With the launch of ARMS in 2007, the drive to improve countries’ monitoring 
capabilities has been consolidated. ARMS serves as a hub around which borrowers’ 
monitoring capacity building can be co-ordinated, and data on the impact of IDA-
supported projects disseminated. As the World Bank (2007: 1) announcement of 
ARMS stated: 
[With ARMS] the Africa Region rolls out a groundbreaking system that 
gathers and shares data on the Results Agenda – all in one place and accessible 
to all. 
 
Under the rubric of ARMS, the Bank has supported impact evaluations in 20 
countries. Again, in the words of the Bank (2009): 
                                                     
16 As the average level for World Bank members includes all IBRD borrowers (i.e. a grouping with on 
average a much higher level of per capita income than the PRSP-HIPCs), it is particularly surprising 
that the PRSP-HIPCs have a higher average capacity. 
17 Calculated using figures from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database. On the 
database, nine proxy-indicators are used by the Bank to represent seven of the MDGs: I aggregated the 
total number of these poverty indicators on the database per year from the PRSP-HIPCs. This provided 
a rough corroboration of the Bank’s own findings that over time the tracking by the PRSP-HIPCs had 
improved. Many thanks to Judi Atkins for her help with this painfully monotonous task! 
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By providing robust evidence on which projects have positive impacts on 
important outcomes such as household income, educational attainment, child 
mortality, and maternal health, impact evaluation can help programme 
managers decide best to contribute to meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
 
So far, some 800 government officials have been trained by the Bank to incorporate 
the results framework into domestic decision-making processes.18  
 The electronic dissemination of information plays a vital role in the ARMS 
project.  Within  the  ARMS  section  of  the  Bank’s  website,  an  Impact  Evaluation 
Database provides details of specific project evaluations that have been carried out 
within 46 African countries. The publicly accessible database allows for evaluations 
of the impact of Bank supported projects on the MDGs to be found, and information 
on methods of data collection and analysis are included in the evaluation synopses. 
The expectation is that, in addition to Bank-directed dissemination of best practices, 
such resources will allow for a snowballing in the improvements to borrowers’ ability 
to monitor and assess project impacts on the a range of poverty indicators. 
Although the drive to increasingly quantify global poverty through ARMS and 
the results agenda are presented as a narrowly technocratic exercise, the process 
entails a deeply political aspect. Attempts to fix the meaning of developmental terms 
are inevitably contentious, and in this instance there is a crucial intersection between 
the shareholder-supported push with the results agenda and long standing debates 
within the Bank over how to operationalise its developmental mandate. The stakes of 
these internal debates are high, concerning at a fundamental level how the Bank sees 
the challenge of global poverty reduction. It is to this debate that the closing section of 
the chapter now turns. 
                                                     
18 See ARMS section of the World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTAFRRES/0,,conten
tMDK:21372873~menuPK:3882921~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3506896,00.html. 
For an examination of the use of training as a means of IO influence, see Broome (2010). 
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2.5. The results agenda and the ‘battlefield of knowledge’ 
Quantification plays a central role in the concretisation of intersubjective 
understandings about aspects of economic life, a process that is both subtle and 
drawn-out. Over a long period of time, a transformation occurs whereby concepts 
evolve from an initially highly contested, malleable form, to being regarded as 
representing a self-evident and pre-existing object, contested only at the margins. 
Through a process of abstraction, homogenisation, and sedimentation, complex social 
phenomena are reduced to a small number of measurable features which, with the aid 
of standardised data collection techniques and official statistics, become an 
unreflexively accepted part of everyday existence. How aggregate social and 
economic outcomes are defined, measured, and interpreted – and how appropriate 
policy responses are crafted – is never a neutral process (Breslau 2003: 381, Blyth 
2002: 150). This process  is  as  true  for understandings of  ‘poverty’ as  for  ‘savings’, 
‘investment’, and ‘inflation’. At the World Bank, the US promotion of an MDG-based 
view  of  poverty  has  helped  to  open  space  for  advocates  of  a  ‘multi-dimensional’ 
conceptualisation of poverty, and entrepreneurial groups are working to re-form the 
dominant understanding of poverty in this direction.  
 Within  the  Bank,  contests  over  the  understanding  of  ‘development’  and 
‘poverty  reduction’  are  ever-present, and the dominant understanding of its mission 
has been transformed several times through the course of its history. The alliance 
building through which paradigmatic change takes place occurs both internally among 
the staff of the organisation, and externally when factions within the Bank join forces 
with different communities outside of the Bank (Wade 2001, Kapur et al 1997: 215-
33). Such dynamics are clearly visible in the contemporary contests over how the 
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Bank should conceptualise poverty, as internal advocates are advancing their favoured 
vision by drawing on the space opened up by US pressure. In terms of the analytic 
framework outlined above,  the  ‘positive  feedback cycle’  (initiated when  the Bank’s 
repositioning of  ‘poverty reduction’ at  the core of  its activities was followed by US 
attempts to monitor Bank performance according to a poverty reduction metric) has 
begun to intersect with the organisation’s internal dynamics. 
At the Bank, the present juncture is characterised by disagreements between 
on the one hand advocates of an ‘economic development’ framework who see growth, 
liberalisation, and globalisation as being good for the poor, and on the other advocates 
of a ‘social development’ framework who see the direct input of the poor in projects 
that challenge domestic power structures as being key to solving the causes of 
poverty.  The  former  hold  an  ideational  framework within which  ‘top-down’  policy 
changes are held to be the most effective means of fostering development and poverty 
reduction; the latter concentrate much more on projects that empower the poor to alter 
domestic social structures. The cleavage between the two groups is deeply 
institutionalised in the Bank, with adherents of the social development approach 
clustering around a small number of functional departments and units within the 
Bank. The economists remain dominant, and the bulk of the Bank’s lending remains 
focussed on structural adjustment whose negotiation occurs in an environment in 
which social development staff are almost entirely absent (Bebbington et al 2004: 39-
51). 
A key site of the battle between the different factions is the question of how to 
measure the success – or otherwise – of Bank supported interventions. The 
economists’  favouring  of  the  $1  per  day  income  headcount  measure  stems  from a 
number of sources, including importantly the amenability of such income data to the 
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established techniques of macroeconomics, and the perceived reliability of the 
National Accounts from which the data is drawn (Deaton and Kozel 2005, Deaton 
2001). In contrast, the social development practitioners’ conceptualisation of poverty 
as a multi-dimensional problem leads them to favour measures that incorporate data 
on consumption, health, and educational levels. A major barrier that has restricted this 
group’s ability to get individuals occupying vital strategic positions to take their ideas 
onboard has been the difficulty of proving, according to accepted statistical standards, 
the  relationship  between  ‘social  development’  and  the  more  deeply  entrenched 
income-based measures of development.19 Owing to the organisational structure of 
the Bank, Country Directors are the single most important group whose ‘conversion’ 
is needed for the dominance of an economistic view of poverty to be challenged.20 
Country Economists and researcher staff within the Development Economics Vice 
Presidency are also important ideational gatekeepers (Broad 2006, Bebbington et al 
2004: 44-5). 
The  Poverty  Reduction  Group  within  the  Bank’s  Poverty  Reduction  and 
Economic Management network, described  previously  as  a  ‘small  powerhouse’  of 
social development ideas within the Bank (Bebbington et al 2004: 49), has been at the 
forefront of promoting the multi-dimensional view of poverty. Through its research 
work, the Group has spearheaded efforts within the Bank to situate the analysis of a 
multi-dimensional conceptualisation of poverty within an econometric framework. 
The Group clearly states its aims in this regard on its section of the Bank website: 
While much progress has been made in measuring and analyzing income 
poverty, efforts are needed to measure and study the many other dimensions of 
                                                     
19 In order to be accepted as appropriate ‘global’ practices, the effectiveness of policy refinements 
generally must be demonstrated according to standards that satisfy key macroeconomic bastions within 
the Bank. See, for examples, Bebbington et al (2004: 44) and Broad (2006). 
20 On the role of Country Directors, see Aycrigg (1998: 18). 
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poverty… This work includes assembling comparable and high-quality social 
indicators for education, health, access to services and infrastructure.21 
 
By embedding a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of poverty within a quantitative 
approach, the Poverty Reduction Group is helping to attract the interest of key 
constituencies within the Bank to the broader aspects of poverty. In practical terms, 
the Group has maintained an entrepreneurial modus operandi, and has favoured an 
informal networking approach to encourage Country Directors and others to sharpen 
up the poverty focus of Country Assistance Strategies, Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
and other important operational documents (Poverty Reduction Group 2006).  
Interestingly, the Poverty Reduction Group has begun to explicitly draw upon 
the conceptual space opened up by the US-backed results agenda in order to advance 
its internal alliance building.  Within their attempts to proselytise, the Group explicitly 
presents their activities as enabling operational staff to meet the demands to perform 
(and to be seen to perform) according to an MDG-focussed conceptualisation of 
poverty reduction. A recent training session organised by the Group, for example, 
outlined  the  ‘tremendous  pressures’  from  the  IDA-14 and 15 replenishment 
negotiations as contributing to the need to refresh the Bank-wide approach to impact 
evaluation of poverty reduction programmes.22  
Change in the way large bureaucratic organisations such as the Bank approach 
their mission is necessarily complex, relying on the evolution of inter-personal 
relationships that are often difficult to observe. Here, we see an intriguing example of 
the interplay between external and internal forces within this process. The pressure 
                                                     
21 See Poverty Reduction Group section of the World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20153855
~menuPK:373757~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html.  
22 Poverty Reduction Group Training Workshop on Impact Evaluation of Poverty Alleviation Programs 
& Institutional Reforms, 29 April, 2009. For further information see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:2
2164246~menuPK:435390~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y,00.html.  
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and conceptual space released by the shareholder-backed results agenda have been 
taken up by internal sympathisers as a tool to enhance their attempts to reshape the 
understanding within the Bank  of  ‘poverty’.  Although  such  changes  occur 
incrementally over the long term, the US push to monitor the performance of the 
Bank has subtly altered the terrain on which this process is unfolding. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
Numbers are a powerful resource in the arena of global economic governance, 
offering states a means to enhance their ability to monitor IOs, and IOs a resource 
with which to bolster their authority and to manufacture autonomy. In the context of a 
positive feedback cycle regarding IO monitoring, the  interaction  between  an  IO’s 
framing of its state-principals’ understandings of  its mission, and the use of material 
incentives by a key state to push for evidence of performance according to this refined 
understanding of the IO’s mission, can accelerate the drive to quantify elements of the 
social  world.  This  is  the  case  with  the  World  Bank’s  results  agenda  and  ARMS, 
through which shareholders have tied IDA replenishments and conditional grants to 
the  Bank’s  ability  to  demonstrate  an  impact  on  global  poverty, as understood 
primarily in relation to the MDGs. 
However, far from being a neutral technocratic exercise in ensuring 
effectiveness  and  ‘value  for money’  from  the Bank,  the  drive  to  quantification  is  a 
deeply political act. The renewed focus on a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of 
poverty that has come through the results agenda has impacted on long-running 
contests within the Bank over how the organisation should approach development and 
poverty reduction. In an attempt to build alliances across the Bank to embed the 
multi-dimensional view of poverty, internal advocates – particularly the Poverty 
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Reduction Group – have seized upon the ground opened up by US pressure. Although 
change in the World Bank is always a long and unpredictable process, external 
pressures have combined with internal innovation to re-energise the battle of ideas at 
the heart of the organisation. Whatever the long term outcome, numbers, along with 
the ability to demonstrate arguments according to an econometric framework, will 
remain a potent weapon in the politics of shareholder accountability at the World 
Bank. 
Contests over the understanding of the Bank’s core aim in its interactions with 
low-income countries, and over the appropriate ways of assessing its performance in 
relation to this aim, have been ever-present throughout the history of the IO. At 
different times, internal and external actors have played key roles in this battle, and 
the forging of alliances has often provided renewed impetus to particular projects. The 
traction that shareholders currently have on this issue is unsurpassed in the recent 
history of the Bank. The concluding chapter of the thesis reflects on the links between 
this creditor state control and the prospects for cosmopolitan global governance, 
exploring in particular the extent to which the concerted focus on the MDGs is 
serving to open-up or close-down the opportunities for the democratic self-steering of 
this policy sphere in low-income countries. More immediately, however, chapter three 
now turns to the politics of shareholder accountability at the IMF, and reveals very 
different sets of dynamics to be in operation on the two sides of 19th Street. Whereas a 
relatively high degree of consensus amongst shareholders has helped facilitate the 
construction of a framework with which to monitor and control the Bank, at the Fund 
intra-shareholder disputes over the IO’s appropriate role have led to divergent, and at 
times contradictory, shareholder pressures. 
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Chapter Three – Ambiguous Goals and Blurred Accountability 
at the PRG F  
3.0. Introduction 
PRGFs aren’t about balance of payments, they’re essentially budget support… 
We in the US Office think the IMF should stay closer to its mandate (Daniel 
Heath, US Alternate Executive Director of the IMF, December 2008).36 
 
What  is  required  now  is  output measurement  [of PRGF programmes]… We 
say that we have helped the poor, but we are not sure if we have helped them 
in a manner that will uplift them out of poverty (Laurean Rutayisire, Africa 
Group II Executive Director of the IMF, December 2008).37 
 
During the closing years of World War II, when the potential form and function of the 
International Monetary Fund was being discussed among allied policymakers, the 
needs of developing countries were considered at best a secondary matter. The main 
concern of the architects of the Bretton Woods System was that mechanisms for 
ensuring stability in the exchange rates of the major global currencies be established, 
in order to provide a predictable environment in which international trade could 
recover. It was thought that the prosperity of developing countries, which largely 
operated within colonial currency blocs, would best be ensured with the IMF acting as 
an effective systemic guardian. However, as over time developing countries have 
become independent members of the IMF, and as the structure of the international 
monetary system has profoundly altered, the relationship between the Fund and this 
group of states has become much more intimate, much more long-term, and also 
much more controversial. In recent years, competing demands from key shareholders 
have placed contradictory pressures on the Fund to reform its engagement with low-
income countries. Intra-shareholder disagreements have revolved around the question 
of how the Fund should relate to the business of development, particularly where the 
                                                     
36 Interview with the author, November 2008. 
37 Interview with the author, November 2008. 
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line should be drawn between balance of payments correction and broader 
developmental concerns. 
 Though encountering major upheavals in its environment and making ongoing 
alterations to its operational practices, over its more than sixty year lifetime the IMF 
has  in  essence  remained  ‘a  balance  of  payments  institution’  (Bird  1995:  12).  The 
qualifying criteria for access to Fund resources has remained the demonstration of a 
balance of payments need, whether through the original General Resources Account 
(GRA) window or the more recently established Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF), Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) concessional windows. However, as over time low-income 
countries have come to dominate the Fund’s lending arrangements, contests over the 
organisation’s role within broader ‘developmental’ goals have emerged. Although the 
IMF itself and the US, its major shareholder, have continued to advocate an 
understanding of the Fund as a balance of payments focussed organisation, other 
major shareholders have attempted to both ensure that Fund resources remain a 
significant component of developmental assistance to low-income countries and that 
Fund supported programmes be driven by an explicit focus on poverty reduction. 
The story of the politics of shareholder accountability at the IMF, specifically 
relating to the attempts of large quota holders to encourage reforms in the 
organisation’s engagements with low-income countries, is complex. It entails both an 
examination of the process through which state-principals’  understanding  of  the 
organisation’s  appropriate  role  have  been  shaped,  and  of  the  mechanisms  through 
which competing shareholders have attempted to enact changes in the practices of an 
institution that is well known for its tendency to speak and act in the language of 
macroeconomic expertise. As the framework outlined in the opening chapter made 
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clear, in order to gain such a comprehensive understanding of the politics of 
shareholder accountability it is necessary to combine the analytical concerns of both 
the constructivist and PA approaches to the study of IOs. By so doing, it becomes 
possible to see two important facets of the contemporary politics of shareholder 
accountability at the Fund: first, the role played by interactions between the IO, state 
principals,  and  external  actors  in  shaping  understandings  of  the  Fund’s  appropriate 
role; and second, the role played by intra-shareholder contests to realise their aims and 
to overcome information shortages and push the IO to make operational alterations. 
 The chapter proceeds according to the following structure. The opening 
section introduces the conceptual framework that allows for a comprehensive 
understanding of the politics of shareholder accountability at the IMF to be presented. 
In contrast to the ‘positive feedback cycle’ explored in relation to the World Bank’s 
International Development Association in the previous chapter, here developments in 
the Fund’s  engagements with  low-income countries  are  characterised as  a  ‘negative 
feedback cycle’. Disagreements among shareholders have led to contradictory reforms 
of the operations of the Fund, which have in turn exacerbated disagreements and 
continued the contradictory pressures on the IO. In the second section of the chapter I 
review the major developments that established the IMF’s core expertise in the field 
of short term balance of payments management. This acknowledged expertise 
provides the sources of both the Fund’s and its key shareholders’ understandings of its 
central mission. In the third section I review the deepening relationship between the 
Fund and low-income countries from the late 1970s, which is done in order to provide 
the historical context of the contemporary intra-shareholder disputes. In the fourth 
section I outline the major developments that occurred within the relationship through 
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The formation of the SAF and ESAF marked the 
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consolidation  of  a  number  of  trends  in  the  IMF’s  engagements  with  low-income 
countries, which in combination served to generate ambiguity as to the appropriate 
goals of the IO. In the fifth section I outline the ongoing intra-shareholder contests to 
redefine  the  Fund’s  role  in  relation  to  low-income countries, which are focussed 
around reforms to the PRGF. Advocates of the ‘developmental’ Fund have attempted 
to use both financial incentives and mechanisms to reduce information shortages to 
push the organisation in a poverty reduction direction, while concurrently advocates 
of  a  ‘minimalist’  Fund  have  fought  to  put  in  place  clear  ‘exit  strategies’  for  low-
income countries with a long term reliance on Fund resources. In the closing section 
of the chapter I review the lessons that can be drawn regarding the politics of 
shareholder accountability in IOs from the experiences at the IMF, and introduce the 
key themes that are returned to in chapter six when the intersection of the politics of 
shareholder accountability at the IMF and debates on cosmopolitan global governance 
are examined. 
 
3.1. Conflicting economic principals 
In order to fully grasp the complexities of shareholder accountability at the IMF, it is 
necessary to combine the insights of principal-agent and constructivist accounts of 
IOs. This allows us to bring analytical clarity to the often subtle power relationships 
that are bound-up within the interactions between the Fund and its major quota 
holders.  In  contrast  to  the  ‘positive  feedback  cycle’  that  was  fostered  through  the 
shareholder accountability relationship at the World Bank, at the Fund conflicting 
understandings of the appropriate role of the IO amongst shareholders, combined with 
the inherent difficulties of reforming an organisation with a deeply embedded 
attachment to operating according to the tenets of ‘economic expertise’, have led to a 
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series of contradictory reforms. In responding to conflicting demands by instituting 
contradictory reforms the Fund has become entangled in a ‘negative feedback cycle’, 
whereby the continued dissatisfaction amongst shareholder groups that the IO is not 
effectively  meeting  ‘appropriate’  goals  has  led  to  continuing  divergent  reform 
pressures. Barring significant changes to either the Fund’s operations or shareholders’ 
preferences, this situation looks likely to continue. 
 A number of the mechanisms outlined by the PA approach are in evidence 
within the contemporary politics of shareholder accountability at the IMF. As was 
noted in previous chapters, the core concern of the PA approach to the analysis of IOs 
is on the balancing act that states carry out between, on the one hand, reaping the 
gains from delegation that allow their goals to be effectively met, and on the other 
hand working to ensure that IOs do in fact pursue these goals. Whilst there is a 
tendency in PA work to concentrate on examples of principals operating en bloc to 
push through reforms to IO practices (e.g. Gould 2006), an established strain of PA 
work analyses the important role played by intra-principal disputes. Amongst these 
contributions, works have focussed on the increased autonomy that can be enjoyed by 
IOs that successfully exploit disagreements to advance their own preferences 
(Worsham and Gattrell 2005: 366, Kiewert and McCubbins 1991: 26), as well as the 
means through which principals resolve disputes (Lyne et al 2006: 58). In relation to 
the latter, analysts consider the absolute formal power of member states to be an 
important determinant of outcomes, but also highlight the ability of lower order states 
to form veto coalitions on particular issues (Lyne et al 2006: 59, Garrett and Tsebelis 
1996: 269). As is shown later in the chapter, the formation of coalitions at moments 
when key funding decisions were taken has allowed shareholder advocates of a more 
developmental orientated Fund to secure key victories. 
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 In addition to the problem of intra-principal disputes, a second issue identified 
by the PA literature as inhibiting the ability of states to effectively control their IO-
agents that is pertinent to the shareholder accountability relationship at the IMF is the 
insulating  function  of  ‘expert  knowledge’. Although  a  central  source  of  state  gains 
from delegation come from the benefits of specialisation, the holding of highly 
specialised  expertise  by  an  IO  can  serve  to  hinder  states’  efforts  to  monitor  and 
demand changes in the output of the IO. In an institution such as the IMF, a great deal 
of expert knowledge is required in order to assess the efficacy of its policy 
prescriptions. In the words of Martin (2006: 145): 
Even when states oversee activities closely, it is often impossible for state 
representatives to have the necessary expertise to craft complex, effective 
programmes  in  a  timely  fashion…  Staff  members  are  responsible for 
collecting and being the repositories of necessary economic and political 
information to design policies that are likely to succeed. 
 
The  ‘problem  of  attribution’  has  long  clouded  shareholders’  ability  to  judge  the 
effectiveness of the Fund.38 Assessing the influence of Fund supported programmes in 
terms of conventional external viability and GDP indicators has proved to be highly 
problematic,39 but when shareholders attempted to push the Fund toward an explicit 
concern with poverty reduction this information shortage became a severe handicap. 
However,  the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) has acted as an important 
source  of  such  information, which  has  allowed  for  ‘developmental’  shareholders  to 
push the Fund to embed important aspects of a poverty reduction focus. The IEO has 
                                                     
38 Although complex statistical models have been used to generate plausible counterfactuals in order to 
clarify the question of how much ‘credit’ or ‘blame’ the IMF deserves for developments in borrowing 
countries, the attempts are founded on ‘a minefield of conceptual pitfalls’ (Schadler 1995: 618) that can 
at best be partially overcome. 
39 Opinion on the impact of Fund supported programmes on GDP growth rates remains divided. For a 
review of the literature, see Vreeland (2003: 3-8), Santaella (1996), Killick (1995: 43-58), and 
Williamson (1983: 129-44). Indeed, despite the heavy criticism encountered by the Fund for its 
perceived mis-handing of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8, reports produced by Fund staff 
maintain that reform programmes have proved to have aided the long term stability and growth of the 
countries (e.g. Boorman et al 2000: 4). Indeed Michel Camdessus, the IMF Managing Director at the 
time of the crisis, described the Fund’s response as ‘an outstanding success’ (Camdessus and Naim 
2000: 37). 
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in fact also played such a facilitating role for the advocates of a ‘minimalist’ Fund. In 
the battle to reform the Fund’s engagements with low-income countries, it seems that 
knowledge – and particularly knowledge expressed in ‘hard’ macroeconomic terms – 
is indeed power. 
As is shown through this chapter, the PA approach sheds light on a number of 
key mechanisms that both restrain and enhance the capacity for powerful states to 
control the IMF. The incentives- and knowledge-based games through which state 
shareholders attempt to realise their preferences clearly form a significant component 
of the politics of accountability at the Fund. However, for a more complete 
understanding to be presented it is necessary to again complement the insights of the 
PA model with those of the constructivist approach to the study of IOs.  
The constructivist approach to IOs adds greater nuance and depth to the 
understanding of the issue of shareholder accountability at the IMF. Whereas the PA 
model focuses on the means at the disposal of states to coerce IOs into compliance, 
constructivism highlights the process of fixing meanings that is deeply embedded 
within the accountability relationship (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 22-7, Bauer 
2002: 387, Alderson 2001: 421, Johnson 2001: 488, Immergut 1998: 14-19). During 
its early years, the Fund was successful in establishing an understanding of its role as 
defined by its macroeconomic expertise relating to the overcoming of short term 
balance of payments disequilibria. However, as the number of active arrangements 
that the Fund had with low-income countries increased dramatically through the 
1980s,  and conditionality  came  to  cover  issues  ‘outside’ of  its  core macroeconomic 
knowledge base, disagreements over the appropriate role of the Fund grew. Although 
the Fund continued to present its engagements with low-income countries in terms of 
its traditional mandate, input from external actors contributed to demands from some 
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shareholders that greater attention be paid to the poverty impact of adjustment 
programmes. 
In common with the previous analysis of shareholder accountability at the 
Bank, a perceived crisis was of central importance in determining contemporary 
developments in the relationship between the IMF and its major quota holders. The 
constructivist foregrounding of the importance of crises in both shifting 
understandings of the appropriate role of IOs in their social environment, and in 
shifting the balance of power between states and IOs in the contest to redefine this 
understanding (Boswell 2008: 472-3, Bauer 2002: 387), sheds light on the 
contemporary developments at the Fund. In particular, this insight can be drawn upon 
in order to fully capture the importance of the widespread criticism in the 1990s of the 
Fund’s  programmes  in  borrowing  countries,  which  culminated  in  the  ‘legitimacy 
crisis’ of  the Fund after  the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8 (Best 2007, Seabrooke 
2007, Elliott 2006, Wade 1998). This legitimacy crisis provided a group of the Fund’s 
major shareholders with an opportunity in the late 1990s to tie the IO in to the global 
policy  issue  of  ‘poverty  reduction’.  In  the  years  since  this  time  there  have  been 
ongoing contests, both internally amongst shareholders and between shareholders and 
the Fund, to fix the position of ‘poverty reduction’ within the Fund’s mission, and to 
attach a degree of operational precision to the goal. 
 A holistic understanding of the politics of shareholder accountability at the 
IMF requires that the insights of both of the major approaches to the study of IOs be 
combined. As was the case with the previous examination of the Bank, this can be 
accomplished by adopting an analytic framework with an explicitly diachronic focus. 
This allows us to see that contests between state-principals and IO-agents are 
essentially two sides of the same coin: the ‘games’ played between creditors and the 
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Fund regarding policy reform are both informed by, and themselves inform, 
understandings of the appropriate role of the IO. In contrast to the positive feedback 
cycle that developed through the Bank’s interactions with its shareholders, however, 
the evolution of shareholder accountability at the Fund has progressed along a more 
divided path. Whereas the Bank’s initial moves to redefine  its primary mission were 
followed by complementary shareholder moves to refine its mission and push for a 
more  effective  meeting  of  output  targets,  the  Fund’s  initial  move  toward  closer 
engagements with low-income countries was met by disputes over what its 
appropriate goals from these interactions should be. This intra-shareholder 
disagreement and confusion has led to contradictory pressures being placed on the 
Fund, and a series of inconsistent operational changes that have impeded the 
resolution of the dispute  over  the  Fund’s  role.  Figure  3.1  provides  a  schematic 
presentation of this process. 
As the following sections of the chapter show, agreement emerged in the early 
years  of  Fund  operations  that  the  organisation’s  primary  aim  was  the  provision  of 
emergency assistance to member states with severe balance of payments disequilibria. 
It also became rapidly established that attaching macroeconomic performance targets 
to high access loans was an appropriate modus operandi for the Fund to follow. 
When, in the late 1980s, the shift in IMF lending operations toward developing 
countries was consolidated with the formation of the Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the belief that Fund 
supported policy programmes needed to incorporate supply-side elements in order to 
facilitate effective balance of payments corrections led to changes in the time frame 
and content of IMF agreements with low-income countries. In more recent years, 
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F igure 3.1. The negative feedback cycle of I O monitoring 
 
 
 
conflict between shareholders over the appropriate endgame of Fund engagements 
with low-income countries, particularly as to whether the IO should be in the ‘poverty 
reduction business’, have led to a series of contradictory reforms. These pressures of 
shareholder accountability have  led  to  the beginning of a  ‘negative  feedback cycle’, 
whereby inconsistent reforms have led to continued disagreement between 
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shareholders as to the appropriateness of its policy tools and aims, and so further 
divergent pressures for reform.40 
 
3.2. Establishing the Fund’s balance of payments expertise 
When outlining his views on the International Monetary Fund, John Maynard Keynes, 
one of the key architects of the post-War international monetary order, cautioned 
against  the  danger  of  the  institution  ‘being  grandmotherly’  (James  2004:  78). What 
Keynes did not want was the Fund to resemble a hectoring matriarch, convinced of 
her own wisdom and telling others what to do in return for providing finance. 
However, through the opening decades of its operation, the Fund rapidly succeeded in 
acquiring an unparalleled level of expertise regarding the resolution of balance of 
payments problems. As a consequence of the general understanding amongst 
shareholders that regarding balance of payments ‘the Fund knows best’, mechanisms 
were put in place whereby access to upper levels of Fund resources was made 
conditional on borrowers’ adherence to IMF policy prescriptions. Against the original 
wishes of Keynes, the ‘Old Lady of 19th Street’ became distinctly grandmotherly. It is 
necessary to take a long-term view of the evolution of the Fund’s operations in order 
to gain a full understanding of the historical context of the contemporary intra-
shareholder disputes. 
 When its Articles of Agreement were signed in 1945, the raison d’être of the 
IMF was to act akin to an international credit union. Under a rules based international 
monetary system with fixed exchange rates, the Fund was designed as a lender of last 
resort to provide offsetting finance to countries with balance of payments 
                                                     
40 Changes in key personnel at the Fund have contributed to this period of uncertainty at the 
organisation. Following the relative stability of the Camdessus years (1987-2000), over the past decade 
the IMF has had three Managing Directors. See IMF Official Website, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/mds.asp. 
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disequilibria. In the face of a persistent problem, members could apply to the Fund to 
make changes to the par value of their currency. Although the system of fixed 
exchange rates broke down in the early 1970s, the role of the Fund remained 
remarkably consistent. Under the new international environment the Fund acquired 
new policy tools such as currency devaluation and moving to flexible exchange rate 
regimes that it increasingly recommended to members with external imbalances (see 
Figure  3.2),  but  the  Fund’s  mode  of  operation  did  not  fundamentally  alter  (Bordo 
2004, James 2004). 
F igure 3.2. Exchange rate regime change 
 
A relatively high degree of autonomy from its shareholders is built into the 
financial structure of  the  IMF. Whereas many  IOs are forced  to go ‘cap  in hand’  to 
their state masters on a regular basis (and so face the inevitable attempts of states to 
link funding to particular outputs), the Fund is insulated from this pressure. The paid 
in ‘quotas’ of member states provide the revolving funds that are lent by the IMF, and 
the operating costs of the institution are covered from within the interest charges 
levied on borrowers (Woods 2006: 15-38). Members’ quotas are calculated according 
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to their relative importance to the global economy, and are composed of 25 percent 
Special Drawing Right (SDR), and 75 percent domestic currency (James 1996: 51).41 
Although control over the flow of resources into the IMF is not a source of power that 
states can use in the normal course of the operations of the IO, at key moments the 
principals have successfully employed this source of leverage.42 
The governance structure that was set up for the IMF mirrored that of the 
World Bank, reviewed in the previous chapter. Under the arrangements, all member 
states are represented on a Board of Governors. Using their voting power, determined 
by the size of their quota, state representatives appoint Executive Directors to an 
Executive Board that has responsibility for the conduct of the general operations of 
the Fund. The largest quota holders each appoint a single Executive Director;43 the 
other members are arranged into groupings of between four and 23 that collectively 
elect an Executive Director.44 The Executive Board meets several times a week to 
discuss both general policy issues and country specific assessments, and although 
technically Executive Directors carry the combined weights of the countries they 
represent into Board votes, in practice decisions are made on a ‘consensual’ basis and 
votes are rarely taken. The Board is chaired by the IMF Managing Director, who, 
owing  to  a  freedom  to  recommend  actions  based  on  the  ‘mood  of  the  meeting’, 
exercises considerable informal power. In 1974, an Interim Committee was added to 
                                                     
41 Although originally quotas were paid in a ratio 75 domestic currency and 25 percent gold, in its 
contemporary operations members are required to pay in domestic currency and special drawing rights 
(SDRs). SDRs are in essence a unit of account used by the Fund, consisting of the euro, Japanses yen, 
British pound, and US dollar. See IMF Official Website, IMF Factsheet: The SDR, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.   
42 As is shown later in the chapter, the extension of multilateral debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the reforms to the Fund in the light of the ‘credit 
crunch’ have been two such exceptions, during which the provision of Funds has been tied to reforms 
in the operations of the IO. 
43 Currently, the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia appoint 
independent Executive Directors. 
44 See IMF Official Website, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.   
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the governance structure of the Fund. Composed of 24 Governors of the Fund and 
reflecting the composition of the Executive Board, the Committee meets biannually to 
discuss potential major operational changes to the IMF (Woods 2006: 15-38, Woods 
and Narlikar 2001).45 
 On paper, the original role of the Fund was remarkably clear. Within the 
fixed-but-adjustable Bretton Woods System, the external monetary policy options of 
the  Fund’s  member  states  were  relatively limited. Faced with pressure on their 
currency value through a balance of payments shortfall (i.e. domestic demand for 
foreign currency was outstripping foreign demand for the domestic currency), states – 
with advice from the Fund – were faced with a judgement call. If the disequilibrium 
was thought to be of a short term, ‘emergency’ nature that would be corrected over a 
natural economic cycle, then they could borrow resources from the IMF with which to 
offset the disequilibrium to defend their currency value. Conversely, if the 
disequilibrium was thought to be of a deeper, longer term nature, they could request 
the Fund for permission to devalue the official rate of exchange. The assumption 
underlying this course of action was that through devaluation positive price 
elasticities  of  supply  and demand would  increase  demand  for  the  country’s  exports 
and reduce its domestic demand for imports, thereby allowing for a stable equilibrium 
to be reached (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 53, Bird 1995: 2). 
 However, in the first decades of its operation, the Fund did a large amount of 
‘learning  on  the  job’.  Its  staff,  with  their  unparalleled  access  to  data  and  key 
practitioners, helped to shape the boundaries of macroeconomic knowledge in the 
field of exchange rate management. Although the first disbursals of Fund credits were 
made with no attached conditions, over time it became established procedure that 
                                                     
45 In 1999, the Interim Committee was re-named the International Monetary and Financial Committee 
(IMFC). See IMF Official Website, IMF Factsheet: A Guide to Committees, Clubs, and Groups, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm.   
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access to Fund resources were made subject to the meeting of certain policy 
benchmarks. A seminal case in the establishment of conditionality was the stand-by 
arrangement of Paraguay in 1957, in which it was agreed that a failure by the 
government to meet set performance criteria would lead to an automatic suspension of 
drawing rights. By the mid-1960s, the practice of attaching policy conditionality to 
loans  had  become  almost  universal  for  loans  that  would  increase  a  borrower’s 
indebtedness by beyond the ‘gold tranche’ (i.e. above 25 percent of a member’s quota 
allowance) (Boughton 2001: 558). The content of conditionality was to a large extent 
determined by the evolving stock of Fund ‘expertise’ on the causes of and appropriate 
responses to balance of payments crises. Of particular importance were developments 
regarding  the  understanding  of  both  the  ‘absorption  approach’  and  the  ‘monetary 
approach’  to  balance  of  payments  disequilibria  (Barnett  and  Finnemore  2004:  55, 
Killick 1995: 22). 
 The key analytic advances that provided the intellectual underpinnings to 
evolving the use of conditionality were made in the early- to mid-1950s. The 
absorption approach to solving balance of payments, notably expounded in IMF 
Working Papers by Tsiang (1950) and Alexander (1952), focussed on the role played 
by  domestic  spending  in  aggravating  a  country’s  balance  of  payments  position. 
Advances around this model led Fund staff to encourage countries with disequilibria 
to institute policies to dampen aggregate demand as part of a correctional policy 
package. Regarding the monetary approach, the contribution of Polak (1957) 
highlighting credit expansion as the primary causal factor in determining balance of 
payments imbalances influenced the advocacy in Fund supported programmes of 
policies to restrict domestic credit creation. In addition, after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates in 1973, currency devaluation also 
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increasing became integrated into IMF policy conditionality (Sumner 2006, Killick 
1995: 135, Dell 1983: 35). Although refinements and changes occurred in the Fund’s 
modelling of balance of payments problems in later years, in certain respects by the 
early 1960s the die of IMF conditionality had been cast. In particular, the burgeoning 
Fund expertise on balance of payments was of an avowedly macroeconomic form, 
concentrating on the ‘big’ fiscal and monetary policy levers available to states rather 
than the supply side structural reforms that could potentially have addressed balance 
of payments disequilibria, albeit over a longer timeframe.46  
 Over the opening decades of Fund operations the large quota holding states, in 
general  satisfied  by  the  Fund’s  expertise  in  relation  to  balance  of  payments 
corrections, ceded authority over the ‘nuts and bolts’ of conditionality to Fund staff. 
Successive reviews of access to Fund resources under the GRA – the pool made up of 
members’  quotas  – reiterated the necessity of linking access in excess of the gold 
tranche to progressively more stringent policy conditionality. A comprehensive 
review of conditionality that was endorsed by the Board in 1968 is remarkable in the 
autonomy that it grants to operational staff: 
Performance clauses will cover those performance criteria necessary to 
evaluate implementation of the programme with a view to ensuring the 
achievement of its objectives… No general rule as to the number and content 
of performance criteria can be adopted in view of the diversity of problems 
and institutional arrangements of members (Board Decision No. 2620-
(68/141), quoted in Boughton 2001: 558). 
 
In spite of growing criticism from some borrowers in the late 1960s and through the 
1970s that Fund policy prescriptions were unnecessarily deflationary and damaging to 
longer term growth prospects, in a subsequent review of conditionality in 1978 the 
Board reiterated their backing for the ‘tough love’ of IMF supported policy packages. 
                                                     
46 Finch (1983: 78) suggests that the IMF eschewed attention to structural factors in order to maintain 
an appearance of ‘political neutrality’, as is enshrined by its Articles of Agreement. By specifying 
conditions in terms of broad macroeconomic indicators, the distance between the sphere of influence of 
the Fund and specific decisions regarding policy implementation was maximised.  
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Indeed, in their communications accompanying the 1978 decision, the Board urged 
countries with balance of payments problems to turn to the Fund earlier rather than 
later, in order to minimise the need for painful reforms (Boughton 2001: 559).  
By the mid-1970s,  the  IMF’s  position  of  expertise  in  relation  to  combating 
balance of payments crises had been comprehensively established. Major shareholders 
were  in  agreement  that  the  ‘medicine’  of  the  Fund’s  policy  prescriptions  were  an 
appropriate accompaniment to higher tranche credit access, and, notwithstanding the 
problem of attribution, the success of Fund engagements could broadly be measured 
in relation to balance of payments corrections. However, up until the mid-1970s, as 
most of the Fund’s lending business was conducted with industrialised countries, the 
question  of  the  organisation’s  engagements  with  its  low-income countries had 
remained relatively unexplored (Boughton 2001: 564, de Vries 1986: 118-20). Owing 
to a combination of their low representation in the Fund and their inability to afford 
the  lending  rates  charged  by  the  Fund,  the  level  of  the  IMF’s  engagement  with 
developing countries had remained restricted. However, the oil crises of the 1970s 
delivered a new wave of borrowers to the Fund, and as the decade went on, 
disagreements between staff and some major creditors began to emerge as to what the 
terms of these engagements should be. The disagreements, concerning the 
compatibility  between  the  IMF’s  established  approach  to  countering balance of 
payments crises and the particular developmental needs of low-income countries, 
continue to structure the contemporary politics of shareholder accountability at the 
Fund.  
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3.3. I M F lending to low-income countries 
From the mid-1970s, the centre of gravity in the use of Fund resources shifted 
dramatically toward the developing world. This shift represented a major re-
orientation in the work of the IMF, and through to the contemporary era lending 
arrangements with developing countries have continued to outnumber those with 
industrialised members (Barro and Lee 2005: 1247, Killick 1995: 14). This shift has 
been accompanied by rising disagreements amongst the Fund’s major shareholders as 
to what  parameters  should  be  set  regarding  the  Fund’s  engagements with this new 
group of constituents. Indeed, this contest is referred to by Boughton (2001: 644) as ‘a 
battle  for  the  soul of  the  institution’. These  intra-shareholder disagreements revolve 
around appropriateness of the concessional provision of resources by the Fund and the 
tension between  the Fund’s expertise  in  the  field of balance of payments correction 
and low-income countries’ developmental needs.  
The events of 1973 marked the beginning of what became a major refocusing 
of the lending activities of the IMF, when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC)  began  to  use  oil  as  a  tool  of  ‘economic  nationalism’.  Over  the 
course of the year, sanctions in response to the Yom Kippur War and more general 
supply limitations saw the price of crude rocket, rising fourfold over the closing three 
months of the year alone (Morse 1999, Weatherford and Fukui 1989). Owing to the 
difficultly faced by importing countries switching consumption away from such a 
vital commodity, current account deficits rapidly began to widen (see Figure 3.3). The 
Fund’s response was to create an Oil Facility, through which offsetting finance could 
be provided to countries with balance of payments problems. In order to make the 
Facility accessible to low-income countries, a Subsidy Account was appended to the 
Facility. Through the Subsidy Account, contributions from a group of 25 
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industrialised countries reduced the rate of interest charged to developing country 
borrowers from the standard Oil Facility rate of 7.7 percent to 2.7 percent (James 
1996: 253-4). Although the US had been against the establishment of the Oil Facility 
because of the legitimacy and sustenance it was thought to provide to the OPEC 
action (James 1996: 316), the successful formation of a coalition to provide the 
necessary  resources  led  to  its  opposition  being  overcome.  The  size  of  countries’ 
access to the Oil Facility was calculated on the basis of a demonstrated balance of 
payments need, and resources were released without any monitored conditionality 
(Boughton 2001: 639, James 1996: 317). 
The practice of the Fund making conditionality-free concessional resources 
available to low-income member countries was deepened in 1977, with the opening of 
the Trust Fund. To a large extent, the Trust Fund was the outcome of a combination of 
serendipitous circumstances; a compromised solution to a disagreement over the 
ownership of the IMF’s stock of gold, and a massive surge in its price. Like the Oil 
Facility, the Trust Fund was designed to assist Fund members through a ‘temporary’ 
crisis period in the mid- to late-1970s, and no monitored conditionality was attached 
to loans (de Vries 1986: 119). By providing resources to counteract an extra-ordinary 
external environment, these developments were still broadly understood by 
shareholders to be within the IMF’s balance of payments remit. 
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Figure 3.3. Non oil exporting developing countries’ payments deficit 
 
 
F igure 3.4. Early I M F concessional lending 
 
 
At the same time as the Oil Facility and Trust Fund were acting to normalise 
the idea of the IMF as a provider of concessional resources to address balance of 
payments crises in low-income countries, there was a growing understanding within 
the organisation that the conditionality-free route made available by these windows 
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might not represent an optimal solution. There was a growing belief amongst Fund 
staff  that  rather  than  being  a  temporary  ‘shock’,  the  oil  price  rise  (and  consequent 
balance of payments deficits) in fact represented a long term change in the world 
economy. It was thought by staff that, to promote the heavy reforms that adjustment 
by development countries would entail,  the one year ‘stand-by arrangement’ used to 
set the conditions of upper access limits to the GRA was too restricted. Consequently, 
an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was set up. In order to access resources under the 
EFF, countries were required to outline a three year policy programme, and 
satisfactory performance was required for continued drawing rights. In terms of the 
content of the conditionality, EFF agreements represented a continuation of ‘business 
as  usual’,  with  the  macroeconomic  expertise  of  staff  informing  the  performance 
criteria (James 1996: 328-35, Schadler et al 1995: 3). According to Haggard (1985: 
506): 
Programmes under the EFF did not represent a sharp departure from the 
Fund’s  traditional  strategies  for  adjustment.  Adjustment  still  relied  on 
traditional instruments – the exchange rate and monetary and fiscal restraint – 
and the goal of short term stabilisation often took precedence over more 
difficult structural changes. 
 
However, in applying its existing expertise regarding the correction of balance of 
payments problems to the new group of developing country borrowers, Fund staff 
inadvertently provoked a confrontation with a coalition of its European shareholders. 
Disagreement between these shareholders and the IMF came into the public 
with the second oil shock, which occurred when the Iranian Revolution let to massive 
reductions in the output levels in this vitally important oil producing country. When 
the price rise hit in 1979, non-oil exporting developing countries’ payment positions 
spiralled dramatically (Figure 3.3). At a fraught Annual Meeting held in Belgrade in 
October of that year, the French Finance Minister René Monory and British 
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Chancellor Geoffrey Howe in particular pressured Fund management to ensure that 
Fund resources were made available to assist this group of countries. In a marked shift 
from the shareholders’ previous support for tough conditionality, owing to what were 
perceived as crisis conditions Monory and Howe called for more relaxed access 
criteria.  In  their  view,  it  would  be  unacceptable  for  the  Fund’s  potential  to  help 
developing countries finance balance of payments emergencies be stymied through 
the imposition of programmes that countries were unable or unwilling to submit to 
(Boughton 2001: 561-2, 637). In the words of Howe: 
Now that the rules governing conditionality have been liberalised, I hope that 
developing countries will find it acceptable to work closely with the Fund and 
exploit to the full the resources now available to help them overcome their 
problems (quoted in Boughton 2001: 561). 
 
Pressure such as this from key shareholders at the time of the second oil crisis 
contributed to a major acceleration in Fund lending, concentrated amongst developing 
countries, and a marked easing in Fund conditionality from 1979 (James 1996: 340, 
Williamson 1983: 640-6).47 
 The aftermath of the Belgrade Meeting shows the emergence for the first time 
of competing interpretations between key shareholders and the Fund regarding the 
appropriate goals of the IO in its interactions with developing countries. However, 
with the exception of the Trust Fund disbursals, the surge in lending largely bypassed 
the lowest income group of IMF members, who were unable to agree to the 
repayment terms of EFF loans (Barro and Lee 2005: 1248). It was with the launch of 
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 that  the  form  of  the  Fund’s 
                                                     
47 Early evidence of the intra-shareholder disputes that would come to dog efforts to reform IMF 
engagements with low-income countries can be seen in the aftermath of this European pressure. In 
1981 the US Executive Director called for a return to tough conditionality to counteract the perceived 
tendency toward ‘more and more financing and less and less adjustment’ in the Fund’s engagements 
with developing countries. The US Executive Director also added his voting weight to the matter, 
withholding support for Fund arrangements with Grenada, India, and Pakistan on the grounds that an 
insufficient focus was being placed on conditionality (quoted in James 2001: 565). 
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engagement with its lowest income country members began to be clarified. Although 
the IMF continued to present its lending engagements with low-income members as 
being driven primarily by concerns with external viability, key shareholders began to 
view the IO as shifting towards more of a long-term  ‘development  partner’  role. 
Whereas the European major shareholders acted to tie the Fund – and particularly the 
Fund’s financial resources – in to this role, the US in particular moved to ensure that 
the Fund  remain within  its  ‘core areas of expertise’.48 These contradictory pressures 
have, in recent years, led to a series of inconsistent reforms that have clouded the 
issue as to whether the IMF is or is not ‘in the business’ of development. 
 
3.4. Throwing open the concessional lending window 
Unusually for a major policy development at the IMF, the proposal to establish the 
SAF came directly from the shareholder level, with no prompting from the formal 
agenda or preliminary staff papers. At a meeting of the Interim Committee in the 
spring of 1985 the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers present noted that over the 
next few years the IMF would be receiving substantial repayments of loans made 
under the Trust Fund, in total some SDR 3 billion. It was agreed that these resources 
should be made available to the organisation’s lowest income members, whose needs 
were considered to be greater by the mid-1980s than they had been when the Trust 
Fund was established. Accordingly, the Interim Committee sent instructions to the 
Executive Board to consider the options available for such a new concessional lending 
window (Boughton 2001: 637). The blueprints of the SAF that were laid out by the 
                                                     
48 Although it is difficult to precisely outline the groupings in the intra-shareholder disagreements, it is 
common to roughly categorise them as revolving around the ‘developmental’ Europeans and the 
‘minimalist’ US. This cleavage has historical validity (Boughton 2001: 560-2), and several 
interviewees highlighted the tendency in particular of the UK and French Executive Directors, owing to 
these countries’ links to low-income former colonies, to bring broader concerns into reviews of Fund 
programmes and debates on policy reforms. 
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Board later that year served to consolidate significant trends  within  the  Fund’s 
engagements with low-income countries. Together, these changes have contributed to 
the emergence of intra-shareholder disputes as to whether the Fund is, and whether 
the Fund should be, a development focussed institution. 
 The SAF guidelines served to secure the position of the Fund as a provider of 
concessional finance, and to widen the practice of longer term arrangements. Whereas 
the Trust Fund and Oil Facilities had contained ad hoc mechanisms to reduce the 
lending charges levied on developing countries, through the SAF the Fund’s ability to 
provide loans at a nominal 0.5 percent over the long term was formalised. In addition, 
it was agreed that arrangements under the SAF would be over a three year period, 
with semi-annual benchmarks used to assess performance and determine whether an 
agreement would remain active (Boughton 2001: 649, Garuda 2000: 1046).  
More substantively, the SAF marked the confirmation of the departure by the 
IMF  from  the  ‘clean’  world  of  macroeconomics  into  the  realm of structural 
adjustment. Through their recent Trust Fund and EFF engagements with developing 
countries, Fund staff had begun to realise that the external imbalances in such 
countries could not be corrected with the use of fiscal and monetary levers alone. 
Rather, it was agreed that the specific barriers to growth and the attainment of a stable 
position in the world economy that had inhibited low-income countries’ development 
would need to be targeted. Such reforms included reducing the power of state run 
monopoly  industries  and  ‘marketing  boards’  to  allow  for  producer  prices  to  be 
determined freely,49 and a series of regulatory reforms at the microeconomic level to 
stimulate enterprise on a local level. In line with this thinking, access to the SAF was 
made contingent of the agreement of a Policy Framework Paper, agreed between the 
                                                     
49 Marketing Boards were commonly used by governments of low-income countries to maintain control 
external trade and monetary relations. Under Marketing Boards, domestic producers wishing to export 
were compelled to sell goods to the Board (IMF 2003: 103, Barber and Jeffrey 1986: 127-30).  
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country authorities and the IMF, setting out both macroeconomic and structural policy 
objectives (Schadler 1995: 617, James 1996: 526). The final change that was 
enshrined within the SAF blueprint covered the overall objectives of SAF 
arrangements, and served to significantly muddy the waters as to the purpose of the 
Fund engagements with low-income  countries. Whereas  previously  all  Fund  ‘upper 
tranche’ arrangements were made with the overall aim of fully solving a balance of 
payments problem over the lifetime the agreement, SAF programmes had the less 
precise  goal  of  ‘assuring  substantial  progress’  toward  such  a  resolution  (IMF  IEO 
2002: 34). In terms of the resources that were released through SAF agreements, after 
a cautious start the Fund’s access policy became more lavish. The first round of SAF 
arrangements that were agreed in 1986 allowed for drawings over the three years 
totalling  no  more  than  47  percent  of  a  member’s  quota. However, due to an 
unexpectedly low take-up of SAFs by eligible countries the ceiling was rapidly raised 
first to 70 percent,50 and then raised further to 250 percent when the Facility was 
‘Enhanced’ to become the ESAF (Boughton 2001: 652, James 1996: 526).  
These changes combined to constitute, in the eyes of many observers, a 
fundamental shift in the purpose of the Fund, from being a short-term crisis manager 
to being a long-term developmental partner (Mosley 2001: 597-600, Collier and 
Gunning 1999: 634, Pauly 1999: 402-3). This impression was heightened by the 
interchangeable treatment of the resources of the IMF, the World Bank, and bilateral 
donors within the Policy Support Papers that accompanied SAF and ESAF 
arrangements. Once an arrangement had in principle been agreed, the Policy 
Framework Paper was circulated amongst bilateral and other donors, highlighting the 
total contributions from the Bank and Fund and the remaining financing need of the 
                                                     
50 Only countries that were eligible for World Bank IDA lending (i.e. the lowest income group of 
states) were declared eligible for SAF arrangements. When launched, this meant that the SAF was open 
to approximately 60 Fund members (Boughton 2001: 652, James 1996: 526). 
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policy programme outlined. The SAF and ESAF lending windows worked to tie the 
IMF into the world of economic development, as although the resources released by 
the IMF made up only a small proportion of low-income countries’ overall  funding 
need, through the 1990s most official bilateral aid was linked to the acceptance of 
IMF conditionality (James 1996: 527). For the lowest income countries, unable to 
access credit through the private markets, this elevated the importance their 
relationship with the IMF dramatically.51 
 Owing to their reliance on official credit, and the increasingly central role of 
the IMF as a conduit for these flows, a group of low-income countries rapidly became 
perennial users 
F igure 3.5. Low-income countries become long-term users of Fund resources 
 
 
of Fund resources. An analysis of the engagements of the group of low-income PRSP 
countries reveals this trend. Of the 24 PRSP countries, an average of 15 had active 
programmes in any given year between 1986 and 2008. The amount disbursed 
through these arrangements was relatively modest, at around SDR12.5 million.  
                                                     
51 The majority of SAF and ESAF eligible countries have never enjoyed access to private sources of 
finance. Indeed, in an interview with the author in late 2008 Jan-Kees Martyn, a Senior Economist in 
the Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department, estimated that only five of the 78 PRGF 
eligible countries had access on affordable terms. 
Source: Data from IMF Official Website                                                    
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The issue of the conditionality attached to SAF and ESAF loans was from the 
start contentious, with a host of pressures combining on Fund staff to encourage them 
to  treat  the  lowest  income  borrowers  ‘lightly’.  The  initial  pressure  to  ‘recycle’  the 
Trust Fund  repayments was  followed by both  ‘cross  conditionality’ pressures  and  a 
growing need  for  ‘defensive  lending’, which all  pushed  the Fund  to  ensure  that  the 
flow of financing was continued. In terms of the balance between  ‘hard’  and  ‘soft’ 
conditionality, arrangements made by low-income  countries  through  the  IMF’s 
concessional  window  tended  to  have  a  disproportionate  number  of  ‘soft’  structural 
benchmarks as opposed to ‘hard’ prior actions and performance criteria. Prior actions 
and performance criteria are quantitative targets that have to be met in order for 
drawings under an arrangement to commence or continue, whilst qualitative 
benchmarks are less absolute indicators that are taken into account by the Board when 
deciding whether a disbursal should be made. In addition to having relatively few 
qualitative targets in agreements, low-income countries under the SAF and ESAF 
were also granted waivers to allow continued drawings in spite of missed targets more 
often than other categories of Fund borrowers (IMF IEO 2002: 44-8). Indeed Michel 
Camdessus, the IMF Managing Director from 1987 to 2000, was explicit about the 
tendency to treat low-income  countries  favourably:  ‘[When  a  borrower]  is  a  poor 
developing country, then we try to give them the benefit of the doubt for as long as 
possible’ (Camdessus and Naim 2000: 41). 
Despite the relative leniency of the Fund in its engagements with its lowest 
income borrowers, the arrangements reached under SAF and ESAF attracted growing 
amounts of criticism in the 1990s. Although Fund assessments found that SAF and 
ESAF programmes were conducive to growth and the correction of external 
imbalances (Schadler 1995, Schadler et al 1993), the methodological difficulty of 
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modelling the counterfactual to a Fund arrangement meant that it was difficult to draw 
definitive results (Bird and Mosley 2004: 304-7). Critical assessments of Fund 
programmes focussed on what was seen as an excessive reliance on demand 
compression to correct balance of payments issues, and an insufficient attempt to 
implement growth-orientated solutions (Killick 1995: 13, Helleiner et al 1991). In 
addition, a number of studies criticised the lack of attention by the IMF to the 
distributional effects of the adjustment programmes that they were supporting, 
particularly the effects on the poorest groups in countries with IMF agreements 
(Garuda 2000, Cornia et al 1987).  
Notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evidence on the long-term growth and 
developmental impact of Fund programmes with low-income countries, in the mid-to-
late 1990s a period of sustained and vocal criticism led to a sense of crisis enveloping 
these  activities.  High  profile  umbrella  groups  such  as  ’50  Years  is  Enough’  and 
‘Jubilee 2000’ carried out vocal public campaigns criticising the IMF, and established 
groups such as OXFAM and even United Nations organisations such as UNICEF and 
the UNDP cast doubt on the broad developmental impact of Fund supported 
programmes. From 1995, it became common for the Annual Meetings of the IMF to 
be accompanied by public protests against the perceived impact of the Fund, with 
these criticisms later carrying over to meetings of the G7. The 1998 G7 Summit in 
Birmingham, UK, marked a watershed of such protests, when some 300,000 
protesters joined hands around the meeting venue to highlight the problem of global 
poverty and debt (Best 2007: 87-9, Callaghy 2004: 6, Christiansen and Hovland 2003: 
20).  It  is  this  sense of  crisis  surrounding  the Fund’s  engagements with  low-income 
countries that led shareholders to push for major reforms to the ESAF in 1999. 
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3.5. Dressing the concessional window, and also trying to close it a bit… 
By the late 1990s, the sense of crisis surrounding the Fund had led the large quota 
holding states to reassess the role of the organisation. A clear cleavage was emerging 
between  the key  shareholders  as  to what  the  appropriate  goals  of  the organisation’s 
interactions with low-income countries should be. Though united in the belief that the 
Fund’s engagements with this group of countries were in need of reform, the desired 
directions of reform were conflicting. On the ‘minimalist’ side, the US view was that 
the  IMF’s  lending  activities  had  taken  them  beyond  its  area  of  expertise,  and  they 
advocated a process of disentanglement from countries that had become long term 
users of concessional resources without enacting visible reforms. On the 
‘developmental’ side, the European view was that although reforms were necessary to 
fine-tune the poverty and growth impact of Fund supported programmes, Fund 
expertise and resources should play a significant role in the policy environment of 
low-income countries.52 The existence of this cleavage, and its dialectic resolution 
over time, reveal important lessons regarding the politics of accountability in IOs. 
 Regarding  the  process  by  which  shareholders’  understandings  of  the 
appropriate role of their IO-agents are formed, the intra-shareholder disputes over the 
IMF’s engagements with low-income countries illustrate the important role played by 
the broader social environment surround the IO. The consistent US opposition to the 
long term provision of concessional resources to low-income countries is, for 
example, influenced by the high attention paid by the legislature to the transfer of 
resources to the Fund and the lack of deeply institutionalised links with the 
                                                     
52 Interviews conducted by the author with Executive Directors and high level members of Staff at the 
Fund consistently confirmed the existence of this cleavage. In addition, IEO reviews of concessional 
lending (e.g. 2001, 2004, 2007a) commonly make coded references to unclear or inconsistent guidance 
from Board level. Indeed, in the report on ‘The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2007: vii) the 
then IEO Director Tom Bernes spells this division out in uncertain terms: ‘Fundamentally, the report 
finds differences of views among members of the Executive Board about the IMF’s role and policies in 
low-income countries’. 
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organisation’s  lowest  income members, whereas  the weaker oversight pressures and 
the embedded links with former colonies have led to converse tendencies within a 
grouping of European shareholders.53 As a result of these disputes, the formation of 
coalitions with control over resources has been an important determinant of reforms to 
the Fund’s engagements, with the direct provision of finance providing shareholders 
with the  means  of  ‘outmanoeuvring’  the  organisation’s  largest  quota  holder.  In 
addition, the ongoing attempts of large quota holders to enact changes in the activities 
of the IMF reinforce the importance of overcoming information shortages within the 
politics of shareholder accountability. 
 Previous to the ESAF reforms in 1999, distributional concerns had never 
figured prominently on the IMF agenda when planning low-income  borrowers’ 
adjustment programmes. The proclivity of Fund staff to deal in aggregated data is 
well established (Gutner 2009, Barnett and FInnemore 2004: 65), and the internal 
reviews of the organisation’s concessional lending followed this format. Published in 
1993, the first major Fund review of its experiences with SAF and ESAF assessed the 
progress made by countries under SAF and ESAF programmes toward attaining 
external viability, and the impact of programmes on domestic growth was also 
examined. In answer to the question as to whether a return to external viability came 
through an excessive restraint of domestic demand and therefore at the expense of 
longer term growth and investment, the report concluded that the impact of 
programmes on these indicators had been generally favourable (Schadler et al 1993). 
For staff, it has traditionally been held that Fund programmes should focus on 
enabling a stable environment to emerge within which the size of the ‘economic pie’ 
                                                     
53 These conflicting pressures were suggested during interviews with representatives from the US, UK, 
Africa Group I, and Africa Group II Offices at the IMF, and by Jon Sanford of the Congressional 
Research Service and Chad Dobson of the Bank Information Centre. 
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can be maximised: who gets what has largely been seen as a matter for domestic 
policy processes (Garuda 2000: 1031). 
It was at the 1998 G7 Summit in Birmingham that, under the leadership of the 
then UK Chancellor Gordon Brown and Secretary of State for International 
Development Clare Short, the ‘developmental’ shareholders began to push the IMF to 
focus more on distributional concerns, and in particular to institutionalise a more 
poverty reduction focussed approach (Christiansen and Hovland 2003: 16). The 
prominent announcement in the Birmingham Communiqué of the G7 commitment to 
reform multilateral  institutions  so  as  to  promote  ‘sustainable economic growth and 
development throughout the world [to] enable developing countries to grow faster and 
reduce  poverty’  is  evidence  of  this  shift.  The  report  of  the  finance ministers  to  the 
summit in Cologne the following year shows a strengthening of the ‘developmental’ 
position within the G7. Referring to the need to reform IMF concessional lending 
practices, the report urges that: 
[Engagements with low-income countries] should be built upon an enhanced 
framework for poverty  reduction… We call upon the IMF to develop by the 
time of the Annual Meeting specific plans for such an enhanced framework for 
poverty reduction (paragraphs 4-6). 
 
The staff paper produced in response to this G7 call provided details of possible 
reforms to improve the poverty reduction focus of the Fund (IMF 1999), and by the 
close of the year the reincarnation of the ESAF as the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility had been announced.  
 The  terms  of  access  to  the  Fund’s  reformed  concessional  lending  facility 
marked a dramatic change with the past practices of the organisation. Although it 
remained necessary for countries to demonstrate a balance of payments need, access 
was made conditional on producing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The 
past ambivalence of Fund staff to distributional concerns appeared to have been 
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spectacularly discarded, as the guidelines on PRSPs called for programmes with an 
optimal impact on poverty to be included:  
Poverty reduction strategies will identify the priorities for public action that 
will have the greatest impact on reducing poverty. They should contain 
systematic and participatory analyses of poverty, short- and long-term 
tradeoffs of alternative policy decisions, and the impact of proposed reforms 
on the most vulnerable social groups (IMF & World Bank 1999: paragraph 2). 
 
The new ‘poverty reduction turn’ of the IMF was also marked by a series of speeches 
and articles highlighting the concern of the Fund in promoting poverty reduction (e.g. 
Camdessus 1999, Boorman 2000). 
 In terms of the way in which it presented its activities to the outside world, 
changes in the Fund in 1999 marked a minor revolution. The success of 
‘developmental’ shareholders in linking demands to reform the ESAF to the provision 
of financing for the extension of IMF debt write-off provided these shareholders with 
significant leverage, and the ‘legitimacy crisis’ experienced by the Fund increased its 
receptiveness to moving beyond its established operating procedures. However, these 
shareholders soon found that pushing the IMF to ‘talk the talk’ of poverty reduction 
was much easier than making it ‘walk the walk’. 
 When attempting to push through changes in the operations of an IO-agent, 
information  shortages  often  hamper  the  extent  of  principals’  success  (Lake  and 
McCubbins 2006: 347-9, Martin 2006: 145, Worsham and Gatrell 2005: 366). For the 
‘developmental’  shareholders at  the Fund,  the  IMF’s  Independent Evaluation Office 
provided a valuable bridge over this problem. From the time of its establishment in 
2001, many  of  the  IEO’s  reports  have  provided  shareholders with  insights  into  the 
IO’s  behaviour  that  have  increased  their  ability  to  push  the  Fund  to  foreground 
poverty reduction in its engagements with low-income countries. IEO reviews of the 
Fund’s  concessional lending activities have consistently highlighted the need for 
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shareholder states (acting through the Board) to set out the operational changes they 
wish to see from IMF staff in a detailed and monitorable manner. 54  However, 
although they have identified potential  pressure  points  for  the  ‘developmental’ 
shareholders to push in order to fine tune the poverty reduction and growth aspects of 
Fund engagements with low-income countries, IEO reports have not succeeded in 
reducing intra-shareholder disputes. 
The key  findings  from  the  IEO’s  review of  the  first  five  years of  the PRGF 
highlighted the need for greater clarity regarding what was expected of the IMF in 
shareholders’  calls  for  Fund  supported  programmes  to  be  more  poverty  reduction 
focussed (IMF IEO 2004: vii). The report is also candid about the shortage of 
knowledge as to how the Fund could improve the growth and poverty reduction 
prospects for low-income countries: 
Since the evaluation is about how the IMF can help countries improve their 
prospects for growth and poverty reduction, it is worth emphasizing at the 
outset that knowledge of the links between policies and growth remains 
limited and understanding of the links between policies and poverty reduction 
even less so (2004: 17).  
 
At the country-specific level, the IEO criticised the lack of integration by Fund staff 
of  ‘poverty  and  social  impact  analysis’  (PSIA)  into  the  design  of  adjustment 
programmes (2004: 43). Indeed, an earlier report on Aligning the PRG F with the 
PRSP Approach suggested that a combination of insufficient capacity at both the 
Fund and country level meant that PSIA of the core structural and macroeconomic 
content of arrangements with low-income countries appeared to have become a long 
term aspiration rather than an established operating practice (IMF IEO 2003: 9-14). 
                                                     
54 Indeed, the IEO’s first Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) explicitly suggests that the Board should 
set out clear monitoring systems to track desired changes in Fund practices (IMF 2007: 6). PMRs 
evaluate the progress made by the IMF in implementing operational changes recommended by the 
Board. 
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 The  recent  IEO  review  of  the  IMF’s  operations  with  sub-Saharan African 
countries was more overtly critical of the shortcomings of the Fund’s mainstreaming 
of a growth and poverty reduction oriented approach. The report also makes clear the 
continuing difficulty of enacting change in the organisation. In the terms of its 
criticism, the IEO was unusually blunt: 
Lacking clarity on what they should do on the mobilisation of aid, alternative 
scenarios, and the application of poverty and social impact analysis, IMF staff 
tended to focus narrowly on macroeconomic stability, in line with the 
institution’s  core  mandate  and  their  deeply  ingrained  professional  character 
(2007: vii). 
 
The report goes on to examine specific issues that the IEO suggests that the Board 
could issue guidance on with a view to increasing the growth and poverty focus of 
adjustment programmes, notably the accommodation of additional aid inflows and the 
PSIA of key reforms. When examining the accommodation of aid inflows within 
PRGF  arrangements,  the  report  concluded  that  staff  continued  to  use  a  country’s 
reserve position rather than absorption capacity to determine how increased flows are 
treated. For countries with reserves under 2.5 months of imports, the absorption rate 
of incremental aid allowed under PRGF agreements was ‘virtually zero’, whereas for 
those above the threshold the programmed absorption of aid averaged 100 percent 
(2007: 7-8).  Regarding  PSIA  of  key  reforms,  the  IEO  noted  that:  ‘Going  forward, 
close management of PSIAs is needed to prevent them from becoming a bureaucratic 
requirement with little impact on programme design’ (2007: 17). 
 The staff response to the IEO criticism illustrates the difficulty of designing 
and enacting changes in the organisation’s behaviour.  In  relation  to  the handling of 
increased aid inflows, the response rebuffed the IEO suggestion that the absorption 
capacity of low-income countries was being underutilised: 
Under the PRGF, securing macroeconomic stability and limiting financial 
vulnerabilities continue to be the primary objectives of programme design, in 
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part by building up a prudent resource buffer. While countries are establishing 
stability, full spending and adsorption may not be the best path to sustained 
growth and poverty reduction (IMF IEO 2007: 80). 
 
Turning to PSIA, the response makes it clear that staff view this type of detailed 
distributional analysis as outside of the expertise of the organisation. Indeed, it is not 
difficult to detect an element of ‘passing the buck’ to the World Bank in the response: 
Fund staff is not responsible for conducting PSIA… There may still be scope 
for enhancing coordination with the World Bank on the use of PSIA on 
programme design. In this context, we would note that the finding that Fund 
staff considered that the Bank did not always provide timely and quality PSIA 
points to the initial lack of clarity on the role of the Bank (IMF IEO 2007: 80). 
 
Through their response to the report’s findings in these key areas, the IMF staff were 
in no uncertain terms using their position of expertise to challenge the suitability of 
the IEO’s suggestions. The position of the Executive Board following their discussion 
of the report shows that the staff were generally successful in ‘defending their turf’. 
After consideration of the IEO report and the staff response, the Board did not 
issue new guidance on the issues of aid accommodation and the use of PSIA. By so 
doing, they ensured that the expertise of IMF staff would continue to determine 
outcomes. On the former, the Acting Chair’s summing up concludes that: 
Directors confirmed the importance of accommodating higher aid flows 
through higher spending and net imports, providing this would not jeopardize 
macroeconomic stability. They considered that this approach should continue 
to be implemented on a case by case basis (IMF IEO 2007: 88). 
 
On the question of PSIA, the Board position was similarly in line with the view 
expressed by staff: 
Most directors confirmed that distributional policies generally lie outside the 
Fund’s core mandate and that PSIA should be conducted by other agencies in 
the context of the PRSP process (IMF IEO 2007: 88). 
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The summing up of the discussions within the Board Meeting also reveals the 
continuing intra-shareholder disagreements over the role of the Fund.55 Rather than 
resolving these tensions, the conclusions from the Board discussions simply meant 
that disagreements would continue to occur as and when issues arose within the 
context of specific country arrangements. However,  the  IEO’s  findings  served  to 
provide key insights with which ‘developmental’ shareholders could challenge Fund 
staff on the conditions attached to PRGF arrangements.56  
 In contrast to the efforts of the ‘developmental’ shareholders to foreground the 
issues of poverty reduction and growth in Fund supported programmes, a group of 
advocates  of  a  ‘minimalist’  IMF,  led  by  the US,  have  since  the  ‘legitimacy  crisis’ 
moved to pare back the extent of the Fund’s engagements with low-income countries. 
The major success of the ‘minimalists’ has been the formation of a clear exit strategy 
for countries with a long term reliance on the use of Fund resources. This highlights 
the negative feedback cycle of IO monitoring at the Fund: on the one hand, 
‘developmental’ shareholders are pushing for a greater poverty reduction focus in the 
use of Fund resources in low-income countries, on the other ‘minimalists’ are pushing 
for the disentanglement of the Fund from lending to low-income countries. 
 The pressures that can lead to low-income countries becoming long-term users 
of Fund resources have long been recognised. As was noted above, because of its 
engagements through the SAF and ESAF, the IMF through the 1990s became an 
important  ‘gatekeeper’  of  development  finance.  Countries that were dependent on 
                                                     
55 The Board Chair’s Summing Up notes that the Directors ‘offered a ranged of views’ on the 
appropriate role of the Fund in relation to a range of aid issues, and that on PSIA agreement was not 
unanimous but rather had been reached by ‘most of the Board’ (IMF IEO 2007: 88-9). 
56 The Office of the UK Executive Director, for instance, continues to press Fund staff both informally 
and at Board Meetings when either the UK Department for International Development or low-income 
country governments with whom the UK has a close relationship raise what they see as problems with 
the policy conditions attached to loans. In this process the findings of the IEO are often drawn upon. 
Information supplied by Joe Thornton, Senior Economic Advisor in the Office of the UK Executive 
Director, in an interview with the author. 
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official sources of financing often found that donors insisted on their having the 
IMF’s  ‘seal  of  approval’;  the  existence  of  an  ongoing  Fund  arrangement  was 
generally  the  most  easily  ‘legible’  proof  for  a  low-income country that it had the 
organisation’s  blessing  (IMF  2004:  24).  Accordingly,  a  tendency  for  low-income 
borrowers to become perennial users of the Fund’s concessional window developed. 
 As was  the  case  in  relation  to  ‘developmental’  shareholders  outlined  above, 
the IEO played an important role in bridging the information shortages of the 
‘minimalist’  shareholding  principals.  The  IEO’s  maiden  report  focussed  on  the 
prolonged  use  of  fund  resources,  providing  a  definition  of  ‘prolonged  users’  as 
countries who in a ten year period had active arrangements for seven or more years. 
The report also revealed the extent of prolonged use through the Fund’s concessional 
window: over the period 1971-2000, some 40 percent of countries eligible for 
concessional lending were prolonged users (IMF IEO 2002: 9). The unclear 
implications  of  linking  access  to  the  Fund’s  PRGF  to  the  long  term  developmental 
plans of low-income countries (in the form of a PRSP) is also noted in the report: 
PRSPs are meant to provide a longer-term framework for donor support to 
low-income countries. This framework does not presume an extended IMF 
involvement, but it does not rule it out, thus generating some ambiguity (IMF 
IEO 2002: 34). 
 
Owing to intra-shareholder disagreement as to whether prolonged use by low-income 
countries should in fact be labelled as a problem in need of remedial action (IMF IEO 
2002: 221), the IEO report was not met with a decisive Board response. However, the 
report  served  to  entrench  the  view  of  ‘minimalist’  shareholders  that  Fund 
engagements with low-income countries needed to be significantly reformed.57 
                                                     
57 Interviews with Executive Directors, Alternate Executive Directors, and their Advisors confirmed 
that IEO reports provided a valuable source of ‘monitoring’ information. 
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 The  launch  in 2005 of  the  IMF’s Policy Support  Instrument  (PSI) marked a 
strong attempt by shareholders advocating a reduced role for the Fund in low-income 
countries to clarify the organisation’s role. The PSI was designed specifically so that 
low-income  countries  that  needed  to  signal  the  IMF’s  approval  to  bilateral  and 
multilateral donors could do so without holding lending arrangements. Through the 
PSI, regular assessments are made by  the  IMF Board of a country’s policies and an 
ongoing dialogue is maintained between staff and country authorities, but it is a non-
borrowing programme (Taylor 2006). Although for numerous reasons the IMF long 
eschewed the role of international ‘credit rating agency’ (IMF 2004), through the PSI 
the organisation now provides an endorsement of low-income  countries’  policy 
environments in the absence of lending commitments. It is commonly held within the 
Fund that the key moment in the emergence of the PSI was the shifting of US support 
in its favour in 2004.58 By putting in place a clear exit strategy with which borrowers 
can ‘graduate’ from the PRGF without loosing access to the Fund’s policy advice and 
signalling endorsement, the PSI represents a significant success for shareholders 
advocating  a  ‘minimalist’  view  of  the  Fund’s  engagements  with  low-income 
countries. As of June 2009, six countries had graduated from low access PRGF loans 
to the PSI.59  
 Reforms to the Fund’s concessional lending window over the past decade have 
both been driven by and have exacerbated divisions amongst major shareholders. 
Shareholders  remain  divided  by  competing  conceptions  of  the  organisation’s 
appropriate role in low-income countries. The contradictory developments since the 
launch of the PRGF are symptomatic of this division, whereby efforts were both made 
                                                     
58 This interpretation was given by John Hicklin of the IEO and Joe Thornton of the UK Executive 
Director’s Office in interviews with the author. The US Executive Director and Alternative Executive 
Director made their support for the PSI clear in interviews with the author. 
59 See IMF Official Website, Factsheet – The Policy Support Instrument, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm.   
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to ensure that Fund resources were better focussed on long term poverty reduction, 
and to ensure that the processes were in place through which countries disengage 
from the use of concessional resources.  
The continuing existence of this cleavage can be seen through the tendency of 
advocates  of  the  ‘developmental’  and  ‘minimalist’  Fund  to  outline  their  position  in 
contradistinction to each other, as can be seen through the following two examples. 
First, the US Executive Director outlines her view of the appropriate role of the Fund 
using a European foil: 
The IMF is outside its mandate with the PRGF. Nobody, certainly not the 
Fund, knows how to ‘do’ development. The PRGF has not been a success. If 
you listen to others, such as the French or Gordon Brown, you’d get a different 
impression…60 
 
In a similar manner, a Senior Advisor in the UK Office explains his understanding of 
the  Fund’s  role,  namely  that  it  is  inextricably  linked to broader developmental 
concerns, in opposition to the US position: 
If  the US had its own way,  there wouldn’t even be the PSI, certainly not  the 
PRGF. They want the Fund to be involved in emergency stabilisation, away 
from anything growth and poverty reduction orientated.  It’s not possible:  the 
two are inseparable. We try to ensure at the least that Fund programmes don’t 
conflict with the long term objectives of countries we have an interest in.61 
 
The recent announcement by the Fund that access limits through the PRGF window 
would be doubled (Broome 2010), made as a rider to the G20 London Summit 
focussing on the financial crisis that erupted in 2008, shows that the tensions between 
the organisation’s major shareholders continue to be felt.  
 
 
 
                                                     
60 Meg Lundsager in an interview with the author, December 2008. 
61 Joe Thornton in an interview with the author, December 2008. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
The politics of shareholder accountability in IOs is at heart about the contests to 
define what the appropriate role of an IO is, and to attempt to ensure that the IO 
effectively performs this role. The politics of shareholder accountability surrounding 
attempts  to  reform  the  IMF’s  engagement  with  low-income countries remain 
dominated by two issues. The first issue is that, under the influence of different 
external factors, there is a major intra-shareholder cleavage over the appropriate role 
of the Fund with this group of countries. Although both groups are united in 
agreement that significant reforms to Fund operations are necessary in order to reduce 
conflict between the policy programmes supported by the Fund and the 
developmental needs of low-income countries, contrasting solutions are put forward. 
The  actions  of  the  ‘developmental’  shareholders  in  pushing  the  Fund  in  a  poverty 
reduction direction with the ESAF reforms in 1999 and the recent doubling of PRGF 
access limits have occurred simultaneously with the moves by advocates of a 
‘minimalist’  Fund  to  extricate  the  organisation  from  lending  to  the  lowest  income 
group of countries. The second issue concerns the importance of information in 
designing and enacting change  in an  avowedly  ‘expert’  IO such as the IMF. In this 
case,  the  Fund’s  Independent  Evaluation  Office  provided  both  ‘minimalist’  and 
‘developmental’ shareholders with key informational resources with which to push for 
the Fund along their favoured path of reform. Although the divisions at Board level 
precluded  the  emergence  of  unambiguous  directives  from  ‘on  high’,  the  IEO 
nevertheless assisted shareholders’ perusal of their aims on an informal and on a case-
by-case level. 
 The contemporary operations of the IMF have been surrounded by a negative 
feedback cycle of IO monitoring. Disagreements between shareholders have led to 
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divergent pressures for reform being placed on the Fund, and contradictory reforms 
have led to continued disagreements. Key features of the IMF’s ‘world’ increase the 
likelihood that this pattern will continue over the medium term, most notably a 
surprising lack of clarity as to what constitutes a balance of payments problem. For 
the lowest income PRGF eligible countries, deep impediments to growth mean the 
current account deficits will very likely remain a persistent problem. Evolving 
understandings  of  where  the  line  lies  between  problems  of  ‘development’  and 
problems  of  ‘balance  of  payments’  will  both  determine  and  be  determined  by  the 
politics of reforms to the IMF’s engagements with low-income countries.  
 In chapter six, the implications of the ambiguous goals of the PRGF on the 
prospects for cosmopolitan governance are reflected on. Particular focus is placed on 
the intersection of this ambiguity and the degree of policy space that is left open for 
the democratic self-steering of low-income country populations. However, before this 
issue is examined, chapters four and five turn to investigate the politics of stakeholder 
accountability at the World Bank and IMF. The insights of these chapters, too, 
provide important insights that contribute to debates on the prospects for 
cosmopolitan global governance, which are drawn together in the concluding chapter 
of the thesis. 
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Chapter Four – The World Bank and the Reconstruction of 
Stakeholder Accountability 
4.0. Introduction 
My colleagues and I decided that in order to map our own course for the 
future, we needed to know more about our clients as individuals. We launched 
a study entitled "Voices of the Poor" and spoke to them about their hopes, 
their aspirations, their realities (James Wolfensohn, World Bank President, 
1999). 
 
Some Country Directors  continue  to  hide  behind  the  ‘apolitical’  Articles  of 
Agreement, but stakeholder engagement has support from the top (Doris 
Voorbraak, World Bank Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, 2008).1 
 
Unlike the relationship of shareholder accountability examined previously, which is 
deeply institutionalised in the formal structure of the Bank and whose parameters are 
broadly accepted, stakeholder accountability is surrounded by elemental contests. 
Outside the Bank, assessments of existing practices vary widely: from NGO and 
academic critics, the charge is repeatedly made that the organisation is ‘undemocratic’ 
and unresponsive to the constituents whose needs it professes to serve (e.g. Lazarus 
2008, Fraser 2005, Grusky 2000), while a common complaint from borrowing country 
governments is that, by engaging too closely with domestic interest groups, the Bank 
is not respecting their sovereignty.2 Meanwhile, within the Bank diverse views exist 
as to what form the operational interactions with borrowing country populations 
should take (Bebbington et al 2004). To navigate a path through such opposing views, 
it  is  necessary  to  go  ‘back  to  basics’  regarding  the  politics  of  shareholder 
accountability. It is only by examining the power structures through which 
stakeholder accountability relationships develop and change that we are able to gain a 
comprehensive insight into the issue at the Bank. 
                                                     
1 Interview with the author. 
2 Several World Bank staff noted in interviews that this charge is most commonly made ‘behind the 
scenes’ by government officials to their counterparts in the Bank.  
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 In contrast to the shareholder accountability relationship, which was 
characterised by a stable principal-agent arrangement, a core focus in the examination 
of stakeholder accountability is on the construction of the relationship between the 
Bank and its in-country ‘stakeholders’. Although the formal structure and mandate of 
the Bank shaped the contours around which stakeholder accountability relationships 
have developed, over recent decades the mode of interaction surrounding both project 
and policy lending has been transformed. The intersection between external and 
internal advocates of particular models of shareholder accountability has played a key 
role in introducing and embedding change in this area, and access to material 
resources has acted to accelerate the process. Under the pressure of these forces, the 
politics of stakeholder accountability have undergone a series of dramatic 
transformations. From an initial condition of severely restricted delegated 
accountability, stakeholders in low income countries are beginning to have access to a 
more  direct  accountability  relationship  through  the  Bank’s  project  lending. 
Additionally, through its policy based lending the Bank has moved to significantly 
reconstruct stakeholder accountability at the domestic level as being an integral 
component of economic development. This change marks a sharp break by the Bank 
with  its historical practice, whereby a concern  to  remain ‘apolitical’ had  limited  the 
degree to which attempts have been made to influence domestic processes. At the 
Bank,  an  internal  cleavage  over  the  desirability  of  this  ‘participatory  turn’  remains, 
but the support of key constituencies inside and outside the organisation suggests that 
the focus on stakeholder accountability as an integral part of governance reform is 
likely to continue. 
 The chapter proceeds according to the following structure. The opening 
section examines the processes by which relationships of stakeholder accountability 
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are developed in arenas of global governance. Rather than simply presupposing the 
existence  of  a  ‘natural’  or  ‘gold  standard’  ideal  type  against which  to measure  the 
performance of IOs, I concentrate on uncovering the practices through which 
stakeholder accountability relationships are constructed and re-constructed. This 
approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the contemporary dynamics of 
stakeholder accountability at the Bank to be put forward. In the second section I 
review the institutional characteristics of the Bank that influenced the initial genesis 
of a delegated form of stakeholder accountability, and outline the factors that led to 
this structure being slowly challenged. Through the third section of the chapter I 
outline the mechanisms of participatory accountability that have developed within the 
Bank’s project based lending, and show that over time a range of stakeholders have 
been identified and incorporated into accountability structures. In the fourth section I 
track the evolution of stakeholder accountability that has taken place under the rubric 
of policy based lending. Significant moves have been made to re-frame stakeholder 
accountability at the domestic level as being a prerequisite of economic development, 
and innovations in the lending instruments available to the Bank have served to 
provide the organisation with the material resources to compel states to reform 
political processes. However, these reforms to policy lending are subject to 
considerable contestation both inside and outside the Bank. The support of key 
constituencies means that the reform of stakeholder accountability at the domestic 
level will remain on the operational agenda of the Bank, although the degree to which 
the  organisation  is  willing  to  ‘push’  recalcitrant  low  income  states  will  remain 
variable. The concluding section of the chapter draws together the lessons leant 
regarding the politics of stakeholder accountability at the World Bank, and highlights 
the key points that are returned to when the intersection of the politics of 
126 
 
accountability and work on cosmopolitan global governance are turned to in the 
closing chapter of the thesis.  
 
4.1. Stakeholder accountability at the global level 
Accountability is a relationship most commonly analysed at the domestic level, and is 
often held to be a defining component of a democratic polity (Flinders 2001). Within 
academic  works,  the  ideational  dominance  of  a  ‘Westphalian’  notion  of  state 
sovereignty acted to restrict interest in the intricacies of global structures of 
governance: indeed, the field of international studies is said  to  have  established  ‘a 
conceptual firewall between domestic and international politics in which democracy is 
confined  to  the  domestic  realm’  (Caporaso  2003:  361).  However,  pushed  by  a 
growing acceptance of the importance of multiple and overlapping sites of authority 
in the contemporary global economy, in recent years the level of focus placed on 
political processes beyond the state level has increased. International organisations in 
particular have attracted a large amount of attention, including much work that is 
heavily critical of their lack of accountability to the domestic populations directly 
affected by their actions. 
 A common approach taken by critical appraisals has been to set out an ideal 
standard of democratic accountability, and to assess the performance of IOs against 
this yardstick. Sometimes the ideal is laid out explicitly, although often assessments 
are  made  with  the  somewhat  vague  assumption  that  ‘real’  power  should  be  in  the 
hands of stakeholders with a direct interest in the operations of a given IO. Following 
this analytic framework, works have emerged ranging from broad calls for the 
incorporation of models of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ into the structures of IOs (e.g. 
Dahl 1999, Held 1995), to critiques of the operational performance of particular IOs 
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(e.g. World Development Movement 2006, Grusky 2000). Although such works 
justify their value in terms of the pressure they exert on IOs to improve existing 
mechanisms of stakeholder accountability, a number of recent analyses have 
challenged the assumed efficacy of this approach. Within this strand of work it is 
common for  the attempts  to apply a  ‘gold standard’ of stakeholder accountability  to 
be dismissed as misguided or even damaging to attempts to reform IOs: rather, the 
favoured approach is to focus on elucidating the intricate processes through which 
accountability relationships are formed and re-formed. (Philp 2008: 45, Grant and 
Keohane 2005: 41, Moravcsik 2002: 621).3  
 In contrast to idealistically driven analyses, the more pragmatic accounts 
recognise the potential legitimacy of several different structures of stakeholder 
accountability at international organisations. Rather than holding the legitimacy of 
accountability structures to   be a ‘natural’ property possessed only by an ideal type, 
legitimacy is seen to be conferred by an intersubjectively held consensus between the 
decision-making authority and the stakeholders (Shearer 2002: 543, Ezzamel et al 
2007: 167). Depending on the form and function of particular IOs, it is equally 
possible  that  a  ‘delegated’  or  ‘participatory’  model  of  stakeholder  accountability 
could emerge as the preferred structure. The general types differ according to who is 
given the direct capacity to hold the powerful accountable: with the delegated model 
those who entrust the IO with its responsibilities have this capacity, with the 
participatory model it is those who are affected by the activities of the IO (Grant and 
Keohane 2005: 31). 
                                                     
3 By questioning the appropriateness of any ‘true’ or universal standard, and instead grounding their 
research in an attempt to increase our ability to exercise ‘control’ in the Deweyan sense (see Cochran 
2002: 527), these latter works accord well with the pragmatist spirit that underpins this research 
project.  
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By conceiving of stakeholder accountability as a fluid, contestable 
relationship, the conceptual space in which to investigate sources of stability and 
change is opened up. Accountability is viewed at a fundamental level as a socially 
constructed relationship: both the form of the relationship and range of actors 
involved in the relationship is open to contestation. The claims of stakeholders that 
they are entitled to a direct accountability relationship must be broadly accepted 
within  the  IO’s  social  environment  in order  for  such  institutional mechanisms  to be 
established and sustained (Shearer 2002: 544). In the world of IOs, with blurred lines 
of causation and responsibility, the establishment of such a consensus can be 
particularly challenging. However, over recent decades NGO advocates have become 
increasingly successful in combining general critiques of operational practices with 
high profile campaigns focussing on specific examples of ‘worst practice’ to highlight 
the plight of groups  that have been negatively  impacted by  IOs’ actions  (Fox 2000: 
304, Keck and Sikkink 1998: 199-201). In this way, NGOs have at times played a 
prominent role in the construction of ‘stakeholders’ to IOs’ activities, and have fought 
for institutional appendages with which to enable a more participatory model of 
accountability. 
Despite this over-arching malleability, institutional contexts can make the 
parameters of the stakeholder accountability relationship more-or-less  ‘sticky’: 
organisations with highly formalised, legally-based accountability structures  tend to 
exhibit greater evidence of continuity over those that rely more heavily on informal, 
interpersonal relationships (Page 2004: 592).  Within these boundaries, the process of 
change is shaped by emerging ‘discourses of accountability’, whose success relies on 
the extent to which they cohere with the beliefs and experiences of actors both inside 
and outside the IO (Ezzamel 2007: 167). Radical periods of change often rely on the 
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successful forging of alliances between groups within the IO and external advocates, 
and access to material resources can also play a key role (Francis and Jacobs 1999, 
Aycrigg 1998). Although ideas matter, sources of funding help a great deal to 
encourage and enable IO staff to embed new practices of stakeholder accountability. 
It is possible, in very general terms, to identify a historical trend in the external 
pressure to reform that has been placed on the main institutions of global governance 
since the Bretton Woods era. In the early post-war decades, there was a broad 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the delegated form of stakeholder accountability. The 
lines of accountability to stakeholders ran exclusively through their political 
representatives at the domestic level, and the secrecy that surrounded the activities of 
IOs meant that even these distant methods were highly imperfect (Keohane and Nye 
2000: 1-2).4 In more recent decades, however, a number of forces have coalesced that 
together have served to push many IOs to engage more directly with stakeholders. 
Aided by reduced costs of communication and organisation, NGO transnational 
advocacy groups have been a significant force in global politics from as far back as 
the 1960s, and have from the late 1970s actively campaigned for IOs to make reforms 
to the accountability mechanisms embedded in their operations (Keck and Sikkink 
1998: 24-5, 135-40). In addition, the more recent emergence of a ‘liberal aid agenda’ 
in the post-Cold War world has fuelled this trend, as major states have also began to 
require that key institutions of global governance improve the means through which 
they are accountable to stakeholders (Nelson 2000: 413). Together, these 
developments have helped to shift the broad understanding of the appropriate form of 
stakeholder accountability mechanisms away from an acceptance of distant delegated 
forms and towards a more directly participatory model. 
                                                     
4 Keohane and Nye characterise this early period as following the ‘club’ model of IO accountability, 
whereby regimes for trade and monetary stability operated exclusively at the elite level in a manner 
that was ‘largely invisible to publics’ (2000: 2). 
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In common with the case of shareholder accountability previously examined, 
periods of crisis play an important role in catalysing major developments in the 
politics of stakeholder accountability. When a concerted challenge is presented to the 
established means through which IOs construct their legitimacy, a recurrent IO 
response is to profess a desire to re-engage with stakeholders and foster institutional 
learning (Lazarus 2008: 1216). In the case of the Bank, crisis did indeed play a 
significant role in fostering change through the mid-1990s; however, for the deeper 
dynamics to be fully grasped it is necessary to investigate the evolution of stakeholder 
accountability within the organisation over the longer term. As the following sections 
of the chapter make clear, the form of stakeholder accountability at the Bank has 
evolved following the complex interplay of deep-rooted ideational change, internal 
and external alliance building, and the use of material incentives. 
The process of change in the relationships of stakeholder accountability 
surrounding an IO commonly takes place through a nuanced, multi-track series of 
events. Multiple forms of stakeholder accountability can emerge that, although subject 
to similar pressures, have the potential to continue to evolve according to distinct 
paths. Such multiple accountability practices have developed at the World Bank, 
whereby different operational strands have led to two identifiable trends within the 
politics of stakeholder accountability. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of this process, 
centred on policy- and project-based lending. 
As the following sections show, the initial creation of a delegated ‘club model’ 
of stakeholder accountability left a deep impression on the Bank, not least for the 
‘apolitical’ self-image that developed amongst the staff of the organisation. For many 
years this structure remained largely unchanged, until eventually a tipping point was 
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F igure 4.1. The reconstruction of stakeholder accountability 
 
 
 
 
reached  following  increasing  levels  criticism of  the Bank’s  lending  projects. NGOs 
played a key role in highlighting the negative impact of Bank supported projects as an 
issue requiring attention, which eventually led to a series of institutional and 
operational changes at the Bank that formalised a structure of participatory 
stakeholder accountability, albeit on a limited scale. In addition to this path of change, 
major reforms also occurred in relation to the policy lending carried out by the 
organisation. Through the 1980s, increasing dissatisfaction over the performance of 
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countries following structural adjustment programmes opened the ground for internal 
advocates of domestic governance reform in low income borrowers. Through a 
process of alliance building, over recent years the idea of stakeholder accountability at 
the domestic level as a necessary component of sustainable development has been 
operationalised  within  the  Bank’s  policy  lending.  Notably,  in order to access 
multilateral  debt  relief,  low  income  countries  must  meet  participatory  ‘process 
conditionality’ when designing developmental programmes.5 Additionally, in a lower 
profile manner, participatory requirements are increasingly being inserted into 
standard development policy loans. Although internal contests over the role of the 
Bank in promoting domestic governance reform remain heated, the inclusion of key 
actors within the coalition in support of this development means that, over the 
medium term, the promotion of more effective accountability relationships between 
low income country governments and populations will remain embedded within the 
Bank’s policy based lending operations. 
 
4.2. The World Bank and delegated accountability 
The formal structure and mandate of an IO leaves a deep impression on its 
accountability mechanisms, and can cast a long shadow over their evolution even at 
much later stages in the life of the IO. It is for this reason that it is necessary to begin 
the examination of stakeholder accountability relationships at the Bank by going back 
to the early history of the organisation. When the Bank was established in the mid-
1940s, mechanisms of stakeholder accountability were not on the agenda for 
discussion. The Bank was mandated to work solely with representatives of client 
governments, and with the embedding of a technocratic, apolitical approach to issues 
                                                     
5 The term ‘process conditionality’ is used by Lazarus (2008: 1216) to refer to the requirement that low 
income countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers be formed after broad in-country consultation. 
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of economic development, there were few ideational challenges to the model of 
delegated accountability that underpinned the Bank’s approach. Although pressures to 
engage more directly with stakeholders did emerge in later years, the pattern laid out 
in the early years continues to influence the direction of the changes forged by these 
dynamics. 
 On New Year’s Eve, 1945, representatives of the governments of 20 states met 
in Washington, DC, to formally bring the World Bank into being. 6  The original 
signatories  of  the  organisation’s  Articles  of  Agreement  laid  out  the  institutional 
governance structure and general modus operandi of the Bank, both of which had a 
major influence over the story of the evolution of stakeholder accountability in later 
years. At the centre of the governance structure that was laid out for the Bank was a 
chain of delegation up to an Executive Board, through which member governments 
maintained oversight of the organisation. By 1947 the number of member states had 
risen to 44, and between them they collectively selected 12 Executive Directors to sit 
on the Board. Directors exercised (and continue to exercise) two closely linked roles, 
presenting the case for the countries that they represented when particular projects 
were being discussed, and advocating Bank-wide policy reforms in line with the 
interests of their selectors. Over time the number of both member states and Directors 
has increased,7 but the general arrangement of delegation has remained (Kapur et al 
1997: 1204-6). The implicit chain of delegation through which stakeholders have 
access to these formal governance structures has remained somewhat extended, 
                                                     
6 The original signatories of the Articles of Agreement were Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, China, 
Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iraq, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. See 
World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:6
4054690~menuPK:64319211~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html.  
7 The Bank now has 186 member states, who select 24 Executive Directors. For further information see 
the World Bank official website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040580~menuP
K:1696997~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html.  
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flowing from on the ground actors, up to their domestic representatives, and in turn up 
to the relevant Bank Directors (Woods 2001: 84-5). 
 The state-centric, delegated model of stakeholder accountability was 
reinforced by other provisions of the Articles of Agreement. The first of these was the 
stipulation that the Bank was empowered to deal only with representatives of member 
governments when making loan arrangements, which served to inhibit the emergence 
of more directly participatory forms of accountability. Article III Section 2 of the 
Bank’s founding mandate sets this limitation clearly: 
Each member shall deal with the Bank only through its Treasury, central bank, 
stabilization fund or other similar fiscal agency, and the Bank shall deal with 
members only by or through the same agencies.8 
 
In addition, a rigid barrier was erected to restrict the agents of the organisation from 
acting in a manner that would impact upon the internal political sphere of member 
states. Article IV.x explicitly prohibited  the  Bank  from  undertaking  any  ‘political 
action’: 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member or members concerned. Only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.9 
 
Though at the time these provisions were considered to be uncontroversial aspects of 
the Articles of Agreement, over time their existence has significantly affected the 
manner in which the politics of stakeholder accountability at the Bank have 
developed. 
A second  feature of  the Bank’s  structure  that  served  to  secure  the delegated 
model  of  stakeholder  accountability  came  from  its  physical  location.  The  Bank’s 
                                                     
8 For the full Articles of Agreement see World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,co
ntentMDK:20049557~menuPK:64020046~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.
html.  
9 See previous footnote. 
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Articles of Agreement stated that its headquarters must be in Washington, DC, and 
the massive expansion of staff numbers during the early decades of its operations 
occurred almost exclusively at its 18th Street base (Mason and Asher 1973: 37-8, 66-
72).  The heavy centralisation of staff at  the  Bank’s  headquarters  restricted  the 
potential for interactions with borrowing country populations, an issue that was 
compounded by the tendency for staff visits to developing countries to be of limited 
duration and involve meetings with a small number of government representatives 
(Cernea 2004: 11). Although a number of personnel shake-ups have been carried out 
throughout the lifetime of the Bank,10 it was much later, during Wolfensohn’s tenure 
as President, that a concerted attempt was made to increase the proportion of staff 
based permanently in borrowing countries (Neilson et al 2006: 123). 
 A final aspect of the Bank that from the outset restricted the effectiveness with 
which the delegated model of stakeholder accountability could function – and 
insulated the IO from demands to reform its stakeholder accountability mechanisms – 
was the control of information. For many decades, the Bank functioned as an 
archetypal  ‘club’-style IO, in which decisions were made at an elite level and 
remained largely invisible to on the ground stakeholders (Keohane and Nye 2000: 2). 
Many project documents remained legally the property of the borrowing government, 
to be released by the Bank only with the government’s explicit consent. It was only in 
1985 that a policy of ‘presumption in favour of disclosure’ was adopted by the Bank, 
and it was another decade later still that the first CAS document was made publicly 
available (Fox and Brown 2000: 516, Vianna 2000: 466-7, World Bank 1994).11  
                                                     
10 The most high profile restructuring was carried out under Barber Conable in 1987, when, to the 
anger of many staff, every position in the organisation was placed up for reassignment (Kapur et al 
1997: 1200-1).  
11 For an overview of the evolution of the Bank’s information disclosure policy see World Bank 
Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTANDOPERATIONS/EXTINFODISCLOS
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 The restriction of stakeholder accountability at the Bank to distant (and 
imperfect) mechanisms of delegation was consolidated during the early decades of its 
operations by the evolving internal culture of the organisation. An avowedly 
technocratic approach to its operations worked to restrict the ability of domestic 
populations in borrowing countries to access discussions over projects. This trend was 
particularly the case in the lowest income countries that joined the Bank through the 
1960s,12 amongst whom weak administrative capacity meant that even governments 
often had a negligible ability to influence project design. Rather than developing plans 
in partnership, it was in fact common that staff would seek out borrowers willing to 
take on Bank-designed projects (Kapur et al 1997: 36, Lancaster 1997: 162). The 
exclusionary language of expertise continued unchecked through to the 1970s. A 
preface  written  by  the  Bank  President  to  a  review  of  the  organisation’s  operations 
exemplifies this approach, in which Robert McNamara spoke of his staffs’ efforts ‘to 
test and change [policies] as we learn more about the science of development’ (World 
Bank 1971: vi). 
 The dominance of trained economists amongst Bank staff helped to maintain 
the  ‘scientific’  approach  to  development,  and  so  bolster  the  separation between 
stakeholders and Bank operations. Although through the late 1960s and 1970s the 
number of full time staff employed by the Bank multiplied almost four-fold, the 
dominance of economists not only remained but actually increased (Cernea 2004: 5, 
Kapur et al 1997: 1181, Mason and Asher 1973: 68). The absolute control by staff 
with an economics background of the Bank’s research division in particular helped to 
embed a culture in the Bank according to which development was conceived as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
URE/0,,contentMDK:21868955~menuPK:64864677~pagePK:64865365~piPK:64864641~theSitePK:5
033734,00.html.  
12 African membership of the Bank rapidly expanded over this time period. By 1957 there were just 
two African members, which by the start of the 1970s had expanded to 40 (Lancaster 1997: 162).  
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‘top-down’ process, with little benefit to be had from cultivating closer ties with the 
populations that were the target of Bank-supported interventions (Ellerman 2006: 1-7, 
Bebbington et al 2004: 50, Mehta 1994:117-34, Hancock 1989: 124-31). Within this 
dominant view, ‘development’ was conceptualised as consisting of a series of project 
interventions aimed at generating aggregated ‘economic growth’. Stakeholders, in the 
form of a discrete, identifiable group, remained invisible to Bank staff (Cernea 1985: 
5). 
 It was during the 1970s that roots began to be put down that would eventually 
allow for shifts in the politics of stakeholder accountability at the Bank to develop. 
Although the governance structure and bureaucratic culture of the Bank were not 
ideally prepared for the cultivation of more direct forms of stakeholder accountability, 
changes that occurred inside the Bank and in its external environment laid the 
groundwork for what in the 1990s were a series of significant developments. It is 
possible to distinguish analytically between the developments in the politics of 
stakeholder accountability that occurred around the Bank’s project- and policy-based 
lending. The evolution in the mechanisms of stakeholder accountability within project 
lending is examined first, within which incremental improvements have occurred to 
strengthen the ability of stakeholders to participate at various stages of project cycles. 
In the following section policy-based lending is turned to. 
 
4.3. The evolution of direct stakeholder accountability in Bank project lending 
Key features of  the World Bank  that were codified  in  the organisation’s Articles of 
Agreement and that emerged in the early decades of its operation served to deeply 
embed a model of delegated stakeholder accountability. During this time, the 
relationship between the domestic populations of borrowing countries and the Bank 
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was conducted largely through official national representatives. In general, the 
process through which transformations take place in the stakeholder accountability 
relationships surrounding IOs is often incremental, involving both informal and 
formal restructurings that occur in response to internal and external stimuli. The 
process through which ‘stakeholders’ are constructed as identifiable groups, holding a 
legitimate entitlement to a direct accountability relationship with the IO, occurs 
through the forging of alliances between external critics and internal advocates, in 
which periods of crisis often play a key role. At the World Bank, it is possible to trace 
the transformational dynamics back to the 1970s, when internal champions of reform 
were able to lay the groundwork for eventual institutional reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s. The intersection of internal dynamics and external pressures, as well as the 
provision of material resources by state actors at key moments, played a central role 
in the gradual opening up of new mechanisms of participatory stakeholder 
accountability at the Bank. 
 It was under the stewardship of Robert McNamara that, in important respects, 
the undercurrents were stirred up that gradually served to reposition domestic 
stakeholders within  the organisation’s operations.  In part because of his background 
as US Defence Secretary, McNamara and the advisory staff he brought in had a 
preoccupation with the links between poverty, rural unrest, and the spread of global 
communism. As President of the World Bank, a central objective of McNamara was 
to refocus the work of the organisation on poverty reduction, and one of the means of 
accomplishing this aim was to push staff to explicitly focus projects on improving the 
living conditions of the poorest 20 or 40 percent of the population, depending on 
specific country conditions. The relevance of this refocusing on poverty is that, for the 
first time, staff were forced to think clearly about an identifiable group of stakeholders 
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in interventions. Whereas the dominant conceptualisation of development in the pre-
McNamara Bank held that development was about engineering and physical 
infrastructure, and its impact was assessed and justified in terms of abstracted 
aggregate indicators, under McNamara a shift occurred so that ‘the poor’ as a tangible 
group became the focus of development (Bebbington et al 2004: 39, Cernea 2004: 6-
7). In the minds of individual operational staff, and in the collective consciousness of 
the Bank, the idea of a distinct social collective with a special interest in the activities 
of the organisation began to take root.  
 At the same time as poverty reduction and the importance of ‘the  poor’  to 
Bank operations were being foregrounded, a concerted effort was also made by 
McNamara’s  senior management  to  expand  the  academic  background  of  staff.  The 
creation of a more heterogeneous intellectual environment helped to build up the 
internal pressures to reform the mechanisms through which the Bank engaged with 
domestic groups. A watershed was reached in 1974 when, three decades after the 
Bank opened for business, the first social scientist was given a permanent position in 
the Bank. The appointment of Michael Cernea was followed by a steady trickle of 
social scientists that, through an industrious process of alliance building, set about the 
process of challenging the Bank’s approach to development. As Cernea later noted: 
[Social science] did not land in an intellectual vacuum [at the Bank]. It landed 
on territory long colonised by economic and technical thinking, both with 
entrenched tenure. It landed onto an in-house culture unfamiliar and resistant 
to this new socio-cultural knowledge and expertise (Cernea 1995: 15). 
 
Although the Bank environment was not immediately receptive to the attempts to 
reshape understandings of the development process, the new breed of social scientists 
were rapidly able to establish a number of institutional structures that enabled them to 
gain a foothold from which to advance their ideas. 
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 By the mid-1970s, an informally arranged ‘Sociological Group’ began to meet 
in the Bank. The Group was used by staff that pushed for an ideational revolution, 
agitating for a fundamental reposition of the targets of development at the centre of 
the cycle of project design, implementation, and assessment. Papers were 
commissioned and disseminated by the Group toward this end, and eventually in 1985 
members secured the publication of  the  Bank’s  first  ‘sociological’  volume.  The 
resulting book, Putting People F irst, was explicit in its call for paradigmatic change at 
the Bank, noting that the developmental framework that it was advocating was 
‘tantamount to asking for a reversal of the conventional approach to project making’ 
in the Bank (Cernea 1985, Cernea 2004: 15). With the setting down in print of a 
manifesto  for  the  Sociological  Group,  published  with  the  Bank’s  official  ‘seal  of 
approval’, the credibility of the ‘counter-culture’ in the Bank was enhanced.  
 During the years that the Sociological Group was beginning to take part in the 
burgeoning internal contests at the Bank over the appropriate mechanisms for 
engaging stakeholders, external pressures for reform also began to build. With the use 
of increasingly sophisticated campaigning models, grassroots movements and NGOs 
worked to highlight domestic groups that, owing to the impact of Bank supported 
projects on their conditions of existence, had a legitimate claim to be systematically 
incorporating into Bank decision making structures. Two early subsets of stakeholders 
that  campaigns  were  formed  around  were  the  groups  subject  to  ‘involuntary 
resettlement’ in order to make way for Bank-supported infrastructure projects, and the 
indigenous peoples whose sacred or ancestral lands were threatened by agricultural 
and forestry developments. In the early 1980s approximately 15 percent of Bank 
lending went to projects that incorporated resettlement schemes, but powerful NGO 
campaigns helped  to  propel  this  issue  towards  the  top  of  the  Bank’s  agenda.  The 
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protests around the Chico River developments in Indonesia and the Polonoroeste 
project in Brazil were early examples of widely publicised campaigns that drew 
together grassroots movements and transnational NGO networks in support of 
indigenous and resettled populations (Gray 2000: 269-70, Keck and Sikkink 1998: 24-
5, Rich 1994: 26-38). 
 In conjunction, the internal changes in the Bank and the increasing external 
pressures led to a series of policy declarations by the Bank’s senior management that 
served to formally recognise the existence of distinct groups of stakeholders in Bank 
projects. 13  In 1980 senior management issued operational guidelines to staff on 
‘Social  Issues  in  Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-financed Projects’. According  to 
the guidelines, staff were permitted to only approve plans for projects that 
demonstrated an effort to minimise involuntary resettlement and provided details as to 
how groups’  needs would  be met  in  their  new environment (Brown and Fox 2000: 
459,  Fox  2000:  304).  Two  years  later,  operational  guidelines  were  issued  on  ‘The 
Protection  of  Indigenous  Populations  Living  in  Project  Areas’,  which  similarly 
clarified that Bank staff should only approve projects that included mitigating 
measures in support of vulnerable indigenous populations (Gray 2000: 273). 
 Following on from these early successes, agitators for reform on both the 
inside and the outside of the Bank continued over the next decade. A series of 
guidelines were issued to staff by senior management that served to increase the range 
of stakeholders whose interests had to be taken account of in project cycles. 
Something of a dialectic engagement between the Bank and NGOs developed over 
this time: the Bank tended to need prodding into its initial pronouncements by NGO 
pressure  but,  once  issued,  the  Bank’s  statement  of  best  practice  served  as  a  target 
                                                     
13 As Fox and Brown (2000: 489) note, although there were few direct links between the external 
campaigners and internal advocates, ‘each reinforced the other, with the external critique tipping the 
balance in an internally divided Bank’. 
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around which increasingly well coordinated campaigns were arranged (Fox 2000: 
303-5, Rich 1994: 10). A combination of external monitoring and internal auditing 
has helped to ensure growing levels of staff compliance with operational guidelines 
(Fox 2000: 320-1). 
 
Table 4.1. Constructing stakeholders through operational guidelines 
 
Code Description Date Issued 
OP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples 1982 
OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement 1980 
OP 4.15 Poverty Reduction 1993 
OP 4.20 Gender Dimensions of Development 1994 
  
Source: Adapted from Fox and Brown (2000: 516)  
 
 
 In terms of the politics of stakeholder accountability, the provisions 
accompanying  the  Bank’s  guidelines  entail  a  decisive  shift  toward  a  directly 
participatory model. OP 4.10 and 4.12 both contain rules laying out the steps that 
must be taken to elicit  these stakeholders’ input  into the design of both projects and 
policies to mitigate their negative impact. Regarding the former, the Operational 
Manual states that: 
The Bank provides project financing only where free, prior, and informed 
consultation results in broad community support to the project by the affected 
Indigenous Peoples.14 
 
Detailed guidance on the process that governments must follow when consulting 
indigenous groups is provided, to the extent that the social scientists used and terms of 
reference issued must be deemed acceptable by Bank personnel.15 Similarly, OP 4.12 
guarantees that resettlement plans must include: 
                                                     
14 OP 4.10, paragraph 1. See World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,m
enuPK:64701637~pagePK:51628525~piPK:64857279~theSitePK:502184,00.html.  
15 OP 4.10, paragraph 9. 
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measures to ensure that the displaced persons are consulted on, offered choices 
among, and provided with technically and economically feasible resettlement 
alternatives.16 
 
Furthermore, the operational policy outlines the financial and technical assistance that 
can be incorporated into project plans to allow for such activities to be undertaken.17 
 The more recently issued directive on the Gender Dimensions of Development 
serves to commit the Bank to systematically incorporating gender assessments into 
interactions with borrowing countries. These assessments outline the differences in 
the ‘socioeconomic roles’ of females and males, as well as imbalances in the control 
of productive resources, disparities in human development indicators, and the formal 
and informal institutions that lead to gender discrimination.18 Where it is deemed 
necessary by Country Directors and Sector Managers, individual Task Teams are 
required to appraise and ensure that their project addresses: 
The local circumstances that may affect the different participation of females 
and males in the project; the ways in which the project might be 
disadvantageous to one gender relative to the other; and the project's proposed 
mechanisms for monitoring the different impacts of the project on females and 
males.19 
 
A set of mechanisms exist within the Bank to ensure that operational staff integrate 
the gender dimension into their work, whereby the Board guidance to staff on the use 
of gender assessments is accompanied by regional and Bank-wide monitoring and 
reporting processes.20 In  this way,  gender has become an  issue  that  is  ‘seen’ by  the 
Bank, and where deemed necessary increased efforts are made to foster the direct 
participation of women in project cycles. 
 As is the case with any complex bureaucratic organisation, the link between 
policy guidelines issued by senior management at the Bank and the actions of ‘on the 
                                                     
16 OP 4.12, paragraph 6a(ii). 
17 OP 4.12, paragraph 32. 
18 BP 4.20, paragraph 1a(i.v). 
19 BP 4.20, paragraph 3a, c, and d. 
20 BP 4.20, paragraph 5. 
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ground’  operations  staff  can  be  less  than  perfect.  Pressure  to  engage  the formally 
identified stakeholders within project cycles continued to be placed on the Bank by 
NGOs after the guidelines had been published, and egregious examples of projects 
that failed to comply were on many occasions flagged up.21 In 1993, aided by the 
successful lobbying by NGOs of US politicians during IDA replenishment 
negotiations, the Bank was pushed by a group of creditor states to address this 
problem through the establishment an Inspection Panel. The Panel was mandated to 
hear complaints from groups  that were  negatively  impacted  on  through  the Bank’s 
failure to follow its own operating procedures (Weaver 2008: 52). As of late 2009, 58 
requests had been received by the Inspection Panel.22 Although there are competing 
interpretations of how effectively it is functioning, 23  the Inspection Panel now 
provides stakeholders with a formally institutionalised mechanism through which to 
proactively engage with the Bank. This, in combination with the staff guidelines 
examined, has served to embed the reformed, directly participatory model of 
stakeholder accountability at the Bank. 
 In the years since the formation of the Inspection Panel, efforts have continued 
by both internal and external actors to further develop the opportunities for 
participatory stakeholder accountability relationships to develop around Bank 
projects. In contrast to the formal developments that occurred through the 
establishment of operational procedures and the Inspection Panel, these efforts have 
focussed on changing the behaviour of key Bank actors through the process of 
                                                     
21 See Fox and Brown (2000: 500-5) for a comprehensive overview of these campaigns by NGOs and 
grassroots movements. 
22 For further information of these requests and the status of investigations see World Bank Official 
Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129249~p
agePK:64132081~piPK:64132052~theSitePK:380794,00.html.  
23 Compare, for example, Udall’s criticism of the Panel’s lack of independence and subjugation to 
managements’ legalistic parrying of requests (2000: 421-7), with Fox and Brown’s judgement that the 
Panel ‘gave teeth’ to the Bank’s social and environmental reform policies (2000: 489). 
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informal networking and alliance formation. From the very earliest days of the 
operations of the Bank, internal norm entrepreneurs have played a key role in 
promoting the acceptance of particular practices or behaviour (Chwieroth 2008): by 
joining forces with external partners, and particularly drawing on the material 
resources these partners are able to provide, such actors are central to the process of 
embedding mechanisms of direct stakeholder participation in the contemporary 
period. Whereas the period preceding the formation of the Inspection Panel was a 
time of contests to reform mechanisms of stakeholder accountability in order to 
minimise the harm done by Bank supported projects, the contemporary period is 
characterised by attempts to disseminate a view of domestic populations as a resource 
to be drawn upon to improve the efficacy of project design, implementation, and 
monitoring. 
 The roots of this internal norm diffusion lie back in the early 1990s. The 
earliest institutional sub-unit dedicated to the promotion of civil society engagement 
by operational staff was the Bankwide Learning Group on Participatory Development. 
Formed in the early 1990s, in its first few years staff efforts culminated in the 
production in 1994 of the World Bank and Participation report and, two years later, 
the Participation Sourcebook. In these early years, supplementary financing for 
training and networking events – a vital component of successful ideational diffusion 
in as large an organisation as the Bank – came from bilateral sources, particularly the 
Scandinavian countries. Under the leadership of Ismail Serageldin, the Vice 
Presidency for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (which housed 
the Learning Group on Participatory Development) became the lead section in the 
Bank for promoting deeper engagements with domestic populations in project cycles 
(Bebbington et al 2004: 42, Francis and Jacobs 1999: 343). 
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 Through the mid- to late-1990s, internal funds began to be released that were 
earmarked for the development of projects that incorporated an innovative approach 
to stakeholder engagement. This occurred partly as a result of the successful lobbying 
of the staff within the Sustainable Development Vice Presidency, but was also 
evidence  of  an  underlying  shift  in  the  Bank’s  institutional  culture.  Initial  resource 
pools included the Fund for Innovative Approaches in Human and Social 
Development and the Africa Region’s Client Consultation Fund.24 With the launch of 
the Strategic Compact in 1997, a further tranche of resources were released for the 
promotion of stakeholder engagement: in its first year, an additional US$12 million 
was made available to fund operational work and capacity building in social 
development (Francis and Jacobs 1999: 347). 
 The resources available within the Bank to support greater engagement with 
stakeholders have been rated by a recent review as ‘significant’. There are some 120 
staff at the global level that have access to funds for organising consultations with 
CSOs, and there are around 300 communications officers across the institution 
available to operational staff to enhance their outreach activities (Ebrahim and Herz 
2007: 5).25 A crucial factor in determining the extent to which mechanisms of direct 
stakeholder accountability are integrated into operations to a level over and above the 
floor set by formal operational guidelines is the mindset of individual Country 
Directors.  Where  Country  Directors  are  ‘on  board’,  and  view  civil  society 
participation as a useful means of improving project effectiveness, operational staff 
tend to be given the time and support to integrate these activities into project cycles; 
                                                     
24 The former released approximately US$4.25 million over FY1995, 1996, and 1997; the latter 
approximately US$750,000 in FY 1995 (Francis and Jacobs 1999: 347).  
25 Although these resources are available, finding them is often an issue. It is generally necessary for 
Task Team Leaders or their immediate superiors to be experienced, well connected individuals with a 
solid knowledge of the Bank’s often opaque structure. Interview with Masud Mozzamel, Senior 
Communications Officer, Development Communications Division, External Affairs.  
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however, the converse is also true (Bebbington 2004: 52, Rosenburg and Korsmo 
2001: 297, Aycrigg 1998: 18). The micro-level of staff incentives also varies 
according to the ideational framework held by their immediate management. It 
remains  standard practice  for  staff  appraisals  to  concentrate on  the  ‘big  numbers’  – 
the volume of loans processed and the ratings given to projects by the Independent 
Evaluations Group – rather than to explore the more qualitative aspects of operations 
(Ebrahim and Herz 2007: 5). Again, Country Directors and other high level 
management have the capacity to control these aspects of Bank procedure, and some 
do incorporate measurements of engagement into staff performance criteria and 
assessments.26 
 Although the extent to which stakeholders are being identified and engaged in 
project cycles varies across the Bank, there is evidence suggesting that a cultural shift 
has taken place within the organisation over the previous decade. An internal 
evaluation carried out by the  
F igure 4.2. Embedding the participatory model of stakeholder accountability 
 
                                                     
26 Several interviewees made the observation that management tried to integrate a focus on processes 
employed at various stages of project cycles into appraisals. Two interviewees (Anjali Kumar of the 
Independent Evaluation Group and Sonja Carvalho of PRMPR) even spoke of a ‘post-Wapenhams’ 
context. 
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Bank in 2006 found that, in the years since 1990, an upward trend in both the absolute 
and relative number of Bank projects that incorporated civil society engagement into 
the project cycle was identifiable. From a base point of just 32 percent in 1990, by the 
mid-2000s the proportion of total projects with a participatory element was 
consistently above 70 percent (World Bank 2006: 23). Although there were 
methodological weaknesses associated with the study, 27  and unresolved debates 
remain as to how ‘deep’ the form of civil society engagement tends to be (e.g. Stewart 
and Wang 2006, Bradshaw and Linneker 2003), it appears that it is becoming 
increasingly routine for operational staff to institute mechanisms of stakeholder 
participation in project cycles. The pressure that is being exerted through the Bank-
wide monitoring system being established by the Participation and Civic Engagement 
Group to track the scope of the participatory mechanisms employed by operations 
staff (World Bank 2006: 25), and the Group’s promotion of ‘participatory monitoring’ 
as a means of promoting project effectiveness (World Bank 2004), suggest that this 
trend is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. The ever-present prodding from 
critical NGOs will further spur these activities. 
 Through a process whose dynamics can be traced back several decades, the 
model of stakeholder accountability in World Bank project lending has been 
comprehensively reconstructed. Driven by the intersection of internal and external 
pressures, from the 1970s the institutional features of the Bank that had acted to 
entrench a distant model of delegated stakeholder accountability were re-formed. 
                                                     
27 The desk review of projects relied primarily on Project Appraisal Documents, which are produced 
between the design and implementation phases of the cycle. The civil society engagement registered by 
the review, then, consisted of both events that had occurred during the planning phase and events that 
were due to occur during the implementation or monitoring phase. Also, there is no grading of the 
‘strength’ of the engagement: one meeting to disseminate information was given the same weighting as 
a series of consultation in which CSOs were empowered to re-design significant elements of a project 
(World Bank 2006: 25). 
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Important changes in the composition and location of staff, the interaction of internal 
advocates and external critics, the formal identification of stakeholder groups, and the 
institutionalisation of participatory mechanisms all combined to reshape how the 
Bank conceptualised and operationalised the role of on the ground populations in 
project design, implementation, and monitoring. From an initial situation in which 
domestic populations’ relationship with the Bank were conducted exclusively through 
formal governmental channels, minimum mechanisms of participation now not only 
exist but also are backed up, in the form of the Inspection Panel, with the powers of 
an independent ombudsman. Moreover, in the past decade there has been a continued 
shift in the bureaucratic culture of the Bank. In advance of the baseline laid out by 
formal guidelines, operational staff increasingly hold the direct participation of civil 
society organisations in project cycles to be of intrinsic merit. A combination of 
continuing internal and external pressures suggest that, over the medium term, this 
trend will continue to take root around the Bank’s project lending activities. 
 
4.4. Policy based lending and stakeholder accountability as a domestic 
governance tool 
Owing to the complexity of IOs and the existence of competing sites of authority 
within their operations, the evolution of the stakeholder accountability relationships 
surrounding these arenas of global governance is often a multi-track process. 
Although there is an inevitable overlap, different structures can emerge within the 
various operational strands of the same IO. In parallel to the emergence of 
participatory mechanisms of stakeholder accountability around World Bank project 
lending,  changes  have  occurred within  the  organisation’s  policy  based  lending  that 
have served to reconstruct understandings of stakeholder accountability in this sphere 
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of operations. Although from early on in its foray into policy lending there was an 
awareness within the Bank of the importance of domestic governance structures, over 
recent years it has taken a more proactive approach to the issue. In common with the 
developments to project lending, the interaction of external and internal factors have 
contributed  to  these  reforms.  Contests  over  the  appropriateness  of  the  Bank’s 
involvement in reforming domestic governance processes continue, but there is clear 
support from senior management and significant material resources to support the 
incorporation of governance reform into policy based lending. Because of this 
support, the operational refocusing will likely, for the foreseeable future, remain. 
After providing some background information on policy based lending at the Bank, I 
then outline the ideational shifts that helped re-position stakeholder accountability as 
a  tool  to  promote  ‘good  governance’,  and  review  the  other  internal  and  external 
developments that have enabled the operationalisation of domestic accountability 
reform within World Bank policy based lending. 
 The use by the World Bank of lending instruments that were specifically 
designed to induce macroeconomic policy reforms is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
It was only in 1980, at the end of the McNamara Presidency, that a new era of 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) was ushered in. Although the Bank’s shift  into 
policy lending attracted much comment and criticism, the amount of resources 
channelled through this route remained relatively limited.28 After the initial fillip that 
came with the 1982 debt crisis, when SALs became a useful vehicle for transferring 
resources to heavily indebted countries, through the decade the proportion of new 
Bank lending made up by policy based hovered around the 25 percent level (Kapur 
and Webb 2000: 2, Kapur et al 1997: 516-18). From 1990 to the present time, the 
                                                     
28 Ritzen (2007: 576) makes the point that outsiders tend to over-state the relative importance of policy 
lending to the Bank’s total portfolio. 
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relative level of policy based lending has decreased marginally, on average 
accounting for between 20-25 percent of total resource flows. 29  Although it has 
remained  a  minority  interest  in  the  Bank’s  overall  budget,  policy  based  lending 
became of significant importance to individual borrowers. Policy lending remained 
concentrated amongst low income countries, for whom the resources released by 
agreements formed a non-negligible proportion of state revenue (Kapur et al 1997: 
534). For this reason, the incorporation of governance reform into policy based 
lending  is  an  important  development  in  the  Bank’s engagements with low income 
countries. 
 Policy based lending emerged at the Bank because of an increasing frustration 
amongst senior management that the often chaotic macroeconomic conditions in low 
income borrowing countries were inhibiting the impact of projects. The overall aim of 
policy based lending was to assist borrowers to create a stable environment capable of 
sustaining balanced  
F igure 4.3. Persistent Conditions 
 
 
                                                     
29 World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120732~menuPK:268
725~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html.  
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growth and poverty reduction. To this end, three broad categories of policy 
conditionality were attached to loans. First, on the supply side, were policies designed 
to increase productive growth and efficiency. As is shown by Figure 4.3, the 
proportion of conditions directed toward supply side reform was consistently around 
75 percent of total loan conditions. Second and third in terms of frequency came 
policies aimed at reducing the absorption effect of rising incomes and policies aimed 
at switching inputs from producing domestically consumed goods and services to the 
production of tradable goods, respectively (Kapur et al 1997: 524). 
 By the late 1980s, there was a widespread dissatisfaction over the performance 
of countries engaged in policy based lending. The failure of these programmes to 
produce the predicted rates of growth, and in many cases the visible social hardships 
caused by budgetary cutbacks and rising unemployment, led organisations including 
the United Nations Commission  for Africa  to publicly  rebuke  the Bank’s  approach. 
Influenced by evolving trends  in  developmental  economics,  the  Bank’s  response 
transferred attention onto the political economies of borrowing countries, specifically 
focussing on the importance of ‘getting the institutional context right’ to allow policy 
reforms to take root (Weaver 2008: 97, Nelson 2000: 413). This shift marked the start 
of a reconceptualisation of the role of civil society in the process of development at 
the Bank, and laid in place the ideational underpinnings for the move toward the use 
of civil society as a governance tool within policy based lending. In order to be 
operationalised,  changes  in  how  the  Bank  ‘saw’  governance  issues  required  the 
support of internal advocates and changes in the organisation’s external environment. 
 The  rise  to  prominence  of  ‘new  institutional  economics’  in  the  early  1990s, 
spurred by Douglas North’s Nobel Prize-winning work, coincided with the push from 
the  Bank’s  research  department  to  explore  the  apparent  failures  of  policy  based 
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lending. North’s  contribution was  to  highlight  the importance of market-supporting 
institutions  in  facilitating  individuals’  economic  transactions.  In  so  doing,  North 
challenged the ‘institution-free zone’ approach of neoclassical economics (Toye 2008: 
517). Institutions, whether formal or informal, were seen as vital to securing 
transparency and predictability in the enforcement of property rights and commercial 
transactions. Within  the  institutional milieu,  the  relationship between  ‘the state’ and 
‘the  people’  gained  particular  importance,  as  civil  society was held to be a vital 
corrective to the counterproductive tendencies of government. In the words of North 
(1990: 59): 
Third-party enforcement means the development of the state as a coercive 
force able to monitor property rights and enforce contracts effectively… 
However, if the state has coercive force, then those who run the state will use 
that force in their own interest at the expense of the rest of the society. 
 
The paradigmatic shift within economic theory ushered the language of ‘governance 
reform’ into  the  lexicon of  the World Bank  (Weaver 2008: 98-9), and helped shape 
the research agenda of the organisation. 
 Through the 1990s, the World Bank research department put significant 
efforts into proving that institutional arrangements were important to the process of 
sustainable development. These efforts culminated with the publication in 1999 of the 
Policy Research Working Paper Governance Matters. In the Paper, aggregate 
indicators  for  six  governance  concepts  were  established,  and  evidence  of  a  ‘strong 
causal  relationship’  from  better  governance  to  better  development  outcomes  put 
forward (Kaufmann et al 1999: 1). Although the direction of the causal relationship 
remains contested within developmental economics (e.g. Chang 2007: 12),30 the Paper 
acted as an intellectual anchor for internal advocates of a governance reform agenda. 
                                                     
30 In direct opposition to the conclusion of Governance Matters, Chang (2007: 12) suggests the in an 
introduction to a recent edited collection: ‘A less obvious principle in the technology of institution 
building that the volume suggests is that it is often more effective to start the process of institutional 
reform by introducing the desired economic activities than by introducing the desired institutions’.  
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The  framing  in  economic  language  of  the  argument  in  support  of  the  Bank’s 
engagement in governance reform was vitally important to the process of internal 
alliance building; it allowed what could have been understood as an intrusion into the 
domestic affairs of borrowers to be constructed as within the Bank’s remit. This was 
important both to allow governance reform to cohere with the bureaucratic culture of 
the Bank, and also to secure the legal basis for its incorporation into policy based 
lending (Weaver 2008: 107, Kapur and Webb 2000: 2). 
 Alterations  in  the Bank’s external environment also helped  to open  the door 
for the governance agenda. At a general level a major change in international political 
culture  took  hold  during  the  1990s,  whereby  the  concept  of  ‘state  sovereignty’ 
became far less revered in international discourse (Kapur and Webb 2000: 2). Linked 
to  this  shift was  the  rise of  a  ‘liberal  democratic  aid  agenda’, whereby donor states 
began to conceive of governance reform and the promotion of human rights as 
intrinsically valuable goals in their own right (Nelson 2000: 413). By the mid-1990s, 
the Bank’s major creditor states had already begun to put pressure on the organisation 
to include mechanisms to empower domestic stakeholders within lending instruments 
(Clegg 2010a). However, the factor that most helped to push the governance agenda 
from a part of development discourse to being a part of development practice, 
operationalised through Bank policy based lending, was the strong support within the 
organisation from senior management (Weaver 2008: 108, World Bank 2001: 7).  
Shortly after assuming the Bank Presidency, James Wolfensohn publicly 
affirmed his commitment to governance  reform  through  the  ‘Cancer  of Corruption’ 
speech,  delivered  at  the  organisation’s  1996 Annual Meeting  in  Hong  Kong. With 
Wolfensohn’s  clear  backing,  the  necessity  of  opening  up  governance  processes  to 
allow for the input of civil society actors quickly gained traction in key Bank 
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publications. The 1997 World Development Report articulated, for the first time, the 
Bank’s  commitment  to  good  governance,  and  further  works  including  Helping 
Countries Combat Corruption and Assessing Aid added signalled a shift in the Bank’s 
approach (Weaver 2008: 108-10). The discursive practice of linking governance 
reform to anticorruption helped to undercut potential criticisms that the Bank was 
overriding the sovereignty of borrowing country governments. 
 The coalescence of these internal and external factors led, in 1999, to the 
dramatic operationalisation of the governance agenda. As part of the efforts to 
‘enhance’ the process heavily indebted poor country debt relief,  the World Bank (in 
partnership with the IMF) announced the launch of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) initiative. Under the initiative, in order to receive multilateral debt 
reduction governments were required to submit a PRSP laying out a long term 
developmental strategy, and vitally the document was to be produced following 
consultation with civil society groups and other stakeholders. The initial guidelines on 
PRSPs noted that: 
Poverty  reduction strategies are expected  to be… designed  in a participatory 
fashion, taking into account the views of Parliaments and (where they exist) 
other democratic bodies, the donor community, civil society and specifically 
the poor themselves (World Bank & IMF 2000: 1).  
 
With the initiative, the Bank for the first time systematically incorporated process 
conditionality into their interactions with low income countries (Lazarus 2008: 1216). 
Although the actual participatory processes surrounding PRSPs have been criticised 
by several observers (e.g. World Development Movement 2006, Bradshaw and 
Linneker 2003,  Craig  and  Porter  2002),  and  the  Bank’s  own  evaluations  have 
concluded that standards varied from country to country (World Bank and IMF 
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2005),31 the incorporation of this new form of conditionality marked a shift in Bank 
practices. For the first time, financial resources were systematically being used to 
leverage low income country governments into reforming domestic accountability 
mechanisms in order to enhance stakeholders’ capacity to influence policy making.  
 With the breaking of the operational watershed through the PRSP initiative, in 
the years since 1999 the inclusion of participatory requirements within development 
policy lending by the Bank has increased markedly (see Figure 4.4). In 2000, some 38 
percent of policy based loans contained prior actions, triggers, or benchmarks relating 
to stakeholder participation in their policy matrix; by 2005, this had risen to 67 
percent. These new forms of 
F igure 4.4. Restructuring domestic governance through conditionality 
 
 
‘hard’  process conditionality are particularly prevalent in the policy lending 
agreements reached between the Bank and the lowest income group of countries, with 
some 83 percent of loans made by the Africa Group of the Bank containing such 
provisions (World Bank 2009: 4). 
                                                     
31 The placing of a participatory process requirement within the PRSP initiative was never likely to 
evolve into a ‘hard’ condition. The pressure on Bank and Fund staff to get the E-HIPC rolling meant 
that no countries’ progression to ‘completion point’ was held up on the grounds of inadequate 
participatory practices. 
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 Although these aggregated figures capture the extensity of conditions relating 
to reforms of domestic accountability structures, they fail to capture the intensity of 
this development within Bank policy lending operations. Should the increasing use of 
process  conditionality  be  taken  as  evidence  of  a  significant  shift  in  the  Bank’s 
operational practices, or  is  it more of a cosmetic, ‘box ticking’ exercise? In order to 
explore this issue it is necessary to closely examine contemporary developments 
within  the  Bank,  focussing  on  the  organisation’s  institutional  structure,  the  micro-
level  incentives  presented  to  staff,  and  developments  in  the  Bank’s  external 
environment. 
 In  terms of  the Bank’s  institutional  structure,  governance  related  issues  now 
have  a  secure  ‘home’  within  the  organisation.  Established  in  1997,  the  Poverty 
Reduction  and  Economic Management  network’s  Public  Sector Group  (PRMPS)  is 
tasked with improving the Bank’s focus on ‘building efficient and accountable public 
sector institutions’.32 The Group continues to present its work in terms of enhancing 
the effectiveness, as measured by economic impact, of development assistance. 
Through  the  ‘Governance  and  Anticorruption’  (GAC)  strategy,  PRMPS  has  fixed 
upon the discursive practice initiated by Wolfensohn of linking governance reform to 
anticorruption, and by so doing has been able to present its work in an attractive 
discursive framework (World Bank 2008: i). Although PRMPS got off to a slow start, 
and was initially provided with insufficient resources to effectively promote its ideas 
within the Bank’s competitive internal environment (Weaver 2008: 118, World Bank 
2001: 25), there is evidence of a recent turnaround. Throughout his brief Presidency, 
Paul Wolfowitz was a staunch supporter of GAC, establishing a monthly Governance 
Council to provide high level leadership for the GAC agenda. The council is chaired 
                                                     
32 See World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANC
E/0,,menuPK:286310~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:286305,00.html.  
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by  the  Bank’s  Managing  Directors,  and  comprised  of  Vice  President  level 
representatives from across the organisation. 33  Support for this and other GAC 
structures continues to be publicly voiced by the new Bank President (e.g. Zoellick 
2008). 
Working alongside the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice 
Presidency, PRMPS have developed a series of analytical instruments for use by 
country teams to assist their incorporation of the GAC agenda into their operations. 
Templates for Country Financial Accountability Assessments and Country 
Procurement Assessments are available to ‘help the Bank and client countries deepen 
their knowledge of governance  settings’,34 and their findings are intended to inform 
the design of agenda setting documents such as CASs (World Bank 2001: 45). During 
2008, in an effort to ensure that such resources were utilised more effectively, a 
‘needs assessment’ of all Country Directors and Country Managers was undertaken. 
As a consequence, US$3.8 million in new funds and US$8.4 million in redeployed 
funds were released to situate GAC-specialist staff within both Network and Regional 
Vice Presidencies (World Bank 2008: 45-6). Under the guidance of the Governance 
Council, significant material resources are being targeted at encouraging operational 
staff to utilise domestic accountability structures as a means of optimising resource 
use within policy based lending.35 
 In 2008, PRMPS and the GAC agenda received a significant material boost, 
when  the  UK,  Danish,  and  Dutch  governments  created  a  ‘Governance  Partnership 
                                                     
33 As a senior PRMPS staff member said of the influence of the Governance Council: ‘Countries now 
feel the light is on them’. Interview with Doris Voorbraak, November 2008. 
34 See World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANC
E/0,,contentMDK:20223795~menuPK:468641~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305,00.h
tml.  
35 Indeed, the approach being used is reminiscent of the earlier attempts of senior management back in 
the late 1990s to embed the operational changes they wished to see relating to the Strategic Compact. 
On the Strategic Compact reforms, see Nielson et al (2006). 
159 
 
Facility’ with a US$100 million endowment. The Facility was set very broad terms of 
access, in order to encourage experimentation by Bank staff. When announcing its 
formation, the creditors stated that: 
[The  Facility]  complements  the  World  Bank’s  efforts  in  the  area  of  good 
governance and provides additional resources with which country teams can 
ramp up their efforts to help governments to improve their internal 
accountability and provide better services to their citizens.36 
 
In  an  early  initiative  to  publicise  the  Facility,  the  Bank’s  regional  Vice  Presidents 
nominated 27 countries, and each country team was awarded US$100,000 on the 
broad proviso that the resources be used to ‘engage a broad spectrum of participants 
in each country’ in furtherance of the GAC agenda (World Bank 2008: iii). Assisted 
by these resources, supporters of the GAC agenda have continued their attempts to 
mainstream the focus on domestic accountability structures in Bank operations. 
 Although significant resistance remains within the organisation, there is 
evidence that the ideational shift has begun to permeate previously hostile corners of 
the Bank. The Development Economics Vice Presidency, long considered a bastion of 
orthodoxy (Broad 2006), is a particularly noteworthy case. Within DEC, research on 
governance, political economy, and public sector management now ranks fourth out 
of 14 thematic groupings in terms of the number of projects carried out (World Bank 
2007: 2). The formation of an informal working group on participation in the early 
2000s suggests that research in this area has a deep level of support within DEC 
(Cernea 2004: 16). At the least, by translating debates around stakeholder 
accountability and participation into an economistic language acceptable to the 
Bank’s  mainstream,  the  work  of  DEC  will  support  a  continued  shift  in  the 
organisation’s bureaucratic culture. 
                                                     
36 See World Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/WBEUROPEEXTN/NORWAYEXTN
/0,,contentMDK:21997367~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:402751,00.html?cid=3001.  
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 Despite these high profile activities and attempts to mainstream domestic 
accountability reforms into Bank operations, it remains the case that micro-level staff 
incentives are not well aligned with this priority. As was the case with project based 
lending, the incorporation of stakeholder accountability issues into policy lending 
operations is a time consuming business that, in an organisation that still largely 
rewards staff for disbursing large quotas of funds, is often regarded as a luxury. The 
conflict with rapid lending turnaround is heightened as these types of governance 
issues also tend to require more intensive monitoring, and are less likely to generate 
rapid,  quantifiable  results.  In  addition,  staff  continue  to  traverse  an  ‘apolitical 
tightrope’. Aspects of policy loan agreements that are considered too overtly political 
may be filtered out by Country Directors, concerned to maintain good relations with 
borrowing governments (Weaver 2008: 117-20, Rosenburg and Korsmo 2001: 297). 
Although these micro-level disincentives  make  the  ‘participatory  turn’  in  project 
lending problematic, it should be remembered that change in bureaucratic 
organisations occurs through (interlinked) changes to both logics of consequence and 
logics of appropriateness (Nielson et al 2006: 107). The performance criteria set by 
senior management are not immutable, and interviews with staff suggested that the 
bonds of  the ‘disbursal  imperative’ may in fact be weakening.37 With the continued, 
and highly visible, support from the highest levels of management for the promotion 
of good governance and domestic stakeholder accountability reform, the potential for 
such a shift is increased. 
 Over the last decade, the World Bank has come a long way in relation to the 
promotion of good governance and domestic stakeholder accountability reform. 
                                                     
37 Several interviewees made the observation that although the ‘disbursement imperative’ as outlined 
by the Wapenhams Report still structures individual staff incentives, there was significant Bank-wide 
variation in the extent to which this was the case. Dino Merotto (Country Economist, Uganda), for 
example, noted that his performance criteria included the successful dissemination of research findings 
beyond governmental partners. 
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Within the Bank, the ideational links between governance and development are well 
established, and with visible support from senior management this agenda is gaining 
traction in the organisation. The continued public backing from the new President for 
the  Bank’s  push  to  reform  domestic  accountability  structures  in  the  name  of  its 
anticorruption strategy, and the sheer volume of resources that are currently flowing 
through to operations aimed at mainstreaming GAC work, suggests that the 
commitment needed to push through significant change in the culture of the Bank will 
be maintained over the medium term. Change in as complex a bureaucratic 
organisation as the World Bank is an inevitably uneven process, whose progress is 
difficult to track; however, the trends outlined above suggest that advocates of the use 
of stakeholder accountability as a tool of domestic governance now have a secure 
foothold in the Bank from which to continue with their proselytising efforts. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In the world of IOs, stakeholder accountability is an essentially contested relationship. 
Although  an  organisation’s  the  formal  structure  and operating  procedures  served  to 
define its initial accountability mechanisms in a manner that can cast a long shadow 
over their future evolution, the relationship between IO and stakeholder groups enjoys 
a high level of malleability. The process of change is shaped by emerging discourses 
of accountability, whose success relies on the extent to which they fit with the beliefs 
and experiences of actors both inside and outside the IO. Reconstructions in the 
accountability relationships surrounding an IO can take place along a multi-track 
process, and rapid periods of change typically relies on the intersection of external 
and internal pressures, with material resources at times playing a vital role in the 
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process of alliance building. In the politics of stakeholder accountability ideas matter, 
but funding enables staff to disseminate and embed new practices. 
From  an  initial  structure  in  which  borrowing  country  stakeholders’ 
accountability relationship with the World Bank ran through a distant and highly 
imperfect chain of delegation, the contemporary situation has been substantially 
transformed. In the realm of project lending, a slow process of internal and external 
agitation led, in the early 1990s, to the formal identification of a range of stakeholder 
groups. These groups were provided with special claims to be included through 
participatory mechanisms in project cycles, and with the formation in 1993 of the 
Inspection Panel a legal mechanism was created through which failures to adhere to 
Bank guidelines could be challenged. Following these formal developments, the 
process of internal alliance building has continued, and although barriers remain, 
advocates have enjoyed some success in disseminating the view of civil society as a 
potentially valuable resource to be drawn upon in project cycles. In the realm of 
policy based lending, moves have been made to reconstruct stakeholder accountability 
at the domestic level as a vital component of the developmental process. With the 
ideational underpinnings of new institutional economics, large efforts were made by 
Bank researchers through the 1990s to provide hard evidence  that  ‘governance 
matters’.  Supported  by  an  increasingly  sympathetic  external  environment,  and with 
the continued support of senior management, process conditionality has increasingly 
been incorporated into development policy lending operations. The conspicuous 
success of the Governance and Anti-Corruption agenda over recent years shows that 
in this area of Bank operations, too, a ‘participatory turn’ has begun to take root. 
 In  spite  of  the  existence  of  these  trends,  barriers  preventing  the  ‘deep’ 
absorption of stakeholder accountability into either the project or policy based arms of 
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Bank  operations  remain.  Perhaps most  seriously,  the  remnants  of  the Bank’s much 
criticised ‘disbursal culture’ continues to structure the micro-level incentives of staff 
in such a way as to make stakeholder participation in project cycles and the promotion 
of stakeholder accountability at the domestic level appear a costly luxury. The 
promotion of stakeholder participation remains a minority pursuit and something of a 
‘bureaucratic sub-culture’ in the Bank. Nonetheless, with the continuing assistance of 
senior management, a supportive external environment (bolstered, somewhat 
paradoxically, by vocal NGO critics), and substantial material resources, it is a sub-
culture that over the foreseeable future will continue to expand. 
 In the closing chapter of the thesis the study of the politics of accountability is 
collapsed out, and the cross-pollination of ideas with projects advocating 
cosmopolitan global governance is explored. In this regard, the insights gained into 
the politics of stakeholder accountability at the World Bank provide useful guidance 
for cosmopolitan works. It is shown in particular that, by ensuring that demands for 
operational change cohere with the bureaucratic culture of the IO under examination, 
the  visions  of  cosmopolitan  writers  can  become  more  ‘saleable’  to  the  IOs 
themselves. However,  before  the  ‘ins  and outs’  of  the  politics  of  accountability  are 
considered more fully, in chapter five developments in the mechanisms through which 
the IMF interacts with domestic stakeholders in low-income countries are first 
examined. 
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Chapter F ive – Apolitical Economy and the Limits to 
Stakeholder Engagement at the IM F  
5.0. Introduction 
 
Learning to leave my door open was the biggest difficulty in my move from 
the Fund to the Bank… At the Fund, everybody’s door is closed (Jeff Chelsky, 
World Bank International Policy and Partnerships Group Senior Economist, 
2008).1 
 
Fund staff should be prepared to share their analyses and key elements of their 
policy positions in the [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper] consultative 
process… Missions should learn from the policy dialogue (IMF 1999: 1). 
 
In the world of monetary policy, information asymmetries between decision makers 
and market actors are widely thought to enhance the efficacy of policy choices. 
Because of this, discussions of monetary policy have traditionally taken place behind 
closed doors, and even today the most liberal of disclosure procedures allow only for 
the post hoc release of limited accounts of discussions (Gutner 2009). In line with 
these norms, throughout the majority of its life the IMF – the international 
organisation charged with overseeing the international coordination of monetary 
policy – has been accustomed  to  ‘acting  behind  the  scenes’,2 providing advice and 
conducting negotiations out of the public limelight. Such an operating procedure is 
diametrically opposed to the calls for greater accountability and stakeholder 
engagement that are now routinely placed on IOs, and it is for this reason that the 
politics of stakeholder accountability at the Fund are of particular interest. Although 
over the past decade innovations in the relationship between the Fund and low-income 
                                                     
1 Interview with author. The comment was made in a literal sense, but in the context of the broader 
interview can also be read as a metaphor regarding the effect of the intellectual culture at the Fund. The 
interviewee talked in depth about the permeation of academic macroeconomics with the assumption 
that abstract modelling can generate optimal solutions, and the consequent belief by Fund staff that 
there is a ‘right’ answer to policy questions. Hence, little value is attached to ‘opening the door’ to 
solicit input from a range of sources, let alone ‘on the ground’ actors in borrowing countries. 
2 This characterisation of the Fund’s modus operandi was given by Ulrich Jacoby, IMF Office of 
Technical Assistance Management. Interview, November 2008.  
165 
 
country populations have emerged, deeply ingrained institutional characteristics of the 
Fund continue to preclude the emergence of direct mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability. The disjuncture between the Fund’s and its critics’ understandings of 
appropriate practice in this area means that, almost inevitably, heated disagreements 
will continue. 
 As was shown to be the case with the World Bank, the formal structure and 
mandate of the IMF provide the context within which contemporary developments in 
the politics of stakeholder accountability continue to unfold. Deeply embedded 
operating procedures and internal understandings of its role have led to substantial 
continuity in the mechanisms of stakeholder accountability at the IMF, and the 
changes that have occurred are of a limited scope. Within these boundaries, there are 
two main lines along which the politics of stakeholder accountability have progressed 
at  the  Fund:  the  first  relates  to  the  engagement  of  civil  society  as  a  ‘disciplinary 
stakeholder’  in  support  of  reforms;  the  second  to  the ‘ownership’  of  restructuring 
programmes by policy-making elites. Both lines have developed under the influence 
primarily of internal dynamics, the former incorporating a series of innovations 
surrounding the Fund’s provision of catalytic lending and the latter a cycle of internal 
learning around the participation-ownership-implementation nexus. Although it 
continues to face demands to fundamentally restructure the mechanisms of 
stakeholder accountability surrounding its operations, deep seated characteristics of 
the  Fund  continue  to  restrict  the  extent  to  which  the  IO  will  ‘open  its  doors’  to 
domestic stakeholders. Much to the chagrin of  critics,  the maxim  that  ‘you  cannot 
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negotiate macroeconomic policy on the street’ continues to inform Fund practices in 
the area of stakeholder accountability.3 
 In examining the sources of continuity and change in the politics of 
stakeholder accountability at the IMF, the chapter proceeds according to the following 
structure. The opening section examines the challenges of reforming accountability 
relationships surrounding the operations of IOs. Although accountability relationships 
are fundamentally subject to contestation and transformation, aspects of the formal 
structure and bureaucratic culture of IOs can serve to minimise the degree of 
operational flexibility. With organisations like the Fund that are widely credited with 
a high level of technocratic expertise, the capacity of external actors to push through 
operational changes tends to be low. In the second section I outline the institutional 
characteristics of the Fund that led to the initial emergence of a restricted form of 
delegated stakeholder accountability, and the practices that served to secure this ‘club’ 
arrangement through to the contemporary operations of the IO. In the third section of 
the chapter I track the evolution of the conceptualisation of civil society groups as 
disciplinary  stakeholders,  used  to  enforce  the  ‘good  behaviour’  of  low-income 
country governments. The genesis of this development lies with the internalisation by 
the Fund of a view of supplementary finance as a disciplinary force. In low-income 
countries, in lieu of private market actors, the disciplinary vacuum has been ascribed 
to domestic groups. Recent Fund initiatives have aimed to enhance their capacity to 
execute this function, particularly by improving the provision of information about 
government performance to stakeholders. In the fourth section I trace the dynamics 
that have led to minor modifications in the participatory mechanisms open to groups 
in low-income countries to directly engage with IMF staff. Institutional learning and 
                                                     
3 Tamar Gutner (2009: 18) quotes a senior IMF official as using this phrase to explain the limitations to 
the Fund’s interactions in borrowing countries. 
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external pressure have combined to foster small operational changes, although the 
Fund’s entanglement in the World Bank’s more radical participatory discourse has led 
to charges of hypocrisy being voiced by critical observers. The concluding section of 
the chapter draws together the lessons learnt regarding the politics of stakeholder 
accountability at the IMF, and reflects on the dynamics that will determine future 
developments. Although some movement away from the ‘club’ model will continue, 
the distance between the Fund’s and its critics’ views of appropriate mechanisms for 
engaging with low-income  country  populations means  that  the  IO’s  legitimacy will 
continue to be challenged. In addition, this section introduces the key themes that are 
examined in the closing chapter of the thesis regarding the intersection of the politics 
of accountability and projects advocating cosmopolitan global governance. 
 
5.1. Technocratic expertise and stakeholder disengagement in global politics 
Over  the  past  decade,  the  charge  of  being  ‘undemocratic’  and  ‘unaccountable’  has 
been a commonplace criticism of high profile institutions of global governance. In the 
developed world, public displays of discontent often accompany meetings of 
international forums (O’Brien et al 2003: 173), and in the developing world protesters 
against policies ‘imposed from on-high’ direct their anger at perceived IO intrusions 
into domestic affairs (Walton and Seddon 1994). The IMF has consistently been at the 
forefront of such protests, and a significant quantity of academic literature has been 
produced that is highly critical of its practices (e.g. Woods 2001, Woods and Narlikar 
2001, Thirkell-White 2004). Although these works have gained widespread 
acceptance, and serve as additional voices in the cacophony calling for reform by the 
Fund, the utility of their contribution can be supplemented through a close analysis of 
the politics of stakeholder accountability. It is only by examining the intricate 
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processes through which the relationship between the Fund and its in-country 
stakeholders is constructed and re-constructed that the cause of the continuing 
disparity  between  the  Fund’s  practices  and  external  critics’  views  can  be  fully 
grasped. 
 When examining the politics of stakeholder accountability surrounding the 
activities of IOs, a key analytical starting point is the institution’s formal structure and 
mandate. The institutional arrangements set out in the founding Articles of Agreement 
establish the parameters around which the future operations of the IO are to be 
conducted, detailing the mechanisms through which engagements with both state and 
non-state actors occur. These codified rules form a legally enforceable framework that 
typically requires the agreement of super-majorities of member states to alter; as such, 
the operational prescriptions they contain help to define the degree of flexibility in the 
IO’s  stakeholder  accountability  relationship over the long term. For international 
organisations set up in the early post-1945 era, the pre-eminent importance attached to 
‘sovereignty’ meant  that  their  founding Articles  bore  a particularly deep  imprint on 
the later politics of stakeholder accountability. For such IOs, which include both the 
World Bank and the IMF, formal spheres of operation are tightly defined, with the 
original signatories often deeming it necessary to include clauses precluding 
interventions in domestic political processes. In this way, Articles of Agreement can 
serve to embed a model of stakeholder accountability firmly in line with the 
delegated, ‘club’ model. Through such accountability structures, stakeholders’ access 
to IO officials comes exclusively through national-level actors (Kapur and Webb 
2000: 2, Keohane and Nye 2002: 2, Vetterlein 2006: 132). 
 Although formal alterations to the rules dictating the structures of stakeholder 
engagement by IOs are comparatively rare, reform can – and generally does – occur at 
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the margins. A vital component in catalysing such change is the creation of a shared 
understanding amongst strategically important external and internal actors that a 
particular social group has a legitimate claim to a direct relationship with the IO. In 
the contemporary constellation of global politics, NGOs have come to play an 
increasingly  prominent  role  in  promoting  such  causes  in  IOs’  social  environments. 
Aided in particular by technological advances that have enabled trans-national 
communication and coordination to be carried out quickly and at low cost, such 
groups have in recent decades spearheaded many successful campaigns against IOs 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998, Castells 1996). However, the characteristics of individual 
IOs are a key determinant of the degree to which external actors’ efforts are likely to 
gain traction and produce behavioural changes. In this regard, the IO’s ‘porosity’ and 
its dominant institutional culture are particularly important (O’Brien et al 2003: 189-
96). 
 Porosity and bureaucratic culture are aspects of IOs that tend to be mutually 
reinforcing, which together create a systematic tendency toward either openness to 
behavioural change through external intervention or insularity and relative hostility to 
external  pressures.  An  IO’s  porosity  refers simply to the external mobility of its 
personnel. IOs that have an established history of high staff turnover and the regular 
use of contracted-in consultants generally exhibit a greater permeability to outside 
ideas. Indeed, there have been some recent examples of a two-way flow of staff 
between IOs and revisionist NGOs pushing for changes in operating practices 
(O’Brien et al 2003: 192). In contrast, organisations with very low staff turnover rates, 
in which staff are recruited at an early age and follow a well trodden and widely 
known career path, can resemble something of a ‘closed-shop’. In such situations, the 
movement of staff between the IO and external critical groups is, at best, highly 
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unlikely. Not only is the transplantation of new ideas through the incorporation of 
new staff lacking, but also an element of self-reinforcing ‘group-think’ can begin  to 
emerge to further insulate the IO from demands for reform.4 In a circular process, 
staff deploy internally accepted arguments amongst themselves to justify the 
continued reproduction of existing practices, thereby severely restricting the capacity 
for constructive dialogue with outsiders (Janis 1982: 174). IOs exhibiting such ‘non-
porous’ characteristics provide a hostile  terrain  for NGO activists, particularly those 
advocating significant operational reform to the mechanisms through which 
engagements with domestic stakeholders are conducted. Unfortunately for such 
NGOs,  the  IMF’s  personnel  practices  represent  something  of  a  paragon  of  non-
porosity (O’Brien et al 2003: 190-1). 
 In a similar manner to the porosity of its staffing practices, the bureaucratic 
culture of an IO also can function to either encourage or resist the accommodation of 
externally driven change. In an extension of the practice of groupthink, staff within 
any organisation adopt a collection of relatively unreflexively held ‘rules of  thumb’. 
This culture is constituted by: 
The set of  ‘basic assumptions’  that affect how organisational actors  interpret 
their environment, select and process information, and make decisions so as to 
maintain  a  consistent  view  of  the  world  and  the  organisation’s  role  in  it 
(Weaver 2008: 37). 
 
Importantly, the bureaucratic culture of an IO sets out the generally held standards of 
proof that must be met in order for demands of behavioural change to be internalised. 
Although materially powerful actors with the capacity to control resources can push 
through  change  in  IOs  by  restructuring  incentive  structures  (i.e.  by  altering  staffs’ 
calculations according to  a  logic  of  consequence),  in  order  for  IOs  to  ‘self-police’ 
                                                     
4 The term was used with this meaning by Alex Mourmouras, IMF Institute Senior Economist. 
Interview with author, December 2008. 
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changes or for less materially powerful actors to successfully impact on IO behaviour 
more deep seated beliefs must be challenged (i.e. staffs logics of appropriateness must 
be reformed).5 By virtue of the specialised nature of the objectives that they have been 
tasked with, the operations of many IOs are surrounded by a language of expertise 
that can be highly problematic for external actors to engage with. Although this 
barrier is not uniformly in existence across different IOs, in some cases the language 
of expertise can act as an almost impervious – albeit generally unintentional – 
insulating layer (Konioka and Woller 1999: 309-10, Adler and Bernstein 2005: 304). 
The IMF is credited with being an archetypal example of such an expertise-based IO 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 50). As such, internal dynamics assume a greater 
importance within the politics of stakeholder accountability surrounding its 
operations.  
 A central component of the pressure currently being placed on IOs to engage 
in more direct relationships with the stakeholders affected by their activities is a 
general liberal-democratic shift in the international aid agenda. In the post-Cold War 
environment, external actors, in the form of creditor states and watchdog NGOs, have 
increasingly drawn upon a normatively laden discourse to push IOs to alter their 
behaviour in this regard (Nelson 2000: 413). However, expertise-based organisations 
such as the Fund are singularly resistant to such methods of persuasion (O’Brien et al 
2003: 189-90). The rigidly arranged hierarchy of operational means and ends in these 
IOs, the causal chains between which are firmly accepted according to internally held 
standards of proof, require evidence that is presented in terms that cohere with their 
language of expertise in order to be accepted. Once accepted, such changes are likely 
to rapidly gain traction within the organisation; indeed, once this tipping point has 
                                                     
5 On logics of appropriateness and logics of consequence, see Nielson et al (2006: 107). 
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been reached, the behaviour of expertise-based IOs has been characterised as like 
‘marines falling into line’.6 However, in order to reach this tipping point, it is of vital 
important for strategically placed insiders to assist in the translation and dissemination 
of arguments in favour of behavioural change (Weaver 2008: 28). Under the influence 
of these generally conservative dynamics, broad operational continuity, supplemented 
by piecemeal incremental reforms, dominate the activities of such expertise-based 
IOs. 
 A final immanent propensity of expertise-based IOs that is pertinent to the 
analysis of the politics of stakeholder accountability at the IMF relates to the field of 
public relations. Owing to the enhanced frequency of les dialogues des sourds 
between such IOs and external critics, it is common for such IOs to face prolonged 
periods of public criticism. The unwillingness or inability of the two sides to speak a 
common language can lead to both a failure to respond to legitimate criticism on the 
part of the IO, and a failure to accept the validity of even strong evidence of IO 
success on the part of critics. Indeed, this latter issue can be exacerbated by the 
unwillingness of the IO to even attempt to  draw  attention  to  areas  of  its  ‘good 
practice’  (Weaver  2008:  37-8).7 Furthermore, when the practices of expertise-based 
IOs are assessed against  those of more ‘friendly’ IOs that more effectively tailor the 
presentation of their operations to specific audiences, they can appear as exemplars of 
inappropriate practices (e.g. STWR 2009). This ‘underoperationalisation’ of reforms – 
the failure to meet the exacting standards set out by other IOs working in a similar 
                                                     
6 The analogy was made by an IMF member of staff in an interview with Catherine Weaver, reported in 
Weaver (2009). 
7 The Fund’s handling of public relations provides is exemplary in this regard. In interviews, numerous 
operational staff were heavily critical of the competence of the External Relations Department (EXR). 
In contrast, Simonetta Nardin, a Senior EXR member of staff, talked of the regular vetoing by 
operational staff of EXR’s attempts to present evidence of programme success in ‘everyday’ terms (e.g. 
additional nurses and teachers employed) on the grounds that it ‘dumbs down’ the output of the Fund. 
Interview with author, November 2008. 
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area of global governance – has been an issue with the contemporary activities of the 
IMF. 
 As was shown through the analysis of the World Bank in the previous chapter, 
change in the relationships of stakeholder accountability surrounding an IO is 
commonly a multi-track process. Different strands of an IO’s operations can open up 
subtly different mechanisms of stakeholder engagement that, although acting under 
similar external and internal pressures, continue to evolve along distinct paths. Such 
multiple accountability practices have developed at the International Monetary Fund, 
where two identifiable streams in the politics of stakeholder accountability have 
produced noteworthy reforms in the relationship between the IO and domestic 
populations. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of this process, based around the 
participation-ownership-implementation nexus learning cycle, and the creation of 
‘disciplinary stakeholders’. 
As the following sections of the chapter show, the initial establishment of the 
Fund with a state-centred, delegated model of stakeholder accountability set firm 
boundaries around the future relationship between the IO and in-country stakeholders. 
Following from the institutional structure and restricted mandate of the IO, these 
boundaries have contributed to a fundamental continuity in the model of stakeholder 
accountability at the IMF; however, two subtle changes have occurred. With its roots 
back in the systemic transformation unleashed by the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods System and the rising importance of supplementary financiers, the first of 
these relates  to  the construction of ‘disciplinary stakeholders’. Domestic populations 
have over recent years been re-positioned as an institutional check on the 
dysfunctional tendencies of governments, with initiatives such as the General Data 
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F igure 5.1. The limited evolution of stakeholder accountability at the Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissemination  Standard  (GDDS)  serving  to  improve  groups’  disciplinary 
effectiveness. In a parallel development, from the mid-1990s arguments in favour of 
broadening the channel of direct stakeholder participation began to emerge in the 
Fund, partly in response to findings of low rates of conditionality implementation, and 
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were accelerated by the high profile launch (in tandem with the World Bank) of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper initiative, with its discursive focus on broadening 
participation in the formation of restructuring programmes. Stakeholder participation 
has, however, remained underoperationalised by the IMF; the organisation has been 
implicated in the World Bank’s recent ‘participatory’ discursive shift, which its own 
very minor behavioural changes have failed to match. External critics have taken this 
underoperationalisation as a sign of institutional hypocrisy, and, as more radical 
reform is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future, this charge will prove to be 
recurring. 
 
5.2. Institutionalising the ‘club’ rules 
The official structure and responsibilities of an IO, as set out in its Articles of 
Agreement, provide the institutional blueprint around which future operations are 
structured. Although change can (and does) occur at both the formal and informal 
levels,  these founding Articles provide an important source of continuity  to  the IO’s 
activities. Regarding the politics of stakeholder accountability, these codified rules 
serve  to both  establish  the mechanisms  through which an  IO’s  relationship with  in-
country stakeholders is conducted, and to shape the path of its future evolution. In the 
case of the IMF, the Articles of Agreement laid out a state centric, club-style 
governance structure,8 with stakeholder accountability arranged according to a rigid 
hierarchic running exclusively through state level representatives. As over time the 
activities of the Fund became routinised, and its bureaucratic culture began to solidify, 
this mode of stakeholder accountability became firmly entrenched. Although in recent 
years some modifications have occurred, in key respects the practices established in 
                                                     
8 I use the term in the manner laid out by Keohane and Nye (2000: 2). 
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its early years continue to pattern the engagements of the Fund and its in-country 
stakeholders.  
 The IMF was formally brought into being at the end of 1945, when a quorum 
stipulated by the preliminary Bretton Woods agreement was met. At the close of 
December that year, by paying in a nominal amount of their overall quota, 30 states 
collectively  ratified  the Fund’s Articles of Agreement and  thereby breathed  life  into 
the IO. According to the governance structure that was laid out for the Fund, member 
states were to retain oversight of the institution through a process of delegation to an 
Executive Board. Using a weighted voting system, biased according to the size of a 
member’s  quota,  a  plenary  Board  of  Governors  (itself  populated  in  the  main  by 
Finance Ministers and representatives from Central Banks) elected representatives 
onto the Board. At the inaugural meeting of the IMF in 1946, a total of 12 Executive 
Directors were elected: the five representatives were nominated by each of the largest 
quota holders, and the remaining seven by smaller states operating en bloc. Although 
the numbers have altered substantially, so that as of late 2009 some 186 member 
states select 24 Executive Directors,9 the formal structure remains largely the same. In 
particular, the extended sequence of delegation through which domestic stakeholders 
have access to the formal structures of governance, involving a chain from on the 
ground actors, to their domestic representatives, and in turn to the relevant Executive 
Directors, has been retained (Horsefield 1969: 116-28, Ferguson 1988: 60-1). 
 In a manner that was strikingly similar to that of the World Bank examined in 
the  previous  chapter,  a  number  of  the  central  provisions  of  the  IMF’s  Articles  of 
Agreement served to reinforce the distantly delegated model of stakeholder 
accountability. The clause in the Fund’s mandate restricting its interactions to official 
                                                     
9 See IMF Official Website, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.  
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representatives of member states mirrors, word for word, that of the Bank. Article V.i. 
of the IMF’s charter reads that: 
Each member shall deal with the Fund only through its Treasury, central bank, 
stabilization fund, or other similar fiscal agency, and the Fund shall deal only 
with or through the same agencies.10 
 
The potential for more directly participatory forms of stakeholder accountability to 
emerge was further constrained by the provisions enshrining the apolitical status of 
the IO. Article IV.iii. forbade staff from allowing considerations of member 
governments’  ‘domestic  social  or  political  policies’  from  entering  assessments  of 
monetary policy. This, and a similar clause in Schedule C of the Articles, were seized 
upon by both staff and member states to minimise official interactions beyond a 
narrow circle of officials (Woods 2006: 27).11 
 A second feature of the formal mandate of the IMF that served to limit the 
horizons  of  the  IO’s  staff  and  further  entrench  the  delegated  mode  of  stakeholder 
accountability was the centralisation of staff at the institution’s headquarters. From an 
initial staff of just eight, seconded from the US Treasury and located in the 
Washington Hotel, by the late 1960s total staff had risen to over 1,000. Despite efforts 
to ensure a degree of geographical diversity in staff backgrounds, all staff remained 
housed in the Washington headquarters (Horsefield 1969: 137, 603). With this 
centralisation,  staff  in  Washington  enjoyed  a  ‘splendid  isolation’  from  domestic 
stakeholder groups, and particularly so in relation to the developing countries that 
from the 1970s formed a sizeable proportion of Fund lending operations. 
Consequently, domestic groups had negligible opportunities to form a direct 
relationship with Fund staff, but instead had to rely on delegated channels. 
                                                     
10 For the full Articles of Agreement see IMF Official Website, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.  
11 See fn above. 
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 The effectiveness with which stakeholders could utilise even these delegated 
mechanisms of accountability was further restricted by the levels of secrecy 
surrounding the operations of the Fund. The strict control of information meant that 
key policy documents, including both those setting out IMF assessments of members’ 
policies  and  borrowing  governments’  promised  programmes of reform, often 
remained classified, undisclosed to domestic audiences. Indeed, up until the late 
1990s, several categories of documentation – including Article IV Reports and Use of 
Fund Resources Reports – could not be published even if the relevant country 
authorities so wished (IMF 2004: 25-6, IMF 2007: 672-84). Although this degree of 
secrecy was not unique in the world of IOs, and also has long been an accepted 
feature of monetary policy discussions, it functioned at the Fund to make the 
decisions made at an elite level largely invisible to domestic stakeholding groups. 
 The exclusive reliance of in-country stakeholders on extended – and 
imperfectly functioning – chains of delegation was reinforced during the early 
decades  of  the  IMF’s  existence  by its evolving institutional culture and operating 
practices. Regarding the former, during the formative years of any complex 
bureaucracy elements of continuity and consistency become sedimented into the way 
staff view both their mission, and the effective means of meeting this mission (Schein 
2004: 17).  In the case of the IMF, the IO rapidly became a leading centre for the 
theory and practice of international monetary economics, in key respects establishing 
the frontiers of knowledge regarding the interrelation of currency systems. With the 
development and refinement of diagnostic models for the analysis of balance of 
payments disequilibria, important rules of thumb became established regarding the 
appropriate policy responses to particular scenarios (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 
56). The development of this highly specialised expertise not only acted as a barrier 
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restricting the ability of domestic stakeholders to access policy debates at the Fund; 
owing to the peculiar apoliticism of macroeconomic analysis, it also served to 
entrench the distance between the IO and in-country groups in a potent (yet subtle) 
manner. 
 Within the academic study of the social world, the prospect of generating laws 
covering behavioural regularities exerts an appeal that is both alluring and enduring. 
Whilst the desire to attain the status that comes from the production of knowledge-
claims in a quantitative manner has permeated most branches of the academy, it is 
within economics that this tendency has most deeply taken root. Here, the quest for 
underlying laws has led to the dominance of an analytical approach that ascribes a 
high degree of automacity to social interactions: behaviour is seen as a function of 
utility-maximising agents responding to environmental modifications (Toye 2008). 
Many economists treat these assumptions lightly, and acknowledge that the value of 
such modelling comes not from teleological insight but rather because at the 
aggregate level individuals behave as if they were rational utility-maximisers. 
Nonetheless, these foundations lead to a conceptualisation of contextual particularity 
as ephemera to be factored out of generalisable explanations of observed regularities 
(Hodgson 2001: 21). At the IMF, with its long history of recruiting postgraduate 
macroeconomists straight out of university (de Vries 1969: 10, Blackmon 2008: 193), 
this has encouraged the genesis of an organisational culture with a singularly 
apolitical view of policy processes. Within this ideational framework, little value is 
attached to gaining knowledge of country particularities beyond the data necessary to 
make balance of payments diagnoses. This worldview helped to normalise the 
absence of interactions with groups beyond a narrow governmental elite: put simply, 
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no tangible benefit is seen to accrue from soliciting the input of a broad range of 
domestic stakeholders.12 
 In a symbiotic relationship with the evolving institutional culture of the IMF, a 
set of operational blueprints emerged to guide everyday practices of Fund staff that 
further normalised their isolation from domestic stakeholder groups. From the 
beginning of its operations, the primary way in which Fund staff have kept abreast of 
developments in member countries, whether expediting surveillance or lending 
business, has been through the inflow of statistical and documentary materials. With 
improvements in long distance transportation, staff from the area departments began 
to increasingly travel to member countries for additional fact-finding missions. These 
visits, however, were routinely of a short duration, and exclusively involved meetings 
with government officials (de Vries 1969: 12, Klitgaard 1990). The practicalities of 
travel to developing countries meant that for stakeholders in low-income countries, 
the potential for direct interactions with Fund staff was even lower. Not only were 
fact-finding missions to low-income countries infrequent; up until the late 1980s, it 
remained common for low-income countries seeking arrangements with the Fund to 
send delegations to Washington rather than to receive IMF Mission Teams (Baber and 
Jeffrey 1986: 135).13 
 Owing  to  a  combination  of  the  features  laid  down  in  the  IMF’s Articles  of 
Agreement  and  the  gradual  sedimentation  of  the  organisation’s  institutional  culture 
and operational practices, the levels of interaction that routinely occurred between 
                                                     
12 This aspect of the Fund’s institutional culture was most commonly mentioned in interviews by 
individuals with an personal experience of both the Fund and the Bank, notably Dino Merotto, World 
Bank Uganda Country Economist, and Jeff Chelsky, World Bank International Policy and Partnerships 
Group Senior Economist. Interviews with author November and December 2008. 
13 This practice led to situations in which, partly owing to low-income country resource constraints, 
one-man delegations with insufficient authority arrived at IMF headquarters to negotiate arrangements, 
with predictable consequences for the subsequent implementation of conditions. See Baber and Jeffrey 
(1986: 135). 
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domestic  stakeholding  groups  and  staff  remained  severely  limited  in  the  IO’s 
formative  years.  In  addition  to  these  ‘supply-side’  issues,  a  central  characteristic  of 
the Fund’s work served to restrict the ‘demand-side’ pressures for reform. In contrast 
to the project-based lending activities of the World Bank, for which domestic groups 
with a particularly close interest were often identifiable, stakeholder groups to Fund 
arrangements remained distinctly  ‘invisible’.  Identifying  the  ‘real  world’  impact  of 
IMF arrangements, with their focus on macroeconomic targets, is an imprecise 
business at the best of times. When the difficulty of dividing responsibility between 
the Fund and country authorities for a programme that is formally an agreement 
between both parties is added in, and the difficulty of accessing even basic 
information such as the content of agreements is borne in mind, it can clearly be seen 
that one of the key external dynamics that led to increasing pressure for reform at the 
World Bank was largely absent at the IMF. A consensus that readily identifiable 
groups  of  ‘stakeholders’  exist  is  a  logical  prerequisite  that  must  be  met  before 
pressures to forge closer links to these groups emerge. 
 During the opening decades of its existence the IMF became something of an 
elite ‘gated community’, largely operating outside the reach of domestic stakeholders. 
This was true both in an intellectual sense, with little value attached to gaining the 
input of borrowing-country populations into loan agreements, and, considering the 
centralisation of staff and their infrequent visits to low-income country members, a 
literal sense. Under these circumstances, stakeholder accountability was a relationship 
that occurred at a distance, running exclusively through national officials. The limits 
imposed by these aspects of the institutional culture and structure of the IMF have 
proved to be remarkably durable, such that the Fund’s contemporary relations with in-
country groups continue to be largely conducted within these parameters. However, 
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the gradual re-conceptualisation of domestic populations in low-income countries as 
disciplinary stakeholders, and the moves to expand stakeholder participation in the 
formation of restructuring programmes, represent noteworthy developments. These 
trends illustrate that there is a dynamism to the politics of stakeholder accountability 
at the Fund that is often ignored. Change in this area remains largely driven by the 
Fund, and is proceeding at a slower pace than many critics wish to see; however, in 
light of the depth to which the club-style operating procedures were institutionalised 
at the IO, there is a degree of inevitability to this. The following section of the chapter 
examines the evolution of ideas regarding disciplinary stakeholders at the Fund, 
before the issue of broadening participation in programme formation is turned to in 
the proceeding section.  
 
5.3. The rise of the ‘disciplinary stakeholder’ at the IMF 
Many analyses of the IMF focus on the organisation in its capacity as an international 
financial intermediary (e.g. Bird 1995, Killick 1995, Stone 2004,  Barro 2005, Bird 
2008). This aspect of the Fund’s work is indeed important, and particularly so for the 
low-income countries that borrow from its concessional facility on a regular basis. 
However, an area of Fund operations that receives less coverage is its role as a 
provider of signalling information.14 It is within this functional sphere that the roots of 
the Fund’s  use  of  low-income country populations as disciplinary stakeholders lie, 
with an ancestry going back to the Fund’s relationship with supplementary financiers. 
Although these developments in the politics of stakeholder accountability have taken 
place very much ‘below the radar’, they represent a significant operational reform. In 
a development that is analogous to that of the World Bank examined previously, the 
                                                     
14 For notable examples of such work, see Stone (2002) and Broome (2008). 
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IMF has made a move to reinforce an understanding of stakeholder accountability as a 
relationship most appropriate to the domestic level, and has embarked upon a series of 
initiatives to improve its effective functioning. 
 The rise to prominence of supplementary financiers in the world of the IMF 
occurred over an extended timeframe, beginning surprisingly early on in the life of the 
IO. As far back as the late 1950s, commercial banks started to tie some foreign 
governments’  loans to  the existence of  IMF programmes. Partly as a function of  the 
relatively low levels of transnational capital flows, this practice initially remained 
rare; however, with the systemic transformation in the international monetary regime 
that occurred with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, by the 1970s this 
practice was becoming more widespread. In fact, as the decade progressed, some 
institutions began to link not only their initial lending decisions to the existence of a 
Fund arrangement, but also made the sequential disbursal of a package of loans 
contingent on the continued adherence to performance criteria (IMF 2004: 12). 
 Although IMF staff were aware of the burgeoning use of this form of cross-
conditionality by market actors from the early days of the practice, ideas regarding the 
potential instrumental use of supplementary financiers did not emerge until much 
later. On the contrary, there was if anything a sense of nervousness on the part of 
Fund staff at the increasing power of lending arrangements with member states. An 
effort was made to disseminate an understanding amongst private financiers and 
member states alike that although the Fund welcomed the banks’ ‘parallel operations’, 
it would bear no implicit responsibility for future government defaults to these lenders 
(IMF 2004: 12-13, Cotarelli and Giannini 2002: 14). 
 A major realignment in the relationship between private financiers and the 
IMF occurred with the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s. With the succession 
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of sovereign defaults that following the Mexican standstill of 1982, it became 
inescapably clear for the first time that for Fund programmes to successfully correct 
unsustainable external disequilibria, it would be necessary to make sure that the banks 
were  ‘on  board’.  Initially,  the  Fund  and  supplementary  financiers were  arranged  as 
something akin to ‘mutual hostages’. Under concerted lending arrangements, the IMF 
refused to lend to stricken countries without official assurances from the exposed 
Banks that they, too, would lend. Once the initial crisis had passed, this practice was 
quickly replaced by the return to normality of the Baker Plan, which resurrected the 
indirect catalytic role of the IO (de Vries 1987: 231-45). However, through the 
episode the mutual interdependence of private sources of finance and the IMF had 
been soundly demonstrated. This prompted a time of innovation in the relationship, 
which laid the groundwork for the emergence of the conceptualisation by Fund staff 
of supplementary financiers as disciplinary stakeholders. 
 The early 1990s saw important developments in the way the IMF approached 
the catalytic aspect of its mission. Assisting member countries to reach a position 
from which they are able to access private sources of finance has long been a guiding 
aim of the IO, and during this time experimentation was undertaken in order to 
explore potential methods of reaching this goal. A succession of policy innovations 
were  launched  to  improve  the  Fund’s  signalling  capabilities,  including  the  Fund 
Monitored Programmes, Rights Accumulation Programmes, and Staff Monitored 
Programmes.15  Underlying these individual developments, a process of ideational 
change was at this time occurring at the Fund, whereby the importance of an emergent 
‘information standard’ in the international financial system came to be recognised. In 
an environment of increased capital mobility, facilitated by both the diffusion of 
                                                     
15 Of these innovations only the Staff Monitored Programme gained wide acceptance, although it was 
by no means universally admired at Board level (IMF 2004: 20). 
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capital account convertibility and technological advances, it became increasingly 
accepted that reducing information asymmetries between private financiers and state 
actors was a vital component of smoothing the functioning of capital markets 
(Broome 2008: 125-6, IMF 2008: 7, Seabrooke 2006: 157, IMF 2004: 15-23, James 
1996: 612).  
 The Mexican ‘Tequila Crisis’ of 1994 and the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s served to accelerate the acceptance within the IMF of the importance of 
information flows. The release of timely and accurate data by member states on key 
aspects of their fiscal and monetary conditions came to be held as a central method of 
guarding  against  such  ‘market  overreactions’.  A  component  of  this  ideational  shift 
was the evolving view that, in the words of an IMF review of its signalling policies, 
‘market scrutiny would discipline governments and lead to early detection of 
problems’ (IMF 2004: 24-5). Partly under the influence of this developing 
conceptualisation of supplementary finance as a disciplinary stakeholder, and partly 
following pressures to conform to more general demands for transparency in 
international organisations,16 a series of operational changes were introduced in the 
late 1990s regarding the publication of Fund reports. Beginning in 1997, when the 
voluntary publication of Board reviews of Article IV Reports became possible, a form 
of glasnost filtered through Fund practices. Although many internal documents 
remain classified (in some cases for up to 30 years), voluntary publication of Article 
IV Reports by country authorities is now permitted, and there is a presumption in 
favour of disclosure of Letters of Intent and Use of Fund Resources Reports (IMF 
2004: 25, IMF 2007: 672-84). 
 Important though these reforms were for the enhanced opportunity they 
                                                     
16 See, for example, Nelson (2000: 413).  
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provided for disciplinary stakeholders to assess the performance of member states, the 
reforms that were made in the field of international standard setting were of a much 
deeper significance. Although the Fund has long set implicit ‘standards of civilisation’ 
regarding the conduct of economic policy (Best 2006), in the late 1990s an initiative 
was launched that served to ratchet-up the effectiveness of these practices. When it 
was launched in 1996, the Data Dissemination Initiative (DDI) was composed of a 
single blueprint for member states to follow, the Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS). Designed for the advanced- and emerging-economies, the SDDS prescribes 
that countries collate and disseminate key data on the real, fiscal, financial, and 
external sectors. A second tier to the DDI was launched the following year, targeted at 
a group of low-income countries whose weak institutional capacity precluded them 
from full membership of the SDDS (IMF 2008: 7-8). With the General Data 
Dissemination Standard (GDDS), the Fund aimed to allow for this group to ‘indicate 
that it subscribes to and observes certain  tenets of good statistical citizenship’  (IMF 
2008:  10).  Although  initially  designed  as  ‘soft’  codes of practice, the IMF rapidly 
introduced an oversight mechanism (in the form of Reports on the Observance of 
Standards, or ROSCs) to put pressure on signatory states to fully adhere to the 
principles of the SDDS and GDDS.17  
 The target audience of the data that is collected and released under the DDI are 
the international capital markets.18 Whilst this audience for information signals is 
potentially appropriate for ‘respectable’ emerging and advanced economies,19 for low-
                                                     
17 I owe thanks to Lucie Laliberte, Director of the IMF Statistics Department, and Robin Kibuka, an 
Advisor to the IMF Statistics Department, for the overview they provided of the intricacies of the Data 
Dissemination Initiative.  
18 Indeed, the DDI was launched against a broader background of both the IMF and World Bank 
encouraging low-income countries to establish the architecture for private financing to play a greater 
role in development. See Lavelle (1999) for a general overview, and Lavelle (2001) on the experience 
of Cote d’Ivoire. 
19 There is a continuing debate on the efficacy of the SDDS in this regard. A review by Mosley (2003: 
331) concluded that as private market actors had not become actively involved with the SDDS, its 
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income countries the destination is problematic. Although there is evidence of rapidly 
increasing capital flows to low-income countries at present, the vast majority of this 
activity  is made  up  of  ‘capital-like  flows’  (primarily wage  remittances)  that  do  not 
respond to such signaling (Dorsey et al 2008, IMF 2009). Similarly, although ten of 
the group of 24 PRSP-HIPC low-income countries hold credit ratings from one of the 
‘big three’ agencies (see Table 5.1), virtually none have market access.20 Indeed, the 
fact that almost all PRGF agreements have a zero-ceiling on non-concessional 
borrowing effectively bars the relationship between low-income countries and private 
financiers from developing (IMF 2009: 5). In this context, the functions that are 
ascribed to private financiers are transferred to the publics within low-income 
countries. This is made clear in the ROSCs produced for individual countries,21 which 
consistently highlight the importance of releasing information to the public, and in the 
Fund’s recent review of the DDI, which explicitly presents the SDDS as an important 
mechanism of improving domestic accountability mechanisms (IMF 2008: 1). 
 Measured in terms of member state participation, the GDDS has proved to be a 
highly popular initiative. As of late 2009, 95 countries had signed-up to the GDDS, 
and in total some 83 percent of Fund members are engaged with the DDI in some 
capacity. Focusing specifically on the low-income PRSP-HIPC group of states, an  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
signalling function remain ineffective. The view on the inside of the Fund in somewhat different, with 
its review of this branch of the DDI concluding that private actors had begun to integrate this 
information stream into their decision-making processes. Moreover, the Fund also highlight the 
disciplinary effect on governments as a marker of success (IMF 2008). 
20 Indeed, Jan Kees Martyn, the Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department Low-Income 
Country Division Deputy Head, estimated that of the 78 PRGF-eligible member states, around five had 
a realistic chance of gaining access to private finance. Interview, December 2008. 
21 All ROSCs under the GDDS have a section examining the accessibility of data to the public. 
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Table 5.1. PRSP-H IPCs with sovereign credit ratings 
  C redit Rating 
Agency 
 
 S & P Moody’s F itch 
Bolivia • •  
The Gambia   • 
Honduras  •  
Madagascar •   
Malawi   • 
Mozambique •  • 
Nicaragua  •  
Senegal •   
Uganda   • 
V ietnam  • • • 
 
Source: IMF 2008: 76 
 
impressive 92 percent are signed-up to the GDDS.22 An additional measure of the 
relatively deep degree to which users have ‘bought in’ to the GDDS is the seniority of 
staff who have been assigned the country-level coordinating role: over half of GDDS 
coordinators are individuals at the rank of head or deputy-head in national agencies, 
most typically central banks or national statistics offices (IMF 2008: 57-8). Moreover, 
the IMF has effectively applied the compliance mechanism at its disposal within the 
GDDS to the PRSP-HIPC group: by June 2009, all of these countries had ROSCs 
published (IMF 2009). 
 The specific standards that the GDDS seeks to promulgate are outlined in a 
series of IMF-produced manuals. The Balance of Payments Manual contains a 
                                                     
22 Of the PRSP-HIPC group of states, only Burundi and Guyana are not signed-up to the GDDS. For a 
full list of participants in the GDDS see IMF Official Website, at 
http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/gdds/gddscountrylist/.  
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methodological framework for the collection of external sector statistics (IMF 2004), 
guidance on real sector statistics are contained in the System of National Accounts 
(IMF 1993), and for fiscal data the Government Financial Statistics Manual is used 
(IMF 2001). The final standard-setting material is contained in the Monetary and 
Financial Statistics Manual (IMF 2000). The rate at which GDDS countries have 
adopted  the  various  guides  to  ‘best  practice’  varies  significantly,  with  91  percent 
having adopted the Balance of Payments Manual, 64 percent the System of National 
Accounts, 56 percent the monetary and financial data guidelines, and just 13 percent 
those on the financial sector.23 Overall, the IMF GDDS review judges that ‘it may be 
concluded that GDDS participants have made significant progress in adopting and 
implementing current best-practice  statistical  methodologies’  (IMF  2008:  65). 
Although resource constraints at the country level are noted as a major barrier to fuller 
implementation, the IMF Statistics Department is currently lobbying the Board to 
issue guidance to staff encouraging them to include ring-fenced funding for statistics 
agencies in countries’ Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks.24 Even in the absence 
of such guidance, under the pressures of the GDDS it is common for individual 
countries’  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy Papers to contain specific references to the 
financing requirements of these domestic agencies.25 
 The development of the General Data Dissemination Standard and the 
increasing efforts to push low-income countries to adhere to global standards of 
‘statistical  citizenship’  have  occurred  at  the  ‘everyday’  level  of  global  governance. 
Although working in a loose alliance with the World Bank and UN Agencies under 
                                                     
23 As the GDDS signatories are predominantly low-income countries, with relatively under-developed 
financial sectors, the slow rate of uptake of the Government Financial Statistics Manual is not as 
surprising as the headline figure perhaps makes it appear. 
24 Interview with Robin Kibuka, Advisor to the IMF Statistics Department, December 2008. Also, see 
Kibuka (2007). 
25 See, for example, Government of Guyana (2005: 108).  
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the Paris 21 umbrella,26 Fund staff have quietly taken the lead in promoting the 
development of countries’  capacity  to  generate  and  disseminate  statistical  data 
pertaining to core macroeconomic functions. These low level operational reforms 
have an established lineage at the IMF, going back to the gradual emergence of the 
conceptualization of supplementary financiers as potential disciplinary stakeholders to 
Fund-supported programmes. Although these reforms to the engagement between the 
IMF and in-country stakeholders have unfolded in a low-key, ‘routine’ manner, they 
are nonetheless significant. In a close parallel to the reforms to policy-based lending 
at the World Bank examined previously, the efforts to improve the efficacy of the 
domestic-level mechanisms of stakeholder accountability serve to reinforce the 
appropriateness of the delegated model of IO accountability over demands for more 
direct mechanisms. The mundane appearance of the evolution of the concept of 
disciplinary stakeholders and the Data Dissemination Initiative should not detract 
from the importance of these developments: by pushing the governments of member 
states to reveal to domestic populations such politically important figures as 
unemployment, growth rates, inflation, and government revenues, the Fund is acting 
at  the boundaries of domestic politics. With the organisation’s ongoing  transparency 
drive, and the increased efforts to increase the material resources available to national 
statistical agencies, this trend looks certain to continue. 
 
5.4. Slowly opening the door to stakeholder participation 
With multilevel and often competing sites of authority surrounding their operations, 
there is an inherent complexity to the world of IOs. In relation to the politics of 
stakeholder accountability, this complexity commonly translates into the existence of 
                                                     
26 See chapter two. 
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multiple accountability practices; different mechanisms for engaging stakeholders 
evolve around the various operational areas of a single IO. At the IMF, in 
combination with the developments in relation to domestic disciplinary stakeholders 
outlined above, reforms have begun to emerge to facilitate more direct mechanisms of 
stakeholder accountability. In particular, two evolving strands of change are worthy of 
note. Although insufficient to assuage the concerns of many critical observers, 
reforms to the Fund’s governance structure and the broadening of direct channels of 
interactions between Resident Representatives and in-country groups reveal 
contrasting lessons about the politics of stakeholder accountability at the IMF. 
 The  first  of  these  strands,  the  changes  to  the  Fund’s  formal  governance 
structure, is a rare example of external actors successfully pressuring the organization 
into enacting reform. Although not yet fully implemented, there is a broad acceptance 
among Fund staff and the Board that significant reforms to the system of 
representation are necessary. Regarding the second of these strands, though often 
dismissed as a superficial response to external criticism, the moves that have been 
made to enable the participation of a broader range of stakeholders in the formation of 
restructuring programmes are underpinned by a growing stock of political economy 
expertise. The IMF has attracted charges of hypocrisy from both NGO and academic 
observers over the minimal nature of its participatory turn. Although there is 
legitimacy to these criticisms, the source of this discontent is more a consequence of 
the Fund’s poor performance relative to the World Bank-controlled discourse on the 
participatory aspects of the PRSP initiative. The Fund’s structure and culture continue 
to restrict the depth of stakeholder engagements; change at the IMF continues to be 
characterized by gradual evolution rather than revolution.  
 As  were  laid  out  in  the  IO’s  original  Articles  of  Agreement,  the  dominant 
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mechanisms of stakeholder accountability surrounding the operations of the IMF 
followed a firmly delegated model. The relationship between in-country stakeholders 
and the Fund ran exclusively through national-level representatives, and, owing to the 
restricted flows of information, even these channels functioned imperfectly. Because 
member states’ voting power in the institution was weighted according to quota size, 
the lowest-income countries became grouped in large constituencies, with (in the case 
of the francophone Africa Group) as many as 24 being represented by one Executive 
Director. 27  Under such structures, the maintenance of even the links between 
government representatives and Executive Directors became highly problematic; a 
recent internal survey, for example, found that less than 25 percent of low-income 
country governments communicated with their Executive Director at least once a 
week (IMF IEO 2008b: 33).28 
 The formal governance arrangements of the IMF have long been a target of 
criticism. As far back as 1967, the Group of 77 declared their dissatisfaction over the 
effective locking-out of developing countries from decisions over reforms to the IMF 
(Ferguson 1988: 86). More recently, analysts have pointed to the growing disjuncture 
between a governance structure dominated by the advanced industrialized states and 
the contemporary reality in which low-income countries constitute the majority of the 
organisation’s  active  borrowers.  Demands  for  institutional  reform  have  been 
expressed both in terms of addressing a fundamental ‘democratic deficit’ at the Fund, 
and in terms of overcoming more mundane operational difficulties (e.g. Woods 2001, 
Woods 2004, IMF IEO 2008, Bretton Woods Project 2009). 
                                                     
27 For a complete list of Executive Directors’ constituencies see IMF Official Website, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.  
28 Both Laurean Rutayisire, the Francophone Africa IMF Executive Director, and Moeketsi Majoro, the 
Anglophone Africa IMF Alternate Executive Director, highlighted the practical difficulties of 
maintaining regular contact with 24 and 20 governments respectively, the majority of whom had 
ongoing Fund arrangements. Interviews with author, November 2008. 
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 Although expertise-based IOs are commonly resistant to externally driven 
demands for change, the reforms to the IMF governance structure mark an interesting 
exception. Over the last two years, the pressures to reform the arrangements through 
which Executive Directors are selected appear to have reached a tipping point. In 
addition  to  the  ‘background  noise’  of  critical voices calling for change, staff and 
Directors of the Fund have pointed to a presentation to the Board by an external NGO 
in 2008 as a key moment at which governance reform was firmly attached to the 
organisation’s  agenda.29 A series of relatively minor reforms were enacted in April 
2008, whereby  the  number  of  ‘basic  votes’  given  to members  irrespective  of  quota 
size were tripled, and a mechanism was put in place for the two Africa Group 
Executive Directors to appoint additional Alternates (IMF IEO 2008, IMF 2009). 
Although these adjustments have been insufficient to placate many critics (e.g. BIC 
2009, Bretton Woods Project 2009), there is the potential that further reforms may 
occur in the near future. A recent review of potential ways forward with governance 
reform made it clear that standing still was not an option: 
The reality is that most [of the developing country] Executive Directors 
represent  large  constituencies…  This  limits  the  voice  of  the  relevant  country 
and their ability to hold to account the Director representing them (IMF 2009: 
10).  
 
The report, which was received well in the Board discussion,30 provides a strong 
indication that further, more radical, change was desired. Although such restructuring 
of the mechanisms of accountability surrounding Fund operations have been muted 
before, the coalescence of external pressures and internal shifts at the present juncture 
increases the likelihood of such developments emerging. 
                                                     
29 Several interviewees made reference to the role of this presentation, including notably Daniel Heath, 
US Alternate Executive Director of the IMF, who was highly complementary about the NGO. 
Interview with author, December 2008. 
30 The Public Information Notice accompanying the Board discussion, for example, relays that the 
majority of Directors expressed ‘dissatisfaction with the present distribution of quotas’. See IMF 
Official Website, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn0998.htm.  
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 The  reforms  that have  so  far been enacted  in  the Fund’s  governance  structure 
have  represented  a  minimal  ‘tinkering  around  the  edges’  of  its  delegated 
accountability mechanisms. As an example of a reform process that has, in important 
respects, been driven by external actors, these changes represent an unusual 
occurrence at the IMF. This peculiarity is perhaps best understood by considering the 
distance of the Board from the areas of macroeconomic expertise that remain under 
the close guard of operational staff. The Board rarely interferes in the day-to-day 
operations of the Fund, and indeed current  
 
 
F igure 5.2. Board self-assessment of expertise 
 
Source: IMF IEO 2008: 15 
 
Executive Directors rate their level of knowledge on core areas of Fund operations as 
being relatively weak (see Figure 5.2).31  
 The  reforms  to  the  Fund’s  formal governance structure have represented 
something of an indirect opening of doors to domestic groups in low-income 
countries, consisting of modifications to the delegated mechanisms of stakeholder 
                                                     
31 Indeed, staff rate the expertise level of Executive Directors significantly lower than the Board rate 
themselves in each of the categories listed (IMF IEO 2008a: 15). 
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accountability. Although intrinsically interesting, these reforms have not served to 
challenge the dominant form of the relationship between the Fund and its in-country 
stakeholders. In contrast, changes to the role of IMF Resident Representatives have 
been initiated that serve to open-up more direct routes for stakeholders to engage with 
Fund  staff.  These  changes  too  are  of  limited  scope,  held  back  by  the  Fund’s 
institutional structure and the requirement from staff that behavioural changes be 
preceded  by  ‘hard’  evidence  proving  their  necessity.  Written  off  as a cynical 
publication  stunt  by  some  observers  (e.g.  BIC  2009),  the  Fund’s  miniature 
‘participatory  turn’  has  been  beset  by  the  problem of  underoperationalisation  rather 
than outright cynicism. The minor modifications to the mechanisms for stakeholder 
engagement, combined with an emergent strain of interest in political economy issues, 
represent developments that are firmly in line with the incremental, internally driven 
norm at the Fund. 
  As was noted above, the institutional structure that was laid out for the IMF 
established a highly centralised organisation. Even with the dramatic expansion of the  
Figure 5.3. The IMF’s expanding diplomatic service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: O’Brien et al (2003: 163); IMF Official Website.32 
 
                                                     
32 See IMF Official Website, at http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=57.  
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size of the Fund that occurred over the early decades of its operation, this trait was in 
no way challenged. Under the influence of a bureaucratic culture that saw little value 
attached to cultivating direct links with domestic stakeholders within borrowing 
countries, the housing of all staff within the IO’s 19th Street headquarters effectively 
cut it off from interactions with low-income country stakeholders. However, from the 
late 1970s, with the expanding number of in-country Resident Representatives (Res 
Reps), this feature of the IMF began to alter. 
 The emergence of a permanent ‘diplomatic service’ amongst the Fund’s staff  
began as a routine affair. As countries developed a relatively long-term reliance on its 
expertise and resources, there came a pressing operational need to ensure that lines of 
communication between the relevant country authorities and the Fund were 
effectively maintained. The growth of Res Rep offices through the 1980s and 1990s 
was concentrated amongst low-income countries, who exhibited a particular tendency 
to become prolonged users of Fund resources. Although the primary objective of Res 
Reps was to facilitate liaison with country authorities, their establishment in 
borrowing countries inevitably served to open an institutional channel to stakeholder 
groups.  
Resident Representatives have been criticised for focussing their outreach 
efforts  on  ‘IMF  friendly’  groups  over  stakeholders  holding more  challenging  views 
(O’Brien et al 2003, Thirkell-White 2004). However, in the mid- to late-1990s a series 
of guidance notes were issued to staff to widen channels of engagement. The aim of 
this guidance was to ensure that Res Reps, (and also visiting Mission Teams) should 
hold meetings with a broader range of civil society organisations than had become 
standard operating procedure. The primary purpose of such meetings was presented as 
providing in-country groups with information on and clarification of the Fund’s role 
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and policy advice, although it was also suggested that information gained could 
improve the quality and relevance of  the  Fund’s  work  (IMF  2008:  2-6, IMF IEO 
2008: 4). The impact of this top-down pressure, however, was rated by Fund 
evaluations as minimal. Slight modification to the practises of Res Reps occurred, 
although ever-present time constraints hampered the emergence of significant change. 
Additionally, the low operational autonomy of Res Reps, who are junior members of 
staff with insufficient authority to introduce stakeholder views into decision-making 
arenas, restricted their ability to carry out these demands effectively (Malan 2006: 26, 
IMF 2008: 6-9). 
 The lack of clarity surrounding the role of Res Reps was added to in 1999, 
with the launch of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper initiative. Although the 
senior management of the Fund were initially circumspect about the operational 
changes to the Res Rep role implied by the initiative, the organisation rapidly became 
implicated in the World Bank’s more expansive language on the participatory process 
requirement. At the launch of the PRSP initiative, representatives of the Fund were 
considerably less radical than their Bank counterparts in the presentation of the 
participatory process requirements that were being placed on low-income countries. 
In  contrast  to  the Bank President’s  attempt  to  immediately  link  the PRSP initiative 
with the extraordinary interaction with domestic stakeholders that had been 
accomplished through the Voices of the Poor study (Wolfensohn 1999), the Fund 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus issued a markedly more modest statement: 
These meetings have resulted in a clear mandate for the Fund to integrate the 
objectives  of  poverty  reduction  and  growth more  fully  into  its  operations… 
We will also continue to consider how better to include a social dimension in 
our policy dialogue with our wider membership (Camdessus 1999). 
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It is notable that no mention is made to reforming the channels through which the 
Fund engaged domestic stakeholder groups, focussing rather on its formal 
membership (i.e. representatives of member states). 
Despite the attempt to distance the Fund from its more participatory-focussed 
Bretton Woods Twin, as the initiative was rolled-out the IMF rapidly became 
implicated in the more expansive conceptualisation of the Bank. As joint 
communications began to be issued on the PRSP initiative by the two IOs, the ‘Bank-
like’  view  came  to  dominate.  For  instance,  in  a  guidance  note  issued  to  clarify  the 
scope of the initiative, the Bank and Fund announced that: 
[Papers] are expected to be country-owned and designed in a participatory 
fashion, taking into account the views of Parliaments and (where they exist) 
other democratic bodies, the donor community, civil society and specifically 
the poor themselves (World Bank & IMF 2000: 1). 
 
The blurring of the boundaries between the Bank and Fund was exacerbated with the 
operational linkages that emerged with the initiative. When communicating the 
requirements of the process conditionality, a single letter was sent to the country 
authorities from both organisations. These letters were written with the explicit 
intention  of  ‘encouraging action to develop country-specific poverty reduction 
strategies, using an open and broad-based  participatory  process’  (IMF  and  World 
Bank 1999: 2). 
 With  a  large  number  of  staff  based  permanently  ‘in  the  field’  (Blackmon 
2008), many of whom viewed stakeholder participation as beneficial to the 
achievement of their operational goals,33 the institutional features of the Bank meant 
that it was well positioned to actively promote the participatory processes surrounding 
PRSPs. The features of the Fund, however, were not so propitious. The ambiguity of 
                                                     
33 Although personnel in key positions at the Bank (notably Country Directors) exhibit more ambiguity 
or hostility to broader participation by domestic groups in Bank-supported projects, staff ‘in the field’ 
are generally more supportive.  See, for example, Bebbington (2004: 52), Rosenburg and Korsmo 
(2001: 297), Aycrigg (1998: 18), and chapter four above. 
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the Fund’s  role within  the  emergent process  conditionality of  the PRSP  initiative  is 
highlighted by the position taken by Resident Representatives in the participatory 
processes surrounding individual PRSPs. Reviewing the Fund’s experiences after five 
years  of  the  initiative,  the  IEO  paid  particular  attention  to  Res Reps’  performance. 
The  IEO  found  that  support  for  expanding Res Reps’  interactions with  low-income 
country stakeholder groups varied significantly across different Area Departments. 
Looking at the terms of reference (ToR) provided to Res Reps, the IEO found that: 
With a few noteworthy exceptions, ToR provide remarkably little guidance on 
what was expected vis-à-vis the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process… 
In only a minority of countries (all in francophone Africa) did the ToR 
describe an explicitly proactive role for resident representatives (IMF IEO 
2004: 71). 
 
Beyond this formal guidance, a survey of Fund staff undertaken as part of the same 
study shed further light on their limited engagements with PRSP processes. The IEO 
reports that staff declared a reluctance to engage in the policy debates among 
stakeholders over the appropriate macroeconomic content of PRSPs on the grounds 
that  they ‘generally  interpreted  the emphasis on country ownership as  implying  that 
involvement on their part should be limited’ (IMF IEO 2004: 4). 
 The IMF has faced much criticism for its lack of support for the participatory 
aspects of the PRSP initiative. Whether from bilateral partners in low-income 
countries, 34  non-governmental organisations (e.g. Bretton Woods Project 2009, 
Grusky 2000), or academic sources (e.g. Lazarus 2008, Fraser 2005, Craig and Porter 
2002), these critiques share a sense of frustration at the Fund’s failure to live up to its 
rhetoric on the participatory turn. Whilst there is ample support for such criticism,35 
the  problems  from  the  organisation’s  minimal  participatory  turn  stem  from  an 
underoperationalisation rather than deliberate cynicism. Rather than flowing from a 
                                                     
34 See IMF IEO 2004: 69.  
35 The IEO itself admits that ‘in general, the [PRSP] processes have not generated meaningful 
discussions… of alternative policy options’ (IMF IEO 2004: 3). 
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deliberate  duplicity  on  the  part  of  the  IMF,  the  gap  between  the  organisation’s 
performance and the rhetoric surrounding the PRSP initiative occurred through its 
entanglement in the more expansive discourse of the World Bank. Indeed, the internal 
learning processes that are currently unfolding in the IMF around the creation of 
‘political economy’ knowledge suggests that an acceptance of the operational value of 
stakeholder engagement is beginning to emerge amongst staff of the IO. 
 The need to establish solid intellectual justifications for behavioural change is 
a hallmark of expertise-based IOs. Within the Fund, the knowledge base in support of 
broadening participation has strengthened from around the time of the PRSP launch, 
specifically as  the  links between participation  in programme formation,  ‘ownership’ 
of a programme, and its successful implementation are explored.36 Following the 
production of a number of assessments by the Fund outlining the low implementation 
rates of ESAF restructuring programmes (Killick 2002: 5), a large amount of research 
was undertaken into the issue.  The proliferation of staff papers on the issue since 
2001 is illustrative of this movement (Ivanovna 2006, Boughton 2003, Khan and 
Sharma  2003,  Boughton  and  Moumouas  2002,  Cordella  and  Dell’Ariccia  2001). 
Although staff papers do not represent official Fund policy, they do provide a vital 
window into the internal dynamics through which institutional learning occurs in the 
IO. The reported positive relationship between the inclusion of line agencies beyond 
the  Fund’s  core  constituencies  in  the  design  of  programmes  and  their  successful 
implementation is yet to gain wide acceptance among staff, but this emergent 
knowledge forms a significant departure from the apolitical assumptions of the Fund’s 
established macroeconomic framework. 
                                                     
36 It has been suggested (e.g. Lazarus 2008) that the Fund’s ‘participatory turn’ was an attempt to 
counteract its perceived legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s. Whilst this may have been a contributing 
factor, I suggest that, because of its fit with the technocratic, evidenced-based culture of the Fund, the 
growing ‘political economy’ knowledge regarding the participation-ownership-implementation nexus 
is of deeper significance. 
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 In recent years, an alliance of members of staff in the IMF with an interest in 
such political economy issues has developed. Through an informal Political Economy 
Group, individuals disseminate research highlighting the need to consider the interests 
of key veto-players when designing adjustment programmes.37 The unifying feature 
of this work is the idea that it is necessary to examine the interrelationship between 
the individual and aggregate units of analysis: conflicting interests on an individual 
level  impact  on  the  translation  of  ‘optimal’  aggregate  level  policy-solutions into 
practice. Since 2003, nine IMF Working Papers have been published with an explicit 
focus on political economy concerns, and a further 44 have been classified under a 
‘political  economy’  subject  area.38 Political economy remains very much a minority 
research interest within the IMF, but the efforts to translate the issue into the Fund’s 
language of expertise have the potential to coalesce with current shifts in operational 
practice to expand the mechanisms of stakeholder engagement at the Fund.  
So far, the reforms to the mechanisms through which the IMF engages with 
low-income country stakeholders have been minimal. Some pressure has been applied 
to Resident Representatives and Mission Teams to broaden the range of domestic 
actors they consult with, although the amount of pressure has varied across Area 
Departments, and there is little evidence of ‘real’ change having occurred. However, 
there is a small but growing intellectual current at the Fund exploring the benefits to 
be had from wider in-country consultation. As is often the case in expertise-based 
IOs, the process of change in this area of IMF operations has been very gradual, and 
largely internally controlled. Although the depth of these developments should not be 
overstated, there is evidence of a continuing drift toward widening stakeholder 
                                                     
37 This informal network was mentioned by several interviewees as evidence that a concern with 
‘political economy’ issues taking root at the IMF.  
38 Figures collated using the IMF Official Website ‘Publications Search’ function, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm.  
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interaction. A recent IEO report suggested that Fund Missions and permanent in-
country staff are making a steady effort to expand the range of actors in borrowing 
countries that they hold official meetings with (IMF IEO 2010). Although it is 
emerging in a defiantly incremental fashion, the beginnings of a movement away 
from the apolitical economy of the Fund’s established worldview are visible. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
It is an often-repeated maxim in contemporary politics that the holders of power 
should be accountable to the populations they serve. Equally common is the charge, 
made by  various  representatives  of  ‘the  people’,  that  these  accountability  structures 
are in some way deficient, and in pressing need of reform. These discussions can 
generate a heated controversy when they take place around domestic governance 
structures, with their well-known and broadly accepted accountability structures; 
when the debates migrate to the world of international organisations, with their 
difficult-to-trace spheres of operation and their general inaccessibility, the levels of 
discontent often multiply. Amongst all IOs, the IMF in its recent history has attracted 
an unparalleled degree of criticism in this regard. Charges of acting under a 
democratic deficit have been made against the Fund, and its institutional structure has 
been criticised for effectively debarring low-income populations from influencing 
operational practices. 
 At the IMF, the delegated model of stakeholder accountability that was 
implicit in its founding structure has remained the dominant mechanism through 
which  the  organisaton’s  relationship  with  in-country groups is conducted. The 
standard operating practices and bureaucratic culture that supported this model of 
stakeholder accountability in the early decades of the Fund’s existence have proved to 
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be remarkably durable. Of particular importance were the extreme centralisation of 
staff and the limited time spent on visits by Mission Teams, which meant that 
interactions were restricted to high-level government representatives (generally within 
central banks and ministries of finance). In addition, the absolute dominance of 
professionally  trained macroeconomists on  the Fund’s staff  led  to  the sedimentation 
of a very particular analytic framework; social change was imbued with a high degree 
of automacity, whereby rational actors responding to altered structures were assumed 
to produce aggregate optimal solutions. According to the apolitical economy 
worldview, little value was attached to soliciting the input of stakeholder groups into 
policy processes.  Indeed,  the  language  of  expertise  that  surrounding  the  Fund’s 
operations served to insulate the IO from such groups. 
 The changes that have occurred in the mechanisms through which the Fund 
interacts with domestic stakeholders have in general been driven by the internal 
dynamics of the organisation. The one reform that has been in important respects 
driven by external actors, the re-weighting of voting and selection of Executive 
Directors, has occurred in an area of activities not directly related to its expertise. The 
emergence  of  the  practice  of  drawing  on  ‘disciplinary  stakeholders’  to  maintain 
pressure on low-income country governments to adhere to agreements made with the 
Fund, and the slight shift in the breadth of in-country groups that Resident 
Representatives and Mission Teams interact with, have both been accompanied by 
shifts in the knowledge frameworks underpinning the justification for such action. 
Although the latter of these changes – the Fund’s miniature participatory  turn – has 
been roundly dismissed by critics as a cynical piece of public relations, it is more 
fairly characterised as an instance of underoperationalisation relative to the World 
Bank-controlled discourse on the PRSP process requirements.  
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 In spite of these reforms, over the foreseeable future the politics of stakeholder 
accountability at the IMF will remain a divisive subject. In view of the Fund penchant 
for incremental, evidence-based reform, the distance between the state-centric 
accountability practices of the Fund and the demands from critics for the emergence 
of more direct mechanisms of interaction with low-income country populations will 
close at a barely visible rate. However, in the cacophony of voices criticising the 
Fund, it is important that the improvements to information flows to developing 
country populations that are being facilitated through the GDDS, and the gradual 
opening of doors to stakeholder participation in the formation of restructuring 
programmes, are not entirely overlooked. 
 Through the following chapter of the thesis, the intersection of the politics of 
accountability and projects advocating cosmopolitan global governance is examined. 
It is shown that the insights from this chapter into the micro-processes through which 
change occurs in the mechanisms of stakeholder engagement at the IMF can be used 
to improve the real-world tractability of these more normatively driven calls for 
change. The shared importance at both the IMF and the World Bank of periods of 
crisis and of deeper processes of institutional learning are particularly instructive in 
this regard. Indeed, it is shown that the empirical and conceptual innovations provided 
in each of the preceding chapters of the thesis can be integrated with the broader 
literature on cosmopolitan global governance, and framed around the meta-question 
of  the  Bank  and  Fund’s  impact  on  the  ‘construction  of  governance  space’  in  low-
income countries. It is to this issue that the thesis now turns. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion: The ‘Ins and Outs’ of the Politics 
of Accountability at the World Bank and IM F  
6.0. Introduction 
In the main body of the thesis, I have outlined a series of contemporary developments 
that are occurring within the World Bank and IMF. These were focused firstly, in 
relation to shareholder accountability, on the mechanisms through which key creditor 
states have sought to monitor and control the low-income country lending activities of 
the organisations, and secondly, in relation to stakeholder accountability, on the 
dynamics driving changes in the structures through which the IOs and in-country 
groups interact. Through this concluding chapter, I step outside of this analytic 
exploration of contemporary developments, and engage with a more normatively 
driven literature. Specifically, I explore the synergies between the analysis presented 
in these earlier chapters and the literature on cosmopolitan global governance.1 This 
shift into a more consciously critical mode allows for the internal lessons of the main 
body of the thesis to be connected in to broader debates on IOs – that is, it allows for 
the ‘ins and outs’ of the politics of accountability to be explored. 
Clearly, the cosmopolitan literature provides just one of several sub-sets of 
literature that could potentially be drawn upon in order to undertake this shift into 
critical analysis. The more ‘problem-solving’ approaches,2 including the ‘realist’ and 
‘liberalist’ variants,3 are eschewed because of their lack of an emancipatory drive. By 
taking existing structures of global governance as their starting point, and from there 
                                                     
1 Within the chapter, the term ‘global governance’ is used to refer to the (commonly hierarchical) 
relationships linking formally recognised international organisations to national and sub-national 
structures of government. This understanding encompasses – and indeed is structured by – the concerns 
of the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ branches of cosmopolitan institutionalism, as outlined below. The 
discussion within the chapter remains focused on the World Bank and IMF, although, as is noted 
below, there is significant potential for the ideas raised to be applied to other arenas. 
2 The phrase is, of course, borrowed from Cox (1986). 
3 See Gilpin (2003) and McGrew (2003) respectively. 
 206 
seeking  to  explore  regularities  in  (states’)  patterns  of  behaviour,  such  frameworks 
serve  to  close  down  the  space  to  explore  the  dichotomy  between  the  ‘is’  and  the 
‘ought’  of  global  governance.  Readings  of  global  governance founded on a more 
materialist base, such as the Marxist and (neo-)Gramscian approaches, perhaps 
provide the most prominent examples of alternative critical models. However, the 
way in which structures of global governance are understood within these ordering 
frameworks is fundamentally at odds with the analytic framework adopted in the main 
body of the thesis: what, in the main body of the thesis, are viewed as intrinsically 
interesting  dynamics  that  are  shaping  important  aspects  of  the  Bank  and  Fund’s 
operationalisation of their mandates would, according to these frameworks, be of 
interest only in relation to the (re-)production of dominant patterns of economic 
relations.4  
The reasoning behind the engagement with cosmopolitan literature in this 
closing chapter is instrumental, and is driven by the potential fruitfulness of such an 
encounter.5 There is a significant degree of cross-over between the concerns at the 
heart of the main body of the thesis and the themes at the centre of cosmopolitan 
analyses of global governance – namely, the mechanics of power in the world of IOs, 
and the means through which access to such arenas of decision-making become more 
dispersed. By adopting the cosmopolitan framework, it becomes possible to 
investigate what the insights of the main body of the thesis into the politics of change 
at the Bank and Fund can tell us about the prospects for the democratisation of global 
governance. The goal of this cross-pollination is to both suggest ways in which to 
increase  the  ‘real  world  tractability’  of  the  cosmopolitan  literature  on  IOs,  and  to 
‘hook-up’ the insights of the previous chapters regarding the politics of change to an 
                                                     
4 See, for example, Cammack (2003, 2002) and Cox (1987). 
5 Such a justification is firmly in line with the pragmatist spirit underpinning the research project as a 
whole, as outlined in Chapter One. 
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explicitly normatively driven project. A series of tactical synergies are drawn, 
whereby suggestions are made as to how cosmopolitan goals can be made more 
‘saleable’  to  actors within  and  around  the Bank  and Fund,  and  the  beginnings  of  a 
potential  future  research  agenda  around  ‘international  organisations  and  the 
construction of governance space’ is mapped out.  
 In examining the ins and outs of the politics of accountability at the World 
Bank and IMF, the chapter proceeds according to the following structure. The 
opening section introduces the key themes that arise at the intersection of the politics 
of accountability and debates over cosmopolitan global governance. Here, the benefits 
to be had by advocates of cosmopolitanism from an increased focus on processes of 
change in particular IOs are highlighted, and the contradictory pressures vis-à-vis the 
realisation of cosmopolitanism that inhere within the politics of shareholder and 
stakeholder accountability are introduced. The second and third sections serve to 
recap the main lessons of the previous chapters of the thesis. Section two reviews the 
dynamics within relationships of shareholder accountability, and reflects upon the 
tendency towards universalisation that resides therein. Section three focuses on the 
lessons learned regarding the processes through which mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability are (re-)produced at the Bank and Fund. Here, the component parts of 
the drives to broaden stakeholder participation in the IOs’ operations are recalled, as 
are the inertia-generating characteristics of the institutions. Section four then clarifies 
the contribution of these overall lessons to debates on cosmopolitan global 
governance. I suggest firstly that a close focus on the process of change in IOs is a 
necessary corollary to grand cosmopolitan narratives, and secondly that the 
relationship between contemporary developments at the Bank and Fund and the 
prospects for cosmopolitan governance depend on our reading of how the IOs are 
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shaping  ‘the  construction  of  governance  space’.  The  final  section  of  the  chapter 
concludes with some thoughts on avenues for future research that could fruitfully 
build on the foundations laid by the thesis. In particular, I outline a research agenda 
directed towards uncovering the dynamics that are unfolding around the implanting of 
‘appropriate standards of governance’ in particular low-income countries.  
 
6.1. The politics of accountability and the prospects for cosmopolitan global 
governance 
It is important to remember that the Bretton Woods Twins are amongst the most 
powerful institutions of global governance. In the contemporary order, these 
international organisations oversee and administer vast flows of finance. The 
combined amount of resources disbursed by the Fund and Bank through the PRGF 
and IDA concessional lending windows in financial year 2008-09 was some US$15.1 
billion.6 This number assumes a much greater degree of significance when it is placed 
alongside the total flow of foreign direct investment to developing countries over the 
same period, which, as just US$0.6 billion, represents less than four percent of the 
Bank and Fund controlled flows. 7  In the case of low-income countries, these 
resources can become a vital component of state revenue, underpinning both 
investment in infrastructure and more routine government operations. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for Bank and Fund supplied finances to make up over 10 percent of 
government expenditures in the lowest-income countries.8 
                                                     
6 See IMF Official Website, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/pdf/a2.pdf, and World 
Bank Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22233771~pagePK:34370~pi
PK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.  
7 For data on foreign direct investment see United Nations Conference on Trade And Development 
Official Website, at http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=3084.  
8 This has been the case over recent years in Mozambique, which is an unexceptional example (World 
Bank 2008). 
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 In part because of the importance of the World Bank, the IMF, and other 
international organisations in the current global order, a great deal of academic 
attention has focussed on the question of their control. It is possible, following the 
classic Humean distinction,9 to categorise such works as falling into two camps: those 
that  focus  on  the  ‘is’  of  international  organisations;  and  those  that  focus  on  the 
‘ought’  of  international  organisations.  Although  the  main  body  of  the  thesis  has 
focussed squarely on the former question, this closing chapter acts as a bridge into the 
latter. More specifically, it provides a bridge into cosmopolitan-based works. Founded 
on a belief in the equal moral worth of individuals, an argument runs through these 
works that institutions of global governance should be restructured so as to foster 
emergent  practices  of  ‘global  citizenship’.10 By highlighting the potential synergies 
between these two groupings of literature, I show that there is room for improvement 
in both. In short, I show that analyses of the ‘is’ of IOs can be more effectively ‘put to 
use’, and analyses of the ‘ought’ of IOs can increase their ‘real world’ tractability, by 
drawing on each others’ respective insights. In building towards these conclusions, I 
first outline the key objectives of cosmopolitan projects of global governance, before 
then highlighting the salient features within the politics of accountability in IOs that 
can both contribute to and benefit from these more explicitly normative frameworks. 
 Cosmopolitan political thought has a long and impressive lineage. The earliest 
formulation of the cosmopolitan ideal is generally taken from the fourth-century BC, 
and the reply that was given by Diogenes of Sinope when asked where he was from 
(‘Cosmopolites eimi’).11 In recent decades, there has been something of a resurgence 
of interest in cosmopolitanism, sparked in particular by the end of the Cold War. The 
ending of an entrenched structure of geo-governance, based on a binary opposition of 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Norton and Norton (2000). 
10 For a comprehensive review, see Cabrera (2010: 30-9) or Archibugi (2004). 
11 ‘I am a citizen of the world’. Quoted in Aksu (2007: 275). 
 210 
East versus West, opened up intellectual curiosity over possible alternative futures. 
Consequently, a number of key academic figures began to unite behind ‘An Agenda 
for a New World Order’, based around the operationalisation of broad cosmopolitan 
principles (Archibugi and Held 1995). 12  It  is  this  strand  of  ‘institutional 
cosmopolitanism’  that  provides  the most  useful  counterpoint  against which  to  draw 
out the implications of the politics of accountability in IOs.13 In order to draw out the 
full implications of the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF, I focus 
on both the formal and informal variants of institutional cosmopolitanism. 
 The writings of David Held on a ‘cosmopolitan order’ are emblematic of the 
formal branch of institutional cosmopolitan writings. Seeking a comprehensive 
restructuring of the institutional architecture of global governance, Held (1995b: 108) 
argues that: 
The cosmopolitan model of democracy would seek the creation of regional 
parliaments (for example Latin America and Africa) and the enhancement of 
such bodies where they already exist (the European Parliament)… In the final 
analysis, the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states 
and agencies – a reformed General Assembly of the United Nations, or a 
complement to it – would be an objective. 
 
Of course, the degree of control by individual agents of these structures would remain 
minimal. As Cabrera (2010: 31) makes clear, the aim of such cosmopolitan projects is 
not  some  illusionary utopia  in which  ‘each  individual… [holds]  some extraordinary 
veto power over agreements between states, or rules enacted by suprastate 
institutions’. Rather,  the defining principle  that is sought out by formal institutional 
cosmopolitanists is more modest, holding that ‘at a minimum, actions deeply affecting 
individuals’ interests must be justifiable to them’ (Cabrera 2010: 31).  
                                                     
12 An analogous development occurred through the Global Civilisation Programme, which (by heeding 
a ‘tip-off’ in 1986 from Georgi Shakhnazarov, special assistant to Mikhail Gorbachev) was 
impressively ahead of the curve (Falk 1995: vii). 
13 The phrase ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ is used by Cabrera (2010: 33), from where I borrow both 
the term and the meaning.  
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When translated into a real world context, the realisation of this criterion 
implies, in the words of Charles Beitz (2005: 17), that ‘each person should be treated 
as having equal standing as an addressee of justification’. This is said to necessitate a 
significant rupture from the state-centrism that dominates the operations of IOs. For 
formal institutional cosmopolitanists, it is a measure of a just system that: 
Individuals should have the opportunity to actually demand justifications and 
jointly reject or accept offers at the trans-state or global level… Their interests 
must not only be considered, but also democratically represented in the 
formation of suprastate rule and operations of suprastate institutions (Cabrera 
2010: 31). 
 
Whereas the Westphalian order permits state actors to execute decisions at a level that 
does not necessarily coincide with the social grouping most closely affected by a 
particular action, institutional cosmopolitanism demands that an inclusive, 
subsidiarity-based procedure be followed. The formal institutional branch of 
cosmopolitanism demands, then, that the operating procedures of IOs undergo major 
modification, to allow for wider (global-)citizen participation in spheres of 
international governance.  
 An interesting component to cosmopolitan works holding a formal 
conceptualisation of institutions is provided by a subset of works examining the more 
informal institutions of governance. With a focus on informal structures of power, 
writers such as Dryzek and Habermas view the opportunities for the realisation of 
cosmopolitan democracy as far more ubiquitous than do formal institutionalists. For 
Dryzek (1990: 92), rather than seeking solutions within IOs (which suffer from the 
potential pathologies common to any complex, problem-solving bureaucracies), it is 
argued that the decentralised character of ‘discursive democracy’ provides individuals 
with the opportunity to critically engage in the restructuring of their ‘lifeworld’. This 
lifeworld is the social network within which individuals interact to maintain and 
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reconstruct subjectivities and personalities, and through which self-realisation can be 
achieved. The danger, according to Dryzek, lies in the potential of formal institutions 
acting to close down the fluidity of these lifeworld networks. Similarly, Habermas 
(2001: 88) writes optimistically of the potential of the ‘postnational constellation’ to 
provide opportunities for democratic self-steering by societies outside of traditional, 
formal structures. By ensuring open communication between internal state processes 
and the contexts and policies of world organisations, Habermas argues that it becomes 
possible to develop a ‘world domestic polity’ (2001: 110).  
From the informally-oriented perspective, the key location at which to 
examine the impact of IO actions becomes not the IOs themselves, but rather social 
processes within recipient societies. It is necessary to judge the extent to which IOs 
become  implicated  within  ‘totalising’  projects.  Recognising  that  complex 
bureaucracies can work  to both ‘enable and restrict… the character of governance’, 
the operational challenge for IOs (and the analytic challenge for observers) becomes 
to negotiate the line between inclusion and exclusion (Neu et al 2006: 636). The 
tendency on the part of IOs to err in this regard is well established, and it indeed has 
been suggested that totalising dynamics are inextricable from their attempted 
‘government at a distance’: 
The single perspective allowed by [IOs’] informing technologies is that of the 
centre; the perspectives of those on the periphery are lost, discarded… What 
information is gathered and reported is mediated by differing understandings 
of what constitutes ‘appropriate’ information (Neu et al 2006: 638-9).  
 
From this standpoint, the very attempt to monitor, evaluate, and control an IO can 
serve not only to squeeze-out stakeholders’ ability  to alter the actions of  the IO, but 
also to control matters closer to home. When governance frameworks are handed 
down from IOs detailing how a policy problem should be understood and addressed, 
and when these problems are structured in a rigid hierarchy, the room for self-
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determination becomes limited.14 Whereas formal institutionalists are concerned with 
realising  reforms  to  IOs’  operating  procedures,  informal  institutionalists  are 
concerned more with the impact of IO actions on the politics of everyday practices. 
 A common criticism of cosmopolitan works is that they exhibit a strong 
tendency to remain rooted in the realm of the ideal. This characteristic has been 
identified by critics as restricting the usefulness of grand cosmopolitan narratives; 
indeed, Ralph Dahrendorf goes so far as to dismiss such projects as akin to ‘barking at 
the  moon’. 15  A number of contributions to this debate have made calls for this 
shortcoming to be addressed (e.g. Archibugi 2004, Goldblatt 1997), or indeed have 
attempted to lead by example by framing discussions of cosmopolitanism around 
detailed empirical work (e.g. Cabrera 2010). The reasoning behind this nascent shift 
are laid out clearly by Aksu (2007: 288):  
Normative theorizing,  especially  in  today’s world,  is  analytically  even more 
demanding than it is given credit for. Sophisticated normative theory requires 
or presupposes robust empirical analysis in the first place. After all, what 
ought to happen cannot be credibly spelled out in the contemporary scholarly 
context without making the prior claim that we already have a reasonable 
understanding of what is happening. 
 
In order to enhance its claims to relevance, it is argued that cosmopolitanism must 
link up with analyses of real world processes and mechanisms of change.  
 The grounds on which the politics of accountability meets cosmopolitan 
global governance are now beginning to emerge. The lessons regarding the 
characteristics of IOs that shape the evolution of mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability  can  be  ‘hooked  up’  with  the  concern  of  formal  institutionalists  that 
governance structures be reformed to empower the groups most directly affected by 
IO actions; and the lessons regarding the potentially universalising tendencies of 
                                                     
14 Neu et al (2006) provide just such an examination of the World Bank’s governance of education 
policy in Latin America. 
15 Quoted in Archibugi (2004: 438). 
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shareholder groups can be ‘hooked up’ with the concern of  informal institutionalists 
that IOs maintain an appropriate degree of flexibility in the governance frameworks 
that they transmit to member countries. This fusing of insights is undertaken in the 
fourth section of the chapter. First, comprehensive reviews of the politics of 
shareholder accountability and politics of stakeholder accountability at the World 
Bank and IMF are provided.  
 
6.2. Paying the piper , calling the tune? 
Material resources matter in the world of IOs. Although the precise funding structures 
of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and International Development 
Association differ, in both institutions a collection of key creditor states have come to 
occupy important strategic positions from which they control, or at least can 
convincingly claim to control, the IOs’ funding streams. In both institutions, member 
states’  formal  voting  powers  are  determined  by  the  quota  of  their  financial 
contribution. Moreover, through the provision of additional resources to these IOs, the 
bargaining power of these shareholder states is substantially raised vis-à-vis the power 
of smaller states.  
At the World Bank, the importance of IDA replenishment negotiations has 
increased dramatically over recent years. In addition to the long-term upward trend in 
the volume of IDA lending, the turn toward grant-based disbursals has magnified 
creditors’ bargaining power. Approximately one-third of all IDA allocations in 2008-
09 were provided as grants, up from around one-fifth in 2006 (World Bank 2006: i), 
and there are calls from creditors for the proportion to be raised further to 50 percent 
in  the  near  future  (Sanford  2009).  Because  of  IDA’s  non-self sustaining nature, 
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creditors’ ability to leverage operational change out of the Bank continues to increase 
over time. 
In contrast to the direct connection between creditor states and IDA resources, 
at the IMF the link is somewhat diffuse. Although the resource transfers that are 
needed to sustain the flow of PRGF resources come partly from direct creditor 
contributions, these tend to be arranged in an ad hoc manner (IMF 2009: 6). The lack 
of an IDA-style institutionalised process of negotiations minimises the opportunity for 
pressure to be applied by creditor states. In addition, a substantial amount of the 
supplementary resources needed for PRGF operations have come through the sale of 
portions  of  the  IMF’s  vast  gold  stocks.16 As these stocks consist in the main of 
membership quota subscriptions over which the Fund holds legal ownership, 17 
spending commitments by individual shareholder-governments are not involved. 
However, notwithstanding this lack of a direct pecuniary interest, the gold sales 
linked to PRGF operations have been accompanied by large quota-holding states’ 
attempts to leverage operational changes out of the Fund. 18  Although less 
institutionally entrenched, shareholders at the Fund have acted in a similar manner to 
shareholders at the Bank in attempting to induce behavioural change on the part of the 
IO through the use of hard financial incentives. 
 We know, then, that materially powerful states in the global economy are 
willing to use their privileged position to push for IO reform. Toward what overall 
end, though, are these mechanisms of influence employed? Chapters two and three 
generated a number of insights into this issue, although it is perhaps useful to begin 
                                                     
16 For information on the financing of PRGF lending see IMF Official Website, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm.  
17 At approximately 3, 200 metric tons, the IMF’s gold stock is the third largest in the world. See IMF 
Official Website, at http://www.imf.org/external/about/gold.htm.  
18 For an overview of the major events in the Fund’s use of gold, see IMF Official Website, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm.  
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by addressing the question in the negative. Contrary to the claims of much literature 
within international studies (e.g. Morgenthau 1960, Waltz 1979, Dunne and Schmidt 
2001, Andersen et al 2006), state action is not guided by narrowly self-interested 
motives. The findings of the earlier chapters of the thesis refute such a reading of state 
behaviour in the international sphere; instead, a much more nuanced picture was 
found, in which intricate mechanisms of socialisation play a central role in guiding 
action. 
 The  process  through  which  state  actors’  understandings  of  what  constitutes 
appropriate and desirable behaviour in a particular area of global politics is 
undoubtedly complex, involving many interlinked relationships. However, in the 
cases examined in this thesis, a definite hierarchy of influence is discernable. In their 
respective operational spheres, the World Bank and IMF play a key role in fixing 
understandings of both policy problems and range of ‘thinkable’ solutions. With their 
widely recognised concentration of institutional expertise and their dedicated research 
centres, the Bank and Fund exert considerable agenda-setting power in the fields of 
international development and monetary policy. This construction and re-construction 
of the dominant understanding of their broad terms of reference by IOs is not, 
however, a straightforward or uncontested process.  
 In the case of the World Bank, we saw that from the early days of its 
operations a central focus was on ensuring that lending was directed towards 
‘economically  viable’  projects. With  the  Central  Projects  Staff  vigilantly  enforcing 
institution-wide adherence to the principle that lending must support demonstrably 
revenue-generating activities, a rigid framework was established around which the 
Bank’s  developmental  mandate  was  operationalised.  Over  time,  aided  by  both 
advances in methods of economic analysis at the Bank and the geopolitical worldview 
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of Robert McNamara (the organisation’s long serving and hugely influential President 
from 1968-81),19 a  concern  with  ‘social  lending’  directed  toward  the  low-income 
groups became incorporated into Bank practice. In more recent years, the  Bank’s 
poverty reduction turn has coalesced with the demands of creditor states that the 
organisation demonstrate better value for money in its interactions with low-income 
countries.  Whilst  creditors  have  ‘bought  in’  to  the  appropriateness  of  the  World 
Bank’s  poverty  reduction  focus,  their  response  to  a  period  of  crisis  from  the  early 
1990s has been to use IDA replenishment negotiations to increasingly push the Bank 
to better perform according to a monitorable poverty reduction metric. In an example 
of a positive feedback cycle of IO monitoring, the Bank also has responded to this 
hostile  environment  by moving  to  increasingly  draw  upon  ‘poverty  reduction’  as  a 
legitimation device for its activities.  
 This positive feedback cycle continues to evolve at the World Bank. Creditors 
states’ push with the results agenda, most recently consolidated with the launch of the 
Africa Results Monitoring System, has sought to increase their ability to monitor 
Bank output, particularly as measured by a range of proxy indicators for the 
Millennium Development Goals. In this process of ‘fine tuning’ the understanding of 
global poverty, state actors’ underlying assumptions have been informed by a range of 
sources, including most notably agents within the Bank, other UN organisations, and 
other (less materially powerful) developmentally-focused states. Crucially, because 
the Bank is itself not a monolithic entity, this fixing on an MDG-centred view of 
poverty has important consequences on the contest within the organisation over how 
                                                     
19 McNamara is pipped at the post for the title of longest serving President by Eugene Black. The 
former held the post for 13 years and two months, the latter 13 years and five months. See World Bank 
Official Website, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTPRESIDE
NT2007/0,,contentMDK:20510826~menuPK:64822290~pagePK:64821878~piPK:64821912~theSiteP
K:3916065,00.html.  
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it should approach its mission. Entrepreneurial individuals and groups within the 
institution that favour a multidimensional conceptualisation of poverty (as opposed to 
the Bank’s traditionally economistic understanding) have begun to rhetorically draw 
on  the  ‘tremendous  pressures’  of  the  results  agenda  to  bolster  their  proselytising 
efforts. In this manner, there is an intriguing intersection between creditors’ efforts to 
better  monitor  and  control  the  IO,  and  the  Bank’s  own  internal  battlefield  for 
knowledge. The wider consequences of these processes are returned to below; for 
now, a brief review of the politics of shareholder accountability at the IMF is 
provided. 
 In a similar manner to the World Bank, during its early years of operation the 
IMF was able to carve out a niche within the nascent structures of global economic 
governance. Under the Bretton Woods System of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, 
the  IMF’s  core  function  was  to  assist  member  states  through  balance  of  payments 
problems. With unparalleled access to data and key practitioners, the Fund rapidly 
became a leading centre of expertise on the interconnectedness of national currency 
systems. Consequently, by the 1960s the practice of attaching monitored conditions to 
the provision of loans had become the norm. The content of conditionality was 
determined  by  the  Fund’s  evolving  stock  of  expertise  regarding  the  causes  and 
appropriate responses to payments crises, and in general members grew to accept that 
the ‘tough love’ of Fund policy packages was necessary. 
 As  the  Fund’s  lending  activities  began  to  shift  increasingly  toward  low-
income countries, unclarity began to grow amongst shareholders regarding the 
ultimate aim of its operations. To assist developing countries through the turbulence 
of the 1970s oil crises, a temporary Trust Fund was established in 1976. However, 
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following its conversion into the more permanent Structural Adjustment Facility,20 
long-term lending relationships began to build-up between the Fund and low-income 
countries with persistent balance of payments disequilibria. With this adjustment 
lending, the IMF left the ‘clean’ world of macroeconomics and became enmeshed in 
the  ‘messy’  world  of  development.  As  the  Fund’s  operations  with  low-income 
members began to attract increasing criticism during the 1990s (e.g. Garuda 2000, 
Grusky 2000, Wade 1998, Bird 1995, Bradlow 1995, Killick 1995), intra-shareholder 
disagreements arose as to the appropriateness of the Fund’s new role. 
 By the close of the 1990s, a clear cleavage had begun to emerge between key 
shareholders  over  what  form  the  Fund’s  engagements  with  low-income countries 
should take. On the one side a group of ‘developmentalist’ shareholders held the view 
that, whilst it was necessary to fine-tune the poverty reduction and growth impact of 
Fund programmes, the organisation’s expertise and resources should continue to play 
a significant role. On the other side, a group of ‘minimalist’ shareholders argued that 
the Fund’s mission had crept into areas that were outside of its core expertise, and that 
a process of disengagement was necessary. This division has led to a series of 
contradictory pressures to reform being placed on the IO. A negative feedback cycle 
has  developed  around  contemporary  reforms  to  the  Fund’s  concessional lending 
operations, by which inconsistent reforms have led to continued disagreement 
between shareholders as to the appropriateness of the organisation’s policy tools and 
aims. At heart, these disagreements are a consequence of the lack of shareholder 
agreement as to what constitutes a ‘balance of payments emergency’. For a group of 
low-income countries, deeply embedded impediments to growth mean that current 
account deficits will likely remain a persistent problem. Without a clear consensus as 
                                                     
20 The first SAF arrangements were agreed in 1986. Following an unexpectedly low demand, in 1987 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment was announced with increased lending limits.  
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to where the line between emergency stabilisation and long-term development lies, 
the  parameters  of  the  Fund’s  engagements  over  the  medium-term will remain 
uncertain. 
 Because  of  creditor  states’  greater  success  in  securing  reforms  at  the  Bank 
relative to the Fund, the potentially totalising tendencies of IOs are more clearly in 
evidence in the former arena. Here, there is a clear tension between the positioning of 
an MDG-centred conceptualisation of poverty reduction as the central priority of 
development policy, and the maintaining of an open environment in which policy 
goals  can  be  set  by  ‘democratic  self-steering’.  At  the  Fund,  the  intra-shareholder 
disagreements have hampered the emergence of a concerted push to tie-down the 
output of the IO, and so the totalising pressures are correspondingly lower. 
Interestingly, it is within the dynamics around the politics of stakeholder 
accountability at the Fund that these totalising pressures most clearly emerge. These 
trends, and the corresponding developments at the World Bank, are outlined in the 
following section. 
 
6.3. Institutional learning and stakeholder engagement 
In sharp relief to the shareholder accountability relationships at the World Bank and 
IMF, which were characterised by stable principal-agent arrangements, a core focus 
on the politics of stakeholder accountability was on the (re-)production of the 
relationship between the IOs and in-country groups. The unfolding processes at the 
Bank and Fund have been driven by the interaction of both internal and external 
factors,  with  high  profile  crises  periodically  serving  to  ‘heat  up’  the  slow-burning 
institutional learning that has underpinned these reforms. Although in many matters 
of detail the story of the politics of stakeholder accountability at the Bank and Fund 
 221 
differ, broad commonalities exist. The structural similarities of the organisations, as 
laid out in their founding mandates, provide the clearest point of shared experience. 
Owing to the importance of these initial provisions in influencing the future course of 
development in the politics of stakeholder accountability, this shared history is of 
deep consequence. Although there has been an over-arching malleability to the 
mechanisms of stakeholder engagement at the Bank and Fund, these early 
organisational structures have in key respects proved to be tenaciously sticky. 
 The governance structures of the World Bank and IMF are laid out in their 
respective Articles of Agreement, which came into force in 1945. The plans agreed 
for the IOs were avowedly state-centric, and at the core of both sets of organisational 
blueprints was a chain of delegation through which official representatives of member 
governments maintained oversight and control. This chain remains broadly in place: 
through a plenary Board of Governors meeting, member states still select 24 
Executive Directors to oversee the day-to-day operations of the IOs. Selection occurs 
through a voting system that is weighted according to states’ financial contributions to 
the organisations, through which a small number of advanced industrialised states 
select individual Directors and smaller states are arranged into constituency groups. 
The implicit chain of delegation through which domestic groups have access to these 
formal governance structures has remained somewhat extended, flowing from on the 
ground actors, to domestic representatives, and in turn to the relevant World Bank or 
IMF directors.  
 This  ‘club’ model  of  IO  governance was  further  reinforced  by  a  number  of 
other common provisions within the Bank and Fund’s Articles. The stipulations that 
the  organisations’  in-country partners be limited to official representatives of fiscal 
agencies, the heavy levels of secrecy that restricted the flow of information outside of 
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narrow policy-making circles, and the centralisation of staff at the headquarters in 
Washington, DC, all served to limit the effectiveness with which the delegated 
channels of stakeholder accountability could function. In addition, during their early 
years of existence, the institutional culture and operating procedures of both IOs 
provided an inauspicious environment in which to foster more direct links with 
stakeholder groups. The predominance of economists at the organisations led to the 
embedding of a worldview according to which little value was attached to soliciting 
the input of in-country groups, and this worldview served to support the evolution of 
the IOs as arenas populated exclusively by elite actors. From this common starting 
point, the journeys undertaken through the politics of stakeholder accountability at the 
World Bank and IMF began to diverge. 
 The beginning of the poverty reduction shift in the World Bank, which 
emerged during the stewardship of Robert McNamara through the 1970s, marks an 
important moment in the politics of stakeholder accountability at the organisation. 
The creation of an informal Sociological Group of Bank staff, which was given 
impetus by a drive to recruit individuals with a broader range of professional training 
and experience, supported the emergence of a counter-culture at the Bank. One of the 
key grounds on which the dominant intellectual thinking at the Bank was challenged 
regarded the social nature  of  the  Bank’s  work,  and  the  consequent  importance  of 
integrating the insights of domestic populations into the design and implementation of 
projects. However, in order for significant operational change allowing more open 
avenues of stakeholder engagement at the Bank, a convergence of these intellectual 
currents with a period of crisis was required. 
 The 1980s saw a period of vocal and sustained criticism of the Bank, whereby 
NGO actors worked to highlight the harmful social and environmental consequences 
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of Bank supported projects. From the beginning of the decade, senior management at 
the Bank began to issue operational guidelines clarifying the participatory procedures 
that had to be followed in the design and implementation of particular types of 
project. Through this guidance, groups including indigenous peoples, those subject to 
involuntary resettlement, and women began to be positioned as identifiable 
stakeholders with a legitimate claim to inclusion within decision-making structures. In 
1993,  with  the  launch  of  the  Bank’s  Inspection  Panel,  these  groups were  provided 
with an institutionalised means of challenging Bank performance in this regard. In the 
following years, internal advocates of greater stakeholder participation have worked 
to disseminate changes in the behaviour and thinking of operational staff. With the 
assistance of various funding pots, the Vice Presidency for Environmentally and 
Socially Sustainable Development in particular has consistently sought to promote 
deeper engagements with domestic populations in project cycles.  
 In addition to the reforms to the mechanisms of stakeholder engagement that 
have emerged to support the effectiveness of project lending, concurrent 
developments surrounding the World Bank’s policy-based lending have taken place. 
In recent years, the re-conceptualisation of domestic governance processes as a key 
determinant of economic growth have led Bank policy-based operations to 
increasingly include conditions relating to domestic mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability. The focus of the World Bank’s research department through the 1990s 
on the importance of institutional constellations to economic development – which 
emerged in the light of the growing dissatisfaction over the performance of early 
structural adjustment lending – played an important role in altering the understanding 
of governance and domestic stakeholder accountability within the process of 
development. By presenting an ‘economic’ rationale for the Bank to use policy-based 
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lending to push countries to improve domestic accountability mechanisms, the work 
of the research department has helped increase the coherence of this shift with the 
Bank’s ‘apolitical’ bureaucratic culture. 
In  recent  years,  the  Poverty Reduction  and Economic Management’s  Public 
Sector Group has become the institutional home of the efforts to advance the 
Bankwide focus on governance-related issues. With the substantial injection of 
resources that accompanied the recently launched Governance and Anti-Corruption 
agenda, PRMPS continues to push operational staff to integrate a focus on stakeholder 
participation and domestic stakeholder accountability into their work. By strategically 
targeting key Bank personnel, and by presenting arguments that are framed according 
to institutionally accepted standards, PRMPS has contributed to the burgeoning shift 
in attitudes regarding the desirability and efficacy of domestic governance reform to 
the organisation’s policy-based work. The changes in the mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability surrounding both the project and policy operations of the Bank have 
emerged through the complex interaction of internal and external pressures. In both, 
periods of crisis have played an important role in advancing reforms, with deeper 
processes of institutional learning and norm entrepreneurship working to sustain and 
embed behavioural change. 
 The area of operational terrain across which the politics of stakeholder 
accountability at the IMF have unfolded is, in general terms, analogous to that of the 
Bank. Developments have occurred both in the mechanisms through which 
stakeholders are included directly into the organisation’s operating practices,  and  in 
relation  to  the  Fund’s  attempts  to  reform  member  states’  domestic  governance 
structures.  Although  the  Fund’s  organisational  structure,  dominant  bureaucratic 
culture, and operating procedures have provided a more enduringly hostile 
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environment to stakeholder accountability reforms than the World Bank, the relatively 
minor changes that have occurred are deeply revealing about the necessary 
prerequisites of change. 
 In relation to changing mechanisms of stakeholder engagement within the 
Fund’s operating procedures,  two main developments  in  recent  years  are worthy  of 
note. The first of these, the reform to the organisation’s formal governance structure, 
is a rare example of outside pressure driving change. In 2008, the background noise of 
NGO  criticism  of  the  Fund’s  constituency-based system of representation for low-
income groups began to resonate within the organisation. Minor reforms to the 
procedure through which member states’ voting power is calculated were enacted, as 
was an arrangement whereby the Africa Group Executive Directors were empowered 
to select an additional Alternative. These minor changes were intended to improve the 
ability of Executive Directors to represent their constituent countries’ interests at the 
Fund, and, focussed as they are on improving the delegated accountability 
mechanisms,  represent  something  of  an  indirect  ‘opening  of  doors’  to  low-income 
country  stakeholder  groups.  Through  the  evolving  role  the  Fund’s  Resident 
Representatives, more direct channels have been opened to in-country stakeholders. 
 It was from the late 1980s that the number of permanent Res Reps expanded, 
largely as a practical response to the requirements for co-ordination and support 
services  in  the  face  of  members’  increasingly prolonged use of Fund resources. 
Primarily intended to facilitate liaison with country authorities, over time Res Reps 
have been increasingly pushed by senior management to also serve as an institutional 
channel for in-country stakeholder groups. Similar pressure has also been applied to 
the  Fund’s  temporary  Mission  Teams.  There  is,  however,  widespread  external 
criticism of Res Reps’  and Mission Teams’  effectiveness  in  this  regard,  and  indeed 
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internal IEO reports have concluded that there is significant room for improvement. 
The widespread reluctance on the part of Res Reps to engage with the participatory 
processes that accompanied individual countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 
and the differing messages in this regard that were communicated through different 
Area Departments, are symptomatic of the low levels of institutional support for 
broadening the mechanisms of stakeholder engagement at the Fund. Whilst it is 
common for analysts of the IMF to take this performance as a stick to beat the IO 
with, it is instructive to recall the underlying factors that help explain the slowness of 
behavioural change at the Fund.  
 The need to establish solid intellectual justification for operational change is a 
hallmark of expertise-based IOs like the IMF. Although such grounds have not yet 
emerged at the Fund in relation to widening stakeholder participation, the green 
shoots of such a development are visible. In recent years, analytic work into the links 
between broader participation in the formation of restructuring programmes, in-
country ownership of these programmes, and their successful implementation, has 
been produced by research staff and disseminated across the organisation. In addition, 
a  nascent  ‘political  economy’  movement  within  the  Fund  is also detectable. An 
economistic understanding of individual behaviour dominates the Fund’s bureaucratic 
culture, with the underpinning analytic approach seeing action as a function of utility-
maximising agents responding to environmental modifications, and ascribing a high 
degree of automacity to social interactions. However, the growing number of works 
examining the links between conflicting individual interests and potentially sub-
optimal aggregate outcomes, which highlight the need to consider the role of 
individual veto-players when designing adjustment programmes, represent an 
important break. Although political economy remains very much a minority interest 
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in the Fund, an informal cluster of staff is beginning to form around the issue. Their 
efforts to translate the issue into the Fund’s language of expertise have the potential to 
coalesce with shifts in operational practice to expand the mechanisms of stakeholder 
accountability at the Fund. 
 Turning to the more domestically focussed aspects of the politics of 
stakeholder accountability at the IMF, recent years have witnessed the rise of the idea 
of the ‘disciplinary stakeholder’. In the light of the Mexican ‘Tequilla Crisis’ and later 
Asian Financial Crisis,  ideas  regarding  the ‘information standard’ and of the role of 
private finance as a disciplining ‘early warning’ gained prominence within the Fund. 
In the case of low-income countries, owing to the absence of significant flows of 
private resources, the disciplinary role was transferred to stakeholder groups. With the 
General Data Dissemination Standard, the Fund now has a successful mechanism 
with which to pressure member states to release key data on macroeconomic 
performance and sociodemographic trends to the domestic audience. Although the 
GDDS has the appearance of a routine, even mundane, operational development, by 
pushing the governments of member states to publicise such politically important 
figures as unemployment, growth rates, inflation, and government revenue and 
expenditure, the Fund is acting at the boundaries of its apoliticism. The intersection of 
developments such as the GDDS and the wider politics of stakeholder accountability 
at the World Bank and IMF with literature on cosmopolitan global governance shall 
be turned to presently; first, the general insights into the politics of stakeholder 
accountability are reviewed. 
 The  ‘take-home  message’  from  the  analysis  of  the  politics  of  stakeholder 
accountability is clear: change happens, but, in order to become embedded, it must be 
justifiable in terms that cohere with the dominant bureaucratic culture of an IO. 
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Mechanisms of stakeholder engagement surrounding the operations of the World 
Bank and IMF have over the years altered, and although periods of crisis have at 
times played an important role in catalysing developments, internal norm 
entrepreneurship and institutional learning help cement these dynamics. In addition to 
these reforms to the channels for direct interaction between in-country populations 
and the IOs, the ‘straying’ of the Bank and Fund into issues of domestic governance 
(and particularly their efforts to push low-income countries to improve the 
effectiveness of their mechanisms of stakeholder accountability) constitute an 
important strand of change. This process, too, has been characterised by piecemeal 
behavioural change in line with altered knowledge frameworks. These insights have 
important implications in relation to cosmopolitan global governance, which are now 
explored in detail. 
 
6.4. Joining up the dots 
In expanding the boundary of the investigation to consider the intersection of the 
politics of accountability and cosmopolitan global governance, the overarching goal 
was to explore the implications of the research project more comprehensively. The 
broad lesson of this collapsing-out is clear: there is significant room for mutual gain 
from the bringing-together  of  the  literatures  examining  the  ‘is’  and  the  ‘ought’  of 
international organisations. Regarding the formal institutions of global governance, 
the synthesis between the politics of accountability and cosmopolitan projects enables 
calls for reform to be tied to detailed knowledge of existing mechanisms of change in 
IOs. Regarding the intersection of IOs and the less visible structures of power that are 
concentrated on by informal cosmopolitan institutionalists, the synthesis provides a 
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framework around which a normative judgement on contemporary developments can 
be built. In the paragraphs below, these two branches of synthesis are outlined in turn. 
 The call to radically reform the institutions of global governance is at the heart 
of the cosmopolitan project. Flowing from a belief in the equal moral worth of 
individuals, arguments have been put forward that the structures and operating 
procedures of IOs be reconstructed so as to allow interested citizens to have direct 
access. The aim is to allow those groups and individuals most directly affected by 
decisions taken within IOs to express their views, demand justifications, and 
collectively accept or reject proposed actions. It is important to note that, over the past 
decade, reforms to operational practice have been implemented at both the World 
Bank and IMF that have led to movements in this general direction. At the Bank, 
efforts have been made to deepen the belief of operational staff in the efficacy of 
social participation as a means of improving the design, implementation, and 
monitoring stages of a project cycle. This followed the repositioning of several 
identifiable groups as holding a special claim to legitimately be incorporated into 
decision-making structures by the Bank through the 1980s, and the launch of the 
Inspection Panel to ensure that these claims were (where appropriate) realised. At the 
Fund, this trend is illustrated by the push to open up Resident Representatives and 
Mission Teams to a wider range of stakeholders. Although both sets of developments 
have been widely written-off as laying somewhere between inadequate and cynical,21 
key lessons can be transferred to cosmopolitan projects from the dynamics that 
surround them. 
 By acknowledging the utility of ensuring that there is a coherence between 
calls  to  reform  mechanisms  of  stakeholder  accountability  and  an  IO’s  internal 
                                                     
21 See, for example, Lazarus (2008), Frazer (2005), Bradshaw and Linneker (2003), and Grusky (2000). 
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bureaucratic culture, demands for operational change from cosmopolitan writers 
could be made more ‘saleable’ to the IOs themselves. This is not to say that demands 
must  be  ‘watered  down’,  but  rather  that  the  IO’s  language  of  expertise  must  be 
engaged with.22 The necessity of making calls for change more credible has been 
highlighted by a number of reviews of cosmopolitan global governance (e.g. Aksu 
2007, Archibugi 2004, Goldblatt 1997). In the case of the World Bank and IMF, the 
practical requirement would be to expound the benefits to be gained from an 
extension of the mechanisms of stakeholder interaction in terms of project- and 
policy-implementation. The achievement of this end is not as onerous as it might at 
first appear. Within the Bank and Fund nascent research projects examining the links 
between participation and outcomes already exist, and provide a fruitful point of 
engagement. There is potential for appropriately pitched calls for operational change 
to dovetail with the growing understanding of economic development as a 
fundamentally social process, the beginnings of which can be seen at both the Bank 
and the Fund. Indeed, in relation to other key issues in global governance, it has been 
shown that linking up effectiveness-based arguments with more normatively-based 
arguments has been a successful way of advancing radical calls for change.23 
 In addition to heeding the close relationship between institutional learning and 
behavioural change in expertise-based IOs like the World Bank and IMF, and 
exploring the means of linking in to these dynamics, the impact of cosmopolitan 
works could further be increased by appreciating the role played by periods of crisis 
in fermenting operational change. The effect of crises in opening-up paths of change 
                                                     
22 The action of NGOs within the ‘drop the debt’ campaign, who questioned the IMF’s initial figures 
and calculations and successfully pushed it to implement a more nuanced (and broader) definition of 
unsustainable debt, provide a practical example of an argument being ‘translated’ without being 
watered-down. See Broome (2009) for a detailed account of this process. 
23 See Busby (2007) on the deployment of this technique in relation to the extension of multilateral 
debt relief, and Brassett (2009) in relation to campaigns in favour of a Tobin Tax. 
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in IOs has long been established (e.g. Best 2007, Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Fox 
2000), and was shown in previous chapters to remain the case in the recent history of 
the Bank and Fund. By developing a greater willingness to tie-in to contemporary 
issues, and to frame their reform prescriptions in terms of their contribution to 
overcoming major points of criticism, the tractability of cosmopolitan works could be 
increased. In relation to the contemporary criticisms of the World Bank and IMF, one 
of the recurring charges is that of the ‘democratic deficit’ (e.g. Woods 2004, Woods 
and Narlikar 2001). There is clear scope for institutional cosmopolitan writers to draw 
more explicitly on this issue in order to advance their calls for reform. 
 The task of joining up the dots between formal institutional cosmopolitanism 
and the lessons of the investigation into the politics of accountability is, then, 
comparatively straightforward. When we move on to consider the intersection of 
informal institutional cosmopolitanism and the politics of accountability, the picture 
becomes more complex. In contrast to the concrete tactical synergies that can be 
forged between the insights of the politics of accountability at the Bank and Fund and 
the formal cosmopolitan project, there is less of a neat tying up of loose ends in 
relation to IOs and the more informal power structures. Rather than allowing for 
strong conclusions to be immediately drawn, this synthesis provides a framework 
around which a normative judgement on contemporary developments can be built. 
Preliminary reflections are set-out below, and in the closing section of the chapter the 
future directions for research that are implied by the framework are explored in more 
detail. 
 For cosmopolitan writers focussing on informal structures of power, the 
primary relationship of interest is the interaction between the international level and 
domestic social structures. The tension between, on the one hand, the tendency of IOs 
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to hand-down pre-formed governance frameworks to developing country 
governments, and on the other, the capacity of local actors to steer governance 
processes toward their own chosen ends, is of particular interest. There are two 
discrete insights from the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF that 
can be transplanted into this broad analytic framework, relating firstly to the 
potentially  totalising effects of  shareholders’ desire  to monitor and control  IOs,  and 
secondly  to  the  potential  limits  to  stakeholder  autonomy  that  accompany  the  IOs’ 
attempts to ‘enhance’ domestic governance structures. 
It is at the World Bank that the totalising  dynamics  within  shareholders’ 
attempts to monitor and control IOs can most clearly be seen. With its efforts to 
support  the  capacity  of  its  poorest  borrowers  to  monitor  ‘poverty’,  as  defined 
primarily by indicators for the MDGs, the World Bank is contributing to the 
normalisation of a very particular conception of  ‘poverty’. This  ‘sedimentation’  is a 
central part of the process whereby concepts are transformed from an initially highly 
contested, malleable form, to being regarded as representing a self-evident and pre-
existing object, contested (and contestable) only at the margins. Through this process, 
complex social phenomena are reduced to a small number of measurable features that, 
with the aid of standardised data collection techniques and official statistics, become 
an unreflexively accepted part of everyday existence (Breslau 2003: 381, Blyth 2002: 
150). As concepts become standardised and quantified, social space potentially 
becomes more ‘legible’ and ‘amenable to the techniques of state officials’; however, 
the flipside of this increased legibility is the crowding-out of the views of individuals 
and groups occupying the social space under focus (Scott 1998: 82, 356).  
 In relation to poverty reduction, the question of whether the framework being 
handed down by the Bank is serving to restrict the autonomy of the poor themselves 
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to influence the priorities of government action is of great importance. The evidence 
of discontent amongst low-income country governments is readily apparent. In its 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 24  the Government of Guyana (2002: 25) 
communicates this tension clearly: 
The term poverty reduction adversely affects national pride as it is linked with 
bankruptcy and mismanagement at the local and international levels. It also 
affects personal dignity leading to a sense of hopelessness and despair. This is 
unnecessary because it is possible to achieve the same objectives embodied in 
the PRSP guidelines… with a concept of a wealth creation strategy, and to do 
so without creating discord. 
 
Similar  evidence  can  be  found  in  several  countries’  lobbying  for  permission  to  re-
name their PRSPs in more neutral language. 25  Overall, though, the question of 
whether the Bank is acting to ‘open’ or ‘close’ governance space remains unresolved, 
and particularly so in the face of developments within its practices that aim to bring 
country populations in to decision-making structures.26 Ways forward on this question 
are explored in the following section. 
 At the IMF, there is less clear evidence of the potentially totalising effects of 
shareholder pressures on the IO. Owing in part to intra-shareholder disagreements as 
to how the Fund should operationalised its mandate in its interactions with low-
income members, a concerted effort to tie-down the output of the IO and monitor its 
effectiveness has not emerged. Interestingly, it is around reforms that have occurred 
in recent years regarding the rise of the ‘disciplinary stakeholder’ that this tension can 
be seen. By setting out a series of universal data standards for member countries to 
                                                     
24 PRSPs, it will be recalled, are the developmental roadmap that low-income country governments 
must produce to access debt reduction through IDA and PRGF. 
25 Several interviewees at both the World Bank and IMF noted this frustration on the part of low-
income country governments. 
26 The Bank has long been heavily criticised for failing to draw on the expertise of the poor themselves 
when designing developmental projects. Criticism has come from both outsiders (Hancock 1989: 124-
31, Mehta 1994:117-34) and insiders (Ellerman 2006: 1-7). However, in addition to the mechanisms of 
stakeholder engagement outlined in chapter four, the Bank is continuing to push low-income to use 
participatory poverty assessments in order to solicit the input of the poor themselves into the setting of 
developmental priorities (Robb 2002: 4, World Bank 2000:1). 
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collate and present key macroeconomic and sociodemographic data, the possibility of 
the ‘views of the centre’ acting to restrict the autonomy of in-country populations is 
clear. The judgement call as to whether, by providing such a comprehensive data 
framework, the Fund is providing stakeholders with a useful tool or pressuring 
stakeholders  to  ‘see’  policy  issues  in  an  orthodox manner  is,  of  course,  difficult  to 
make. Some preliminary indications on the matter can, though, be put forward. 
 On  the  ‘negative’  side of  the balance  sheet,  although  in  isolation  the GDDS 
can appear to be a neutral means of information provision, in reality the initiative 
functions in parallel to other operations of the Fund. Although the macroeconomic 
data that governments are required to collate and disseminate within the GDDS 
framework may seem to be an ‘open’ resource, available  to be freely  interpreted by 
stakeholders, this very same data is tied in to Fund arrangements with country 
governments. In this manner, the Fund is sending strong signals to domestic groups as 
to how this data should be interpreted. Although these judgements are presented as 
technocratic and apolitical, this is rarely the case. As was noted in chapter three, for 
example,  although Fund arrangements  routinely  use countries’  reserve position  as  a 
determinant of aid-inflow absorption, there is room for debate on the appropriateness 
of this link. Similarly, the zero ceilings that are routinely placed on the contracting of 
non-concessional debt serve to restrict the limits of possible action, and in doing so 
seem to close-down the domestic governance space of member states.27 In relation to 
the  guidelines  on  sociodemographic  data within  the GDDS,  the  existence  of  ‘core’ 
universal data measuring population, health, education, and poverty, has potential to 
                                                     
27 On the contracting of non-concessional debt, see IMF (2009: 5). 
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restrict both the way in which these policy spheres are understood and the range of 
solutions that remain thinkable.28 However, this issue is by no means clear-cut. 
 On  the  ‘positive’  side  of  the  balance  sheet,  within  the  sociodemographic 
framework of the GDDS space is left for the opening-up of governance space through 
the  customisation  of  data.  Whilst,  for  example,  the  ‘core’  poverty  indicators  are 
centrally determined and based on proxies for the Millennium Development Goals, 
governments are able to include a selection of country-specific data in their overall 
frameworks. More generally, on an intuitive level it appears plausible that, by 
pressuring governments to regularly disseminate a wide range of macroeconomic and 
sociodemographic data to their domestic audience, the GDDS will serve to generate 
policy debate. Information on government action is an absolute prerequisite to the 
construction of the governance space within which domestically situated groups and 
individuals act to steer governance frameworks; as such, the GDDS (and the Fund’s 
wider transparency drive) constitute a valuable resource. Although the impact of this 
data framework will never be neutral, and will necessarily have implications for 
domestic social relations, it is important that firm judgements on the issue are taken 
on the basis of solid empirical research. 
 The intersection of the politics of accountability and cosmopolitan global 
governance creates two distinct crossroads, at which the lessons drawn from the 
analysis of contemporary trends at the Bank and Fund in previous chapters hook into 
more normatively driven work on IOs. These crossroads concerned both the formal 
and informal structures of governance, and the joining-up of the dots at these two 
points produced contrasting pictures. The task of integrating insights around the 
former issue was comparatively straightforward. A series of tactical synergies were 
                                                     
28 For an overview of these core components see IMF Official Website, at 
http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/gdds/gddscategorylist/. 
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drawn, and it was shown that the effectiveness of cosmopolitan works could be 
increased through an engagement with the intricacies of the ‘real world’ processes of 
change in IOs. When informal structures of governance were turned to, the picture 
became more complex. Here, rather than providing the grounds for strong conclusions 
to be reached, the combining of the insights of the politics of accountability and 
cosmopolitan global governance instead allowed for the emergence of a framework 
around which judgements of contemporary developments could be constructed. In 
relation to the analysis of informal institutions, the key question becomes whether the 
actions of the IOs can be said to enhance or restrict the capacity of locally situated 
actors to pursue autonomous action. It is possible to identify dynamics operating in 
both directions, although it is fair to preliminarily suggest that it is at the World Bank, 
owing to the relatively effective application of shareholder pressure, that these 
totalising tendencies are more visible. 
 With the removal of the boundaries around the politics of accountability at the 
World Bank and IMF, it has become possible to begin to fully grasp the ‘ins and outs’ 
of the research project. Fruitful grounds exist upon which to explore the intersection 
of the processes of change outlined in the main body of the thesis with more 
normatively driven analyses of IOs. However, rather than representing a tidy point of 
closure, this synthesis has in fact served to bring a further set of important issues into 
focus. The closing section of the chapter, and indeed the closing section of the thesis, 
is used to outline these issues, and to the setting-out a programme of future research 
through which they can be explored. 
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6.5. Directions for future research 
The investigation of the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF has 
generated important, and timely, contributions to the study of international 
organisations. In this concluding section of the thesis, I briefly flag up the conceptual 
and empirical contributions of the research project, and provide a sketch of a 
proposed research agenda. 
Over the past decade, the Bank and Fund have faced increasing levels of 
criticism from a wide range of actors. In addition to a ratcheting-up of the 
‘background noise’  of NGO complaints  regarding  the  IOs’  ‘democratic  deficit’  and 
the negative social and environmental consequences of their operations, the Bank and 
Fund have also attracted unprecedented levels of mass public opposition. This 
opposition has taken the form of demonstrations coinciding with key global summit 
meetings, and protests highlighting domestic anger at the perceived consequences of 
Bank- and Fund-supported policy programmes. Frustration is also voiced by actors on 
the inside of the governance structures surrounding the IOs, as can be seen through 
the  ubiquitous  references  to  the  ‘mission  creep’  and  ‘unaccountable  nature’  of  the 
Bretton Woods Twins in politicians’ speeches. The research project sought to identify 
and increase our understanding of contemporary issues around the accountability of 
the Bank and Fund, and provides two forms of contribution to this end. These 
contributions are centred broadly around our conceptual and empirical knowledge of 
the IOs.  
 The central conceptual lesson of the investigation relates to the need to 
integrate the insights of rationalist and constructivist approaches to the study of IOs. 
The rationalist approach, typified by the principal-agent model, provides important 
insights into the mechanisms through which materially powerful actors can (attempt 
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to) structure the incentives of IO staff to achieve desired behaviour, and into the wider 
conditions that effect their ability to exert control. However, the assumption of stable 
preferences within this framework leads to significant aspects of the world of IOs 
being overlooked: the intricate socialisation processes through understandings of IOs’ 
appropriate activities are fixed are overlooked, and the role played up the very 
establishment of monitoring frameworks in fixing the meaning of key ideas is not 
adequately captured. By combining the rationalist and constructivist approaches to the 
study of IOs, with the latter’s focus on the social context within which understandings 
of appropriate behaviour emerge, these lacunae can be overcome. Additionally, the 
tendency of constructivist-based works to foreground the importance of ideational 
structures at the expense of the role played by agential behaviour in reshaping these 
structures can also be mitigated.  
 In order to integrate the role played by structure and agency in the process of 
change in IOs, a morphogenic framework was drawn upon around which to combine 
the insights of rationalist and constructivist works. This general framework allowed 
for the interaction of ideational structures and agential behaviour in the evolution of 
the ‘positive feedback cycle’ of IO monitoring at  the World Bank and the ‘negative 
feedback  cycle’  at  the  Fund,  and  for  the  micro-processes to be examined through 
which mechanisms of stakeholder interaction at the IOs were reformed. In line with 
the pragmatist underpinnings of the research project, the value of the analytic 
framework lies in its capacity to elucidate the mechanisms at work in the unfolding of 
a concrete series of events. There is significant scope for this framework to be refined 
through further investigations, focussing on either different operational developments 
at the Bank and Fund, or on the operations of other IOs.29  
                                                     
29 See Clegg (2010a) for an overview of the morphogenic approach and its application to a series of 
developments in the Bank and Fund not covered within the thesis. 
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 In terms of the empirical side of the research project, broad contributions were 
made to the existing knowledge of contemporary developments and trends at the 
World Bank and IMF. Through an extensive analysis of archival and publicly 
available documents, publicly available databases, and interview material, a detailed 
picture of contemporary dynamics was built-up. The use by creditors of IDA 
negotiations as a tool for improving World Bank effectiveness, the existence of intra-
shareholder disagreements regarding the appropriateness of PRGF lending, the role 
played by PRMPS at the Bank in advancing the cause of domestic stakeholder 
accountability  and  governance  reform,  and  the  nascent  ‘political  economy’  turn 
within the Fund are important highlights here. These and other insights leave the door 
open for future research to explore these dynamics in more detail, or to uncover 
analogous developments within other arenas of global governance. 
 The avenues noted above represent routes through which additions could be 
made to the investigation of the politics of accountability at the World Bank and IMF 
that, whilst significant, remain relatively limited. It is from the collapsing of the 
boundary around the research project that a broader agenda for future research can be 
seen to emerge. The call for the exploration of the linkages between the ‘is’ and  the 
‘ought’ of IOs’ formal structures invite a clear series of more general additions. There 
is significant potential for a tactical synthesis of insights into the intricate processes of 
change in IOs and cosmopolitan projects to be advanced, which could be done in 
relation to a broad range of IOs. The insights presented in this chapter regarding the 
necessity for cosmopolitan projects to engage more fully with the World Bank and 
IMF’s  language  of  expertise  provides  a  useful  starting  point  for  future  analyses. 
However, it is in relation to the intersection of the activities of IOs and social 
 240 
processes in domestic countries that the most expansive area of future research is 
opened up. 
The extent to which the activities of IOs serve to open-up or close-down 
domestic governance space is an issue of pressing concern. Although there are a range 
of policy areas in which the actions of the Bank and Fund have potentially significant 
impact, it is in the field of poverty reduction that this potential is at its most profound. 
There  is  significant  need  for  a  future  research  agenda  around  ‘International 
Organisations and the Construction of Governance Space’ to be established. 
The core aim of this research would be to track the agenda-setting power of 
the Bank and Fund from the global, to the national, to the sub-national levels, and for 
this to be done in a manner that is sensitive to the concerns of cosmopolitan writings 
on IOs reflected on above. As Neu et al (2006) found in relation to the global 
governance of education policy, there is significant potential for the views of the 
centre to not only shape, but also to distort, how an issue is seen by actors further 
down the governance chain. This agenda-setting power can distort to the extent that 
the governance structures and processes established – broadly, what gets done and 
what gets monitored in a given policy sphere – are at odds with the aims and 
requirements of local populations.30 These pressures are plainly visible in the case of 
the World Bank, with the ongoing efforts to lock down its MDG centred results 
agenda.31 And the resources of the IMF too are currently being swung behind this 
issue.  
In  the  decade  following  the  1999  declaration  by  the  Fund’s  then Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus that poverty reduction had become the most pressing 
issue in global governance (Camdessus 1999: 1), the attention of the organisation has 
                                                     
30 Ellerman (2006) and Scott (1998) both provide compelling insights into this dysfunctional tendency 
of complex bureaucracies. 
31 See chapter two, or Clegg (2010b) for an expanded version of the argument. 
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increasingly been directed  towards  this  issue. Not only  is  ‘poverty’ one of  the  core 
sociodemographic elements within the General Data Dissemination Standard, but it is 
also becoming increasingly common within PRGF arrangements for conditions 
relating to the implementation of ‘poverty reduction expenditure tracking systems’ to 
be included.32 Indeed, it has recently been announced that in an effort to enhance the 
poverty reduction impact of Fund lending, minimum poverty reduction expenditure 
levels will be increasingly incorporated in concessional lending agreements.33  
Detailed country specific work is necessary in order to allow for a fuller 
understanding to be established of the developmental and poverty-reduction 
governance spaces currently under construction. By adopting a three-tiered approach, 
and analysing the global, national, and sub-national levels, it will be possible to 
explore the full dynamics within the evolution of these governance frameworks. At 
the global level it is necessary to track IO-supported interventions into domestic 
governance structures and processes. In practical terms, such an analysis would aim to 
uncover the quantity and form of statistical capacity building and more general 
monitoring and evaluation capacity building provided to government key agencies, as 
well as the specific content of policy and project lending (e.g. how commonly were 
poverty reduction expenditure tracking systems and floors included in policy 
programmes, and how commonly were ‘paper trails’ to record the poverty reduction 
impact of particular projects established?). At the national sub-national levels, the 
evolution of government and non-official developmental discourse could be tracked 
over time, as are visible through, for example, speeches, documents, and newspaper 
                                                     
32 For more information see Kibuka (2007). The increasing use of these expenditure floors was also 
noted by Ulrich Jacoby, Senior Economist in the Office of Technical Assistance Management, in an 
interview with the author, November 2008. 
33 See Burke 2010. 
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archives. Indeed, records of consultations carried out around the formation and review 
of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers could provide a valuable source of such data.  
The case studies around which to frame such an analysis of the Bank and Fund 
and the construction of developmental governance space require careful selection. 
The aim of the case studies would be to generate a rich understanding of 
developments within particular national contexts, and the extent to which cases 
chosen could be claimed as typical or representative would be low. However, as a 
‘first  cut’,  aggregated  data  on  references  to  the Millennium Development Goals  or 
poverty reduction by key government ministers in a cohort of low-income countries 
could be generated, and the outliers investigated. Indeed, examples such as the 
Guyanese case referred to above, in which the government openly and explicitly 
rejected the language  of  ‘poverty  reduction’  within  its  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy 
Paper, provide a self-selecting sample group with which to study conflicts between 
the international- and domestic-level standards of appropriateness in the field of 
development. However, case study selection would also rely on the expertise of 
investigators and co-investigators, and a range of practical considerations, including 
for example the availability of official and non-official archives through which to 
track evolving discourses, would also need to be carefully considered. 
The World Bank and IMF appear to be providing increasing levels of material 
resources and information to enhance global poverty reduction. However, it remains 
to be seen whether the pre-existing operational goals that underpin the activities of 
these complex bureaucratic organisation serve ultimately  to  restrict domestic actors’ 
capacity for autonomous action. And beyond the World Bank and IMF, a broader 
multilateral alliance continues to re-position poverty reduction as the core 
problematique of global governance. The 2002 UN Conference on Finance for 
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Development provided the impetus for a concerted push on this front. The agreement 
reached at the Conference (commonly referred to as the Monterrey Consensus) laid 
out the responsibilities of low-income country governments to ensure that 
development funds were used effectively, chief amongst which was the enhancement 
of their capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of aid flows (UNCFD 2003: 4-5). 
The Paris21 Consortium provides one of the institutional supports of the Monterrey 
Consensus. Paris21 works to coordinate a range of IOs (including the World Bank, 
IMF, UN, and OECD) around the improvement of low-income  countries’  poverty-
reduction related statistical capacity. Owing to the scale of these activities, there is a 
pressing need to evaluate their impact on the domestic governance space of low-
income countries. How poverty reduction is defined and measured will remain a 
controversial issue at the top of the developmental agenda through the opening decade 
of the twenty-first century; by examining the role of the Bank and Fund in the 
construction of developmental governance space in a rigorous and methodologically 
innovative manner, it will be possible to bring a degree of analytic tractability to the 
subject. 
 
This thesis has aimed to clarify the conceptual tools at the disposal of analysts of 
international organisations, and to contribute to our knowledge of the contemporary 
dynamics surrounding the shareholder and stakeholder accountability relationships at 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. By adopting a morphogenic 
conceptualisation of change, I formulated an innovative method of integrating the 
core components of the rationalist and constructivist approaches to IOs. This analytic 
framework underpinned the structure of the main body of the thesis, and helped to 
generate the key insights therein. In relation to the politics of shareholder 
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accountability, it was shown that important differences between the Bank and the 
Fund, including notably the degree of shareholder unity, led to the emergence of a 
‘positive  feedback  cycle  of  IO monitoring’  at  the  former,  and  a  ‘negative  feedback 
cycle’  at  the  latter.  In  relation  to  the  politics  of  stakeholder  accountability, it was 
shown that change to the mechanisms through which the IOs interact with low-
income country populations occur incrementally, in response to both periods of crisis 
and deeper institutional learning processes. Important developments were seen to be 
occurring at the Bank and the Fund, regarding both their attempts to reform domestic 
level accountability structures and to reform the mechanisms through which they 
engage directly with these populations. Finally, by exploring the scope for a cross-
pollination of ideas between the insights into the politics of accountability at the 
World Bank and IMF and works advocating cosmopolitan global governance, an 
outline was presented of a potentially fruitful avenue of future research. 
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Annex 1 – Interviewees  
Interviews were undertaken during a three-month period as a Visiting Research 
Scholar at American University, Washington DC, between November 2008 and 
January 2009. As the central argument for Chapter Two had been established through 
a detailed analysis of primary documents and databases in advance of this period, the 
interviews were used predominantly to gather data in relation to Chapters Three, Four, 
and Five. A small number of interviews were conducted in order to triangulate and 
corroborate the analysis within Chapter Two. 
Interviewees were selected using two sampling methods, which can be broadly 
classified as inductive and deductive. Deductively, following an extensive analysis of 
both primary and secondary sources, I sought to contact individuals whose positions 
suggested that they would be able to provide valuable insights into key subjects of 
interest. At the IMF, I focused in particular on staff within Executive Directorates, 
staff who were publicly connected to political economy work (for example, as authors 
of relevant Working Papers), staff connected with statistical capacity building, and, 
because of the uniquely panoramic nature of the department, staff within the IEO. At 
the World Bank, I focused in particular on staff within the Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management (PREM) Network. Inductively, once the interview process 
had  begun  I  adopted  the  ‘snowball’  technique,  and  at  the  end  of  most  interviews 
solicited suggestions for follow-up interviewees. In ‘elite’ organisations like the Bank 
and Fund, where access is commonly problematic to negotiate, this latter technique 
was particularly fruitful. 
The data collected during interviews was used as corroborative information, 
confirming the existence of dynamics that were also visible in primary documents, 
databases, and secondary literature. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the most useful 
 
 
aspect  of  interviews  was  interviewees’  suggestions  of  documents  and  reports  for 
further reading. To give some illustrative examples of the confirmatory nature of 
interview data,  interviewees’  discussions  of  the  dynamics  surrounding  the  intra-
shareholder disputes at the IMF were supported by the insights within IEO reports and 
archival  records  of  Executive  Board Minutes,  and  interviewees’  discussions  of  the 
importance of sub-groups  within  PREM  to  the  ‘governance  agenda’  at  the  World 
Bank reflected the findings of leading contemporary literature on the organisation 
(e.g. Weaver 2008, Bebbington et al 2004).  
With the exception of two interviews conducted over the telephone, interviews 
were conducted at  interviewees’ places of work.  Interviews had an average duration 
of approximately one hour and were conducted in an informal manner, either in 
personal offices or in on-site cafeteria at the Bank or Fund. By conducting loosely 
structured interviews, I was able to collected in-depth  data  about  subjects’ 
interpretations of relevant dynamics within the organisations. As the data collected 
through  the  interviews  was  not  intended  to  provide  ‘stand  alone’  evidence  of 
developments within the organisations, the commonly stated drawbacks of the loosely 
structured interview method – particularly the inapplicability to coding and 
comparison – was not a salient issue when considering research design.1 Overall, the 
success of the research process was significantly enhanced by the relative length of 
my period as a Visiting Research Scholar at American University. Over the course of 
the three months, a combination of the deductive and inductive methods of 
interviewee selection allowed for individuals within a range of departments to be 
contacted, and for a ‘saturation point’ to be reached from which the marginal value of 
                                                     
1 On the strengths and weaknesses of the interview method, see Miller and Salkind (2002: 309-21). 
 
 
additional interviews began to rapidly decrease.2 I concluded the research visit to 
Washington DC with an extended period of time in the IMF Archive, which served to 
uncover a substantial volume of powerful supporting documentary evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 On saturation point, see Guest et al (2006). 
 
 
Name Position Date of 
Interview 
BERNES, Tom Director, IMF Independent Evaluation Office 4 / 11 / 08 
CARVALHO, Sonja Economist, World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 
10 / 11 / 08 
CHELSKY, Jeff Senior Economist, World Bank International Policy 
and Partnership Group 
14 / 11 / 08 
DEVARAJAN, 
Shanta 
Chief Economist, World Bank Africa Department 21 / 11 / 08 
DOBSON, Chad Executive Director, Bank Information Group 10 / 11 / 08 
EELE, Graham Senior Statistician, World Bank Development Data 
Group 
10 / 09 / 08 
HEATH, Daniel US Alternate Executive Director, IMF 10 / 12 / 08 
HICKLIN, John Deputy Director, IMF Independent Evaluation Office 19 / 11 / 08 
JACOBY, Ulrich Senior Economist, IMF Office of Technical 
Assistance Management 
07 / 11 / 08 
KIBUKA, Robin Advisor, IMF Statistics Office 09 / 12 / 08 
KOFFI ALLE, 
Marcellin 
Senior Advisor to Africa Group II Executive Director, 
IMF 
13 / 11 / 08 
KUMAR, Anjali Economist, World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 
06 / 11 / 08 
LALIBERTE, Lucie Director, IMF Statistics Department 09 / 12 / 08 
LUNDSAGER, Meg US Executive Director, IMF 10 / 12 / 08 
MAJORO, Moeketsi Africa Group I Alternate Executive Director, IMF 13 / 11 / 08 
MARTYN, Jan Kees Deputy Division Chief, PRGF Operations Division of 
the Policy Review Department, IMF 
21 / 11 / 08 
MEROTTO, Dino Uganda Country Economist, World Bank 02 / 12 / 08 
 
 
MOURMOURAS, 
Alex 
Senior Economist, IMF Institute 12 / 12 / 08 
MOZZAMEL, 
Masud 
Senior Communications Officer of the Development 
Communications Division, World Bank 
05 / 12 / 08 
NALLARI, Raj Lead Economist of the Poverty and Growth 
Programme, World Bank Institute 
03 / 11 / 08 
NARDIN, Simonetta Senior External Relations Officer, IMF 11 / 11 / 08 
NDYAMBU, 
George 
First Secretary, US Embassy of the Republic of 
Uganda 
11 / 12 / 08 
NYAMBAL, 
Eugene 
Senior Advisor to Africa Group II Executive Director, 
IMF 
13 / 11 / 08 
RUTAYISIRE, 
Laurean 
Africa Group II Executive Director, IMF 13 / 11 / 08 
SANFORD, Jon Senior Researcher, Congressional Research Service 17 / 11 / 08 
STILWELL, Amy External Affairs Media Manager, World Bank 24 / 09 / 08 
THORNTON, Joe Advisor to UK Executive Director, IMF 19 / 11 / 08 
UKPONG, Godwill Senior Advisor to Africa Group I Executive Director, 
IMF 
13 / 11 / 08 
VOORBRAAK, 
Doris 
Senior Public Sector Management Specialist of the 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network, World Bank 
25 / 11 / 08 
WILHELM, Vera Senior Economist, World Bank Poverty Reduction 
Group 
20 / 11 / 08 
 
 
